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CRITICALLY HISTORICAL PHILOSOPHY OF SPORT AND ROUTINISTS: A METAPHILOSOPHICAL DILEMMA

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SUMMARY

This study presents some metaphilosophical notes about the use of concepts in philosophical reflection. In the first part of the paper, the concept of movement is exposed to the following dilemma. Is the concept, in its ideal form, a grasping of some true essence; or is it a more or less useful tool for our thinking and acting? The overwhelming majority of our philosophical tradition tends to choose the first possibility. If this is correct, we should be able to depict in an exact way the procedure for grasping the concept, and thus dispel our doubts.

In the second part of the paper, I shall attempt to show how and why this depiction is not persuasive in both of the most frequently used versions in sport philosophy – the phenomenological and the analytical traditions. The reason is that both of them share the same traditional background picture, i.e. the picture of “the True World”. I will try to show how this picture is the source of many problems in philosophical sport discourse.

The last part of the paper will suggest a new way of using the phenomenological and the analytical equipment, stressing the historicity of meanings and practices – a way in which we use concepts and analyses of them as tools for our thinking and acting. This helps us not to insert our prejudices or presuppositions into things, events and relations, and thus to solve (in Deweyan wording) problem situations intelligently.

Key words: metaphilosophy, philosophy of sport, phenomenology, analytical philosophy, critically historical philosophy of sport, movement

INTRODUCTION

If we ask the ordinary person what philosophers really do, they probably answer the question this way: “Nothing, they just play with words.” As philosophers, we can take the offensive and ask these troublesome amateurs: “What do you mean by the word ‘play’ or by the collocation ‘to play with words’? Since this is very important: “What we have in

mind when we use this or that word?” And then we can take the amateur’s attention away by the help of a long discussion on the difference between “play” and “game”, using the intricate equipment of lengthy philosophical quarrels.

However, what do we, philosophers, really do? Of course, we play with words. To play with words is our fate. (Cf. Deleuze, Guattari, 2001, pp. 19–75) Yet could we do more than that? Do our deeds have any important impact on our life? In last few months, I am not sure. This type of doubt makes me adopt the position of the ordinary person. I ask myself every day: Where is the change in my behavior or behavior of my colleagues or my students, caused by my researches or my teaching?

This hard question has urged me to probe into methods and outcomes of philosophy of sport. Doing this has disturbed me. The thing that I have often seen is playing with words. However, it is the professional “game” of routinists who know how to prove their own significance. I am sorry for this generalization; of course, there are some of sport philosophers in the Czech Republic for whom philosophy is a way of life. Nonetheless, I feel that there are some conventional features, which enable the routinists to pretend their importance. What I am going to criticize here are these routinists “working” in the field of sport sciences. For they pretend that they do philosophy and mask their intellectual impotence under clichés that philosophy abandoned in 1970s. However, they are able to use these clichés so easily and relatively successfully because of our tradition. The idea (or the myth) of the True World has preoccupied our Occidental thinking for a long time (at least from the time of Parmenides) and feeds our insatiable longing for certainty and power, coming from eternal knowledge. The power – not wisdom or the will to solve problems – is what attracts the routinists. Moreover, most of great recent phenomenologists or recent analytical philosophers have changed their approach. Therefore, the following words are not directed at phenomenologists or philosophical analysts, but at the routinists in the field of philosophy of sport, especially at the routinists in the Czech Republic. When I am opposing phenomenologists and analytical philosophers, I am opposing only the phenomenology and the analysis as they were misused by the routinists. Readers must bear this in mind so as not to miss the point.¹

THE WORD “MOVEMENT”

In contemporary Czech philosophy of sport, there are two main approaches: phenomenology and analytical philosophy, by the help of which philosophers (or “philosophical kinanthropologists”²) solve their questions. Nevertheless, the philosophers (or the kinanthropologists) use tools of these philosophies superficially and, therefore, they remain unaware of the structural limits that any philosophy must have, and thus they convert the instruments of thinking into primitive dogmas.

¹ I would like to express words of thanks to the unnamed reviewer of the previous version of my article that reminded me of what my main goal is, i.e. the routinists, not the whole phenomenological or analytical tradition. And I thank him also for other notes that made my text much better. Moreover, I am deeply grateful to Irena Martínková and Jim Parry for their kind help.

