CZECH ECONOMIC REVIEW
CZECH ECONOMIC REVIEW
The Czech Economic Review (CER) presents original, rigorously peer-reviewed research in economics with solid microeconomic grounds. Coverage includes both theoretical and methodological articles (game theory, mathematical methods in economics) as well as empirical articles (political economy, institutional economics, and public economics). CER also encourages short communications (usually limited to 2,000 words) that provide an instrument for a rapid and efficient dissemination of new results, models and methods in the above mentioned fields of economic research. One of the primary purposes is to serve as a common ground for economists and political scientists who explore political economy from a formal perspective (positive political economy, public choice and social choice, political economics). Another goal is to attract key contributions of gifted European junior economists. The journal is indexed in international bibliographical databases Scopus, EconLit, EBSCO, RePEc, CEEOL, and Google DOAJ.
The Czech Economic Review is published by Charles University in Prague. The journal was founded in 2007 as a descendant to a traditional Czech-written outlet, Acta Universitatis Carolinae Oeconomica (AUCO). Three issues are published per volume. All articles and communications are available online free of charge. Printed copies can also be ordered.

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Editorial board

Contact:
e-mail auco@fsv.cuni.cz

Charles University in Prague
Faculty of Social Sciences
Institute of Economic Studies
Opletalova 26
110 00 Prague

Distribution:
see above

CZECH ECONOMIC REVIEW, Vol 2015 No 1 (2016), 36–48

Participation and Solidarity in Redistribution Mechanisms

José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez, Josep E. Peris

published online: 19. 10. 2015

abstract

Following Bossert (1995), we consider a model where personal income depends on two different characteristics: skills and effort. Luttens (2010) introduces claims that individuals have over aggregate income and that only depend on the effort they exert. Moreover, he proposes redistribution mechanisms in which solidarity is based on changes in a lower bound on what every individual deserves according to these claims: the so-called minimal rights (O’Neill 1982). A debatable consequence in one of Luttens’ mechanisms is that “the poorest individuals might up with a negative income” (Luttens 2010); that is, this mechanism does not satisfy participation, which turns out to be incompatible with claims feasibility, under Luttens’ assumptions. We present a new solidarity axiom that is compatible both with participation and claims feasibility, and we provide a mechanism satisfying these properties and our new additive solidarity axiom. Moreover, our mechanism satisfies additional properties, as priority, or respect of minimal rights.

keywords: redistribution mechanism; minimal rights; solidarity; participation; claims feasibility

157 x 230 mm
periodicity: 3 x per year
ISSN: 1802-4696
E-ISSN: 1805-9406

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