CZECH ECONOMIC REVIEW
CZECH ECONOMIC REVIEW
The Czech Economic Review (CER) presents original, rigorously peer-reviewed research in economics with solid microeconomic grounds. Coverage includes both theoretical and methodological articles (game theory, mathematical methods in economics) as well as empirical articles (political economy, institutional economics, and public economics). CER also encourages short communications (usually limited to 2,000 words) that provide an instrument for a rapid and efficient dissemination of new results, models and methods in the above mentioned fields of economic research. One of the primary purposes is to serve as a common ground for economists and political scientists who explore political economy from a formal perspective (positive political economy, public choice and social choice, political economics). Another goal is to attract key contributions of gifted European junior economists. The journal is indexed in international bibliographical databases Scopus, EconLit, EBSCO, RePEc, CEEOL, and Google DOAJ.
The Czech Economic Review is published by Charles University in Prague. The journal was founded in 2007 as a descendant to a traditional Czech-written outlet, Acta Universitatis Carolinae Oeconomica (AUCO). Three issues are published per volume. All articles and communications are available online free of charge. Printed copies can also be ordered.

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Editorial board

Contact:
e-mail auco@fsv.cuni.cz

Charles University in Prague
Faculty of Social Sciences
Institute of Economic Studies
Opletalova 26
110 00 Prague

Distribution:
see above

CZECH ECONOMIC REVIEW, Vol 2015 No 1 (2016), 74–90

Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and Implicit Contracts: Differences between Banks

Juha-Pekka Niinimäki

published online: 31. 03. 2016

abstract

This paper studies asymmetric information on banks, relationship lending and switching costs. According to the classic theory of relationship banking asymmetric information on borrower types causes an informational lock-in by borrowers: good borrowers are tied to their banks. This paper shows that an informational lock-in effect occurs even if borrowers are identical. Asymmetric information on banks generates an informational lock-in for borrowers. A borrower is tied to the initial bank even if it charges higher loan interest. The borrower is not ready to leave the bank and take a risk that the new bank proves to be even worse.

keywords: asymmetric information; banking; relationship lending; bank competition; switching costs

157 x 230 mm
periodicity: 3 x per year
ISSN: 1802-4696
E-ISSN: 1805-9406

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