² This is that strange brand of saints who love much more to blather on human movement than to love wisdom in their movement, life style or discourses.

The old versions of the above-mentioned philosophies proceeded in quite opposite directions. While phenomenology attempted to reconstruct the wholeness of human life from its pieces (the “noematic contents”, “noemas”), because the pieces were thought of as being the only things that are accessible to our purified consciousness, an analytical philosopher tried to analyze our intricate and dim understanding of the world into clear and precisely defined concepts. In spite of the difference, both of them were grounded in the very old idea that the True World exists and, after all, we could know it or touch it by our cognitive capacity. Of course, we needed to have at our disposal one thing only – the right method. And it was the method, in which the philosophies differed.

In the case of phenomenology, the method was an exposition of the transcendental subjectivity in our experience. In the case of analyticism, the method meant to reveal the true meanings of concepts under the veil of the ordinary languages or pseudo-languages of our mental states. Both approaches, consciously or unconsciously, relied on “the true world picture” – we can call it “the true meanings” or “the objective parts” or “the true structures” etc. These, of course, are hidden from the unpracticed sight of the ordinary person. This is the heart of Occidental way of thinking. It had its great ethos, which suggests that there are but a few humans who can touch the True World. This ethos plays with the truism that gifted, educated and practiced people could find the best ways, and mingling it with the belief that we could differentiate whether or not these people uncovered the right structure of the world.

Since the second part of the ethos is unpersuasive for me more and more, I would like to see philosophy as a wise servant of human lives instead of seeing it as a holy discipline. That is why I want to point out some deficiencies of the above mentioned approaches in philosophy of sport. Doing this, I choose the two examples of musing on movement. Please, keep in mind that both authors are not routinists about which I wrote above.

My first example is an example of the phenomenological stance. Four years ago, Ivo Jirásek published his book *Philosophical Kinanthropology* (Jirásek, 2005). The title can be confusing for colleagues who do not know the background of sport philosophy in the Czech Republic. In the near past, kinanthropology was elevated as an official discipline that integrates all researches and teachings concerning sport, movement activities, and the human body. Naturally, Czech sport philosophers are enticed to define the still dimly defined field of kinanthropology. In this book, Jirásek enters the debate and tries to move from preferring physical education to preferring movement activities. Thus he puts the emphasis on the wholeness of sport and other bodily activities, and shows in this way that movement should be a key concept not only in the philosophy of sport. That is the reason why he needed to define the concept of “movement” precisely.

As a good philosophical scholar, he starts by returning to history, but unfortunately to the history of Occidental philosophy only. He unsurprisingly mentions Parmenides and Zeno, and then he raises Heraclitus against them. The story is crowned by a synthesis of Plato and of Aristotle. The two names might prove that movement has to be understood holistically. Then he warns us against reading movement in its corporeal dimension only, because there are other dimensions – psychic, social and spiritual. As an instance of a philosopher who had worked out his late philosophy upon the background of all movement dimensions, he mentions Jan Patočka, whose concept of “life movement” stems from instinctively-affective movement, goes through movement as coping with

reality, and ends in movement as a spiritual breakthrough into individual conscious life in which the human being faces absurdity and awareness of death. Mentioning Patočka, the holistic approach to movement is certified by a great name, and thus we might accept Jirásek's final definition of movement without question. The definition says: "... *Movement as well as body is a multisignificant symbol enabling its various interpretations...*" (Jirásek, 2005, pp. 102–111).

However, the definition begs an answer of the following questions: After accepting it, do I understand movement better than before? How does this "multisignificant symbol" help me to solve problems of the contemporary sport or active relaxation? Is not the definition too wide? After all, this conception suggests that movement is everything – movement is running as well as the falling of a stone in the gravitational field, or square move in chess, or the idea of a chess player, or a thought of a great philosopher or – going back to more corporeal features – even weeding in the garden.

An analytical philosopher, of course, would not be enthusiastic about this phenomenological analysis and its outcomes. He would proceed in an opposite direction. He would take some the ordinary person's preunderstandings, or the preunderstandings of a phenomenologist, and begin to purify them by close analyses of words.

