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AUC IURIDICA, Vol 69 No 2 (2023), 95–106
Google Android: Behavioural Theories of Harm in the Light of New Judgments and Regulatory Tools
Miroslav Jakab
DOI: https://doi.org/10.14712/23366478.2023.17
published online: 07. 06. 2023
abstract
This contribution takes a look at the recent Google Android judgement of the General Court as a case study of antitrust informed by behavioural economics – the study of not fully rational economic agents. It contrasts the General Court’s pragmatic approach to economic evidence to the U.S. Supreme Court’s willingness to delve into economic theory, where the latter can prove more of an obstacle to the development of behavioural antitrust. It further concedes that cases relying on behavioural theories of harm can prove to be less predictable from a legal standpoint. This, nevertheless, does not obviate older legal tests, which might just need to be reformulated as requiring an analysis of effects, in line with the General Court’s rhetoric on the necessity to avoid false convictions in such cases. Lastly, the contribution argues that the relevance of behavioural antitrust will not fade in its entirety with new regulatory tools addressing similar issues.
keywords: competition law; antitrust; theory of harm; behavioural economics; behaviouralism; Google Android
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Google Android: Behavioural Theories of Harm in the Light of New Judgments and Regulatory Tools is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
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