CZECH ECONOMIC REVIEW
CZECH ECONOMIC REVIEW
The Czech Economic Review (CER) presents original, rigorously peer-reviewed research in economics with solid microeconomic grounds. Coverage includes both theoretical and methodological articles (game theory, mathematical methods in economics) as well as empirical articles (political economy, institutional economics, and public economics). CER also encourages short communications (usually limited to 2,000 words) that provide an instrument for a rapid and efficient dissemination of new results, models and methods in the above mentioned fields of economic research. One of the primary purposes is to serve as a common ground for economists and political scientists who explore political economy from a formal perspective (positive political economy, public choice and social choice, political economics). Another goal is to attract key contributions of gifted European junior economists. The journal is indexed in international bibliographical databases Scopus, EconLit, EBSCO, RePEc, CEEOL, and Google DOAJ.
The Czech Economic Review is published by Charles University in Prague. The journal was founded in 2007 as a descendant to a traditional Czech-written outlet, Acta Universitatis Carolinae Oeconomica (AUCO). Three issues are published per volume. All articles and communications are available online free of charge. Printed copies can also be ordered.

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Editorial board

Contact:
e-mail auco@fsv.cuni.cz

Charles University in Prague
Faculty of Social Sciences
Institute of Economic Studies
Opletalova 26
110 00 Prague

Distribution:
see above

CZECH ECONOMIC REVIEW, Vol 2015 No 1 (2016), 169–183

Reciprocal Equilibria in Link Formation Games

Hannu Salonen

published online: 19. 09. 2016

abstract

We study non-cooperative link formation games in which players have to decide how much to invest in relationships with other players. A link between two players is formed, if and only if both make a positive investment. The cost of forming a link can be interpreted as the value of privacy. We analyze the existence of pure strategy equilibria and the resulting network structures with tractable specifications of utility functions. Sufficient conditions for the existence of reciprocal equilibria are given and the corresponding network structure is analyzed. Pareto optimal and strongly stable network structures are studied. It turns out that such networks are often complete.

keywords: link formation games; reciprocal equilibrium; complete network

157 x 230 mm
periodicity: 3 x per year
ISSN: 1802-4696
E-ISSN: 1805-9406

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