Das intentionale Fühlen und der wertende Akt in der phänomenologischen Ethik Husserls und Schelers

E. Husserl’s reflections in Logical Investigations on “intentional feeling” and “non-intentional feeling” are significant in both his later ethical explorations and M. Scheler’s thought of ethics. The differentiation made by Husserl of non-objectifying acts such as feeling acts and objectifying acts such as presenting acts obviously bears the intent to differentiate theoretical reason from practical reason. In fact, the difference between Husserl and Scheler is not only embodied in the analysis of intentionality of feeling-acts, but also in their understanding of the position of intentional feeling-acts themselves and the relation it has with presenting acts, which relate to the position of a phenomenological ethics. Through the incorporation of the views of Husserl and Scheler, we find that the phenomenology of the intentional feeling-acts is not only the foundation of the material (non-formal) ethics of values in Scheler’s phenomenology, but also at least the constitutive foundation of the ethics of Husserl’s first orientation.