CZECH ECONOMIC REVIEW
CZECH ECONOMIC REVIEW
The Czech Economic Review (CER) presents original, rigorously peer-reviewed research in economics with solid microeconomic grounds. Coverage includes both theoretical and methodological articles (game theory, mathematical methods in economics) as well as empirical articles (political economy, institutional economics, and public economics). CER also encourages short communications (usually limited to 2,000 words) that provide an instrument for a rapid and efficient dissemination of new results, models and methods in the above mentioned fields of economic research. One of the primary purposes is to serve as a common ground for economists and political scientists who explore political economy from a formal perspective (positive political economy, public choice and social choice, political economics). Another goal is to attract key contributions of gifted European junior economists. The journal is indexed in international bibliographical databases Scopus, EconLit, EBSCO, RePEc, CEEOL, and Google DOAJ.
The Czech Economic Review is published by Charles University in Prague. The journal was founded in 2007 as a descendant to a traditional Czech-written outlet, Acta Universitatis Carolinae Oeconomica (AUCO). Three issues are published per volume. All articles and communications are available online free of charge. Printed copies can also be ordered.

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Editorial board

Contact:
e-mail auco@fsv.cuni.cz

Charles University in Prague
Faculty of Social Sciences
Institute of Economic Studies
Opletalova 26
110 00 Prague

Distribution:
see above

CZECH ECONOMIC REVIEW, Vol 2015 No 1 (2016), 135–154

Differential Game Approach for International Environmental Agreements with Social Externalities

Lina Mallozzi, Stefano Patri, Armando Sacco

published online: 19. 09. 2016

abstract

In this work we study an N-player differential game, in which positive social externalities affect the payoffs of the players when they make an agreement. We divide the N players in two homogeneous groups, N1 developed countries and N2 developing countries. For the latter, we consider a damage-cost function that evolves in time. We imagine the externalities as the possibility that bilateral or multilateral agreements of various nature are by-products of an International Environmental Agreement (IEA). After the determination of emissions solutions, we use the externalities to investigate whether it is possible to have a self-enforcing agreement on pollution emissions in the short run.

keywords: differential game; self-enforcing agreement; social externality; asymmetric players

157 x 230 mm
periodicity: 3 x per year
ISSN: 1802-4696
E-ISSN: 1805-9406

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