Acta Universitatis Carolinae Iuridica (AUC Iuridica) is a legal journal published since 1955, which presents longer essays as well as short articles on topics relevant for legal theory and international, European and Czech law. It also publishes works concerning current legislative problems.
Although intended primarily for domestic audience, AUC Iuridica is useful also for foreign experts, who can take advantage of summaries in foreign languages (English, German and French) and key words, which are systematically added to the main articles and essays.
The published articles are subject to peer reviews. If necessary, reviewed texts are sent back to the author for revision.
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The journal is archived in Portico.
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AUC IURIDICA, Vol 63 No 4 (2017), 123–135
Proč nepotřebujeme člověka při legislativním vymezení pojmu fyzické osoby?
[Why We Do Not Need a Human Being in the Legislative Definition of the Natural Person?]
Karel Beran
DOI: https://doi.org/10.14712/23366478.2017.26
published online: 20. 12. 2017
abstract
The aim of this article is to answer the question why we do not need “a man” in the legislative definition of a physical person. The author shows that in the Czech legal order we can identify two different possible approaches how to define according to the law what should be understood as a physical person. The first concept is based on a man to whom belong obligations and rights, while the latter concept is based on the ability to be a bearer of rights and obligations which belong not to a man, but to a physical or juristic person. The author believes that the second construction of a person is based on the pure legal science, which influenced precisely the construction of a person contained in the Civil Code of 1964 – this definition did not need “a man” to define the concept of a person.
keywords: osoba, fyzická osoba, právnická osoba, personifikovaný soubor norem, bod přičitatelnosti, Kelsen, Weyr
references (9)
1. <bez popisu>
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6. Matějka, J.: Pojem veřejnoprávní korporace. In: Sborník věd právních a státních, Praha 1929.
7. Sedláček, J.: Občanské právo československé. Všeobecné nauky. Brno 1931.
8. Thöndel A. K.: Stručný historický vývoj občanského práva na českém území. In Dvořák, J., Švestka, J., Zuklílnová, M. et al.: Občanské právo hmotné, svazek 1., Praha: Wolters Kluwer, 2013.
9. Weyr, F.: Základy filosofie právní. Brno 1920.
Proč nepotřebujeme člověka při legislativním vymezení pojmu fyzické osoby? is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
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ISSN: 0323-0619
E-ISSN: 2336-6478
