La métaphysique comme métontologie. De Heidegger à Tengelyi

In this paper, I attempt to draw a parallel between László Tengelyi’s understanding of a “phenomenological metaphysics” (as it is expressed in his posthumous work, Welt und Unendlichkeit), and Heidegger ’ s project of a “metaphysics of Dasein”, developed in the aftermath of the publication of Being and Time. This undertaking is facilitated by Tengelyi’s constant references to this Heideggerian project. I propose a reconstruction of Tengelyi’s reading of Heidegger, insisting on the themes belonging to the “metaphysics of Dasein” that widen the scope (or even go against some fundamental assumptions) of the fundamental ontology of Being and Time. I show that Tengelyi’s “phenomenological metaphysics” and Heidegger’s “metaphysics of Dasein” share a central doctrinal commitment, namely that the proper object of metaphysics is the “world” and not the being.