Phänomenologie als Methode und Fundamentalontologie als Phänomenologie

This paper addresses the problem of intentionality in phenomenology. We will demonstrate how the concept of intentionality as a methodological problem is implicit to every scientific investigation. Phenomenology is to be considered as scientific method and not as philosophical school. The particularity of this method is to investigate first its own implicit premises – to show its intentionality. We will try to show how Heidegger’s fundamental ontology is at the same time an investigation of the experience of being in the (in a) world, using the method of phenomenology, and by doing so, it is also an investigation of this method itself – because both elaborate the existential analysis as an analysis of intentionality. As Heidegger’s use of words is peculiar, in order to avoid metaphysical ballast, his terminology is different from Husserl’s terminology. We will try to show how Heidegger, in Being and Time, is coherent with Husserl’s ideas of a phenomenological assay concerning the dimension of intentionality as donation of meaning. Furthermore this paper indicates the importance the concept of intentionality will play in Merleau-Ponty’s reception of Heidegger’s work.