Das Problem des Problems in den Phänomenologische Werkstatt-Notizen von Eugen Fink

From a scholarly perspective, it may seem plausible to assume that certain ‘questions’ or ‘problems’ in philosophy exist independently, can be readily found in canonical texts, and are continuously carried forward. Eugen Fink and Gilles Deleuze clearly challenge this assumption. Both share an interest in a conception of philosophical problems according to which such problems must not only be constituted but are also what enable philosophical thinking to ground itself and formulate its own positions. To demonstrate this, I will primarily reconstruct Fink’s conception of the problem as it develops in the context of Husserlian phenomenology and, critically, in contrast to it – particularly as presented in the volumes of the Phänomenologische Werkstatt drawn from his unpublished writings. Building on this, and drawing further on Fink’s texts, I argue for a conception of philosophy shaped by a reconfiguration of the transcendental relations among Being, Truth, World, and the Good – characterized by a fundamental openness and plurality. I will then place this perspective in dialogue with Deleuze’s position, briefly highlighting some profound similarities between the two thinkers. Finally, I will show that Deleuze’s notion of problem-thinking brings into focus an additional aspect that is especially relevant to the ‘plurality’ of problems.