Pour une théorie intégrée du jugement : La validité universelle subjective du jugement de goût

This paper discusses the notion of judgment by Kant and the possibility to understand the validity of the judgment of beauty, which Kant claims to be subjective and universal at the same time. The problem arises because in the Critique of pure reason Kant says that the judgment is “the manner in which given cognitions are brought to the objective unity of apperception” (B141). Now, if all judgments do possess objective validity, then the judgment of beauty cannot be a judgment according to Kant’s theory. In order to solve this incongruence, firstly we will consider the possible judgment definitions in the Critique of pure reason, and we will observe that although a certain notion of objective validity (insofar as it stands for the property of possessing a value of truth) cannot be assigned to all judgments, another notion of objectivity is indeed kept as characteristic of judgments in general. Secondly, we proceed to explain what Kant understands as the foundation of the judgment of beauty, namely the disinterested pleasure. Finally, we discuss how a certain approach to the notion of objectivity, which can be expressed by the necessary relation to an object (conceived in the broad sense), does not prejudice the possibility of a subjective and universal judgment.