L’interpretation phénoménologique du perspectivisme de Nietzsche et ses limites

The aim of this article is to explain the general aspects of the phenomenological interpretation of Nietzsche’s perspectivism, as well as to point out some of its limits. In the first section, we explain the terms of the debate on perspectivism in the Nietzsche-Forschung, with emphasis on the problem of the reference to becoming in Nietzsche. Afterward, we show the alternative phenomenological interpretation of perspectivism proposed by Granier, whose general idea is that, through a connection between the nietzschean concept of perspective and the husserlian concept of phenomenon, it would be possible to understand perspectivism as an avant la lettre formulation of phenomenology, that is, a pluralist ontology, whose basic thesis would be: being discloses itself under a perspectivistic way in the perspectives. Thus, proposes Granier, we would be authorized to quit the discourse on perspectivism in the name of a phenomenological hermeneutics. However, our critique stresses the deficit of Granier’s answer in regards to the problem of the becoming-reference in Nietzsche’s philosophy. The pluralist ontology, this discourse on becoming, would still be an insidious form of the language seduction (Verführung der Sprache).