CZECH ECONOMIC REVIEW
CZECH ECONOMIC REVIEW
The Czech Economic Review (CER) presents original, rigorously peer-reviewed research in economics with solid microeconomic grounds. Coverage includes both theoretical and methodological articles (game theory, mathematical methods in economics) as well as empirical articles (political economy, institutional economics, and public economics). CER also encourages short communications (usually limited to 2,000 words) that provide an instrument for a rapid and efficient dissemination of new results, models and methods in the above mentioned fields of economic research. One of the primary purposes is to serve as a common ground for economists and political scientists who explore political economy from a formal perspective (positive political economy, public choice and social choice, political economics). Another goal is to attract key contributions of gifted European junior economists. The journal is indexed in international bibliographical databases Scopus, EconLit, EBSCO, RePEc, CEEOL, and Google DOAJ.
The Czech Economic Review is published by Charles University in Prague. The journal was founded in 2007 as a descendant to a traditional Czech-written outlet, Acta Universitatis Carolinae Oeconomica (AUCO). Three issues are published per volume. All articles and communications are available online free of charge. Printed copies can also be ordered.

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Editorial board

Contact:
e-mail auco@fsv.cuni.cz

Charles University in Prague
Faculty of Social Sciences
Institute of Economic Studies
Opletalova 26
110 00 Prague

Distribution:
see above

CZECH ECONOMIC REVIEW, Vol 2015 No 1 (2016), 184–201

Experimental Results about Linguistic Voting

Manzoor Ahmad Zahid, Harrie de Swart

published online: 19. 09. 2016

abstract

In this paper, we describe the results of experiments in which about 7000 voters in the Netherlands were asked in three different waves to give their most favored party and to give an evaluation on a scale of 0 till 10 of eleven major Dutch parties. We have applied five different voting rules to determine the number of seats each party would obtain in Parliament. Different from what one might think, in general voters had no problem to give an evaluation of eleven major Dutch parties. Interestingly, many voters gave the same evaluation to two or more parties, something they cannot do if they can only vote for one party. Although Majority Judgment has not been designed for a seat distribution in parliament, we describe two possible ways which enable such a distribution.

keywords: voting experiments; linguistic voting; plurality rule; range voting; approval voting; majority judgment; Borda majority count

157 x 230 mm
periodicity: 3 x per year
ISSN: 1802-4696
E-ISSN: 1805-9406

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