Recently, I read an interesting book by David Best, named *Philosophy and Human Movement* (1978). As the title suggests, the book is devoted to movement. Best is a very clever author and I have found many important insights into the "nature" of movement in his book. His trenchant criticism points at phenomenological misconceptions (not only) of movement. For example, he criticizes the tendency to defined movement as an all-embracing concept. To pick some examples of this vice, he quotes from J. Russell's *Creative Dance in the Secondary School*: "... We live in a world of movement: the whole universe is in constant motion, all living things are in a state of gradual evolution and growth. There is ebb and flow in water and wind..." (Best, 1978, p. 26) and from M. North's *Introduction to Movement Study and Teaching*: "... In the seemingly static as in the obvious mobile, the same kinds of laws of movement operate – at the macrocosmic level as well as microcosmic and at the material level as well as the nonmaterial..." (Best, 1978, p. 27).

Also, Best criticizes the strict separation of experienced movement and conceptualized movement, which is so typical for phenomenological arguments. He shows that this step is based on a presupposition – odd, but internalized by our tradition – that experience and language are two completely different things. In his counter-arguments, he points out the fact that language cannot be wholly idiosyncratic. That is why there is some "objective" (let me say "intersubjective") logic, which establishes the meanings of words or, more precisely, the meanings of their interdependent structure. Then he connects this idea with the next one: It is completely mindless to see language or conceptualization and reality as two distinct phenomena, and thus to understand experienced movement to be a symbol of reality. "[H]uman movement does not *symbolise* reality, it *is* reality" (Best, 1978, p. 137).

Nonetheless, Best does not provide us with any definition of movement. His brilliant work is the work of criticism only. Actually, he admits it in the following passage: "My point is that although it may not be possible to produce a definition of the meaning of the term 'movement' ... that does not prevent our having a fairly clear idea of what are the concerns of a department of human movement or human kinetics..." (Best, 1978, p. 35).

Take, please, these two examples as a synecdoche *pars pro toto*, which should outline the main features of the two philosophical approaches. As we can see, we cannot use either. Neither Jirásek's nor Best's way could provide us with a precise definition of the word. The first approach to movement generalized the concept in such a way that movement started to be almost everything and thus made from movement a symbol whose meaning could express everything else. (This principle worked in Fink's analysis of play, which at the end of his text received the role of the symbol of our whole world. See Fink, 1988, pp. 145–157) The second approach analyzed the concept and criticized the opponent's propositions so deeply that nothing remains in our hand. However, the second approach could be seen as a very good starting point for further analyses and definitions because it shows us by which words we cannot, and why we could not, define "movement". It is paradoxical that both approaches need each other in order not to drown in its own one-sidedness.

In the next section, let me point out the common features of the two philosophies, thus revealing their vices, and offer a different – and hopefully more useful – approach.

THE VICES REVISED

Both of the above-mentioned philosophical approaches have done very much work in the field of sport philosophy. However, they have not helped us to understand sport as well as movement much better than before. Especially in Czech kinanthropology, these two approaches work with intellectual equipment that was reasonable in 1970s when there were not useful and efficacious criticisms to help the approaches to transform their one-sidednesses. In fact, Czech sport philosophers or "philosophical kinanthropologists" have not been aware enough of this fact. That is the reason why I am depicting their one-sidednesses and showing the alternative in the next section.

Now, I am repeating some very well-known points. Please, keep in mind that I will simplify the philosophies. Since our aim here is not to provide exhausting criticism of phenomenologists or analytical philosophers, but to point out the basic structures of both philosophies and thus to show why the philosophers (kinanthropologists) analyzing the phenomenon of sport and using the philosophies without critical stance have failed.

Husserl, guided by his teacher Brentano, recognizes that the main structure of experience is given by "intentionality". It means that if we speak, if we think we speak about *something*, we think of *something*. Our language as well as our any mental activity is aimed at something. For phenomenologists of the Husserlian cast of mind, it is important that these intentional "objects" – they call them "*noemas*" – create their own structure and if we are able to analyze the structure we could say something crucial about human thinking and their experience. According to Husserl, we could do what Descartes and Kant wanted to, but failed. We could find not only borders and limits of our reason, but primarily borders and limits of all human experiences.

At his second phase, Husserl wanted to progress his theory. He believed that thanks to a careful phenomenological analysis, we could find the true structure of the world in our personal, subjective experience or consciousness. We have no time to introduce the main principles of the analysis, let me note only that according to Husserlians, twofold

“bracketing” of our experience (*epoché* and *phenomenological reduction*) we could allegedly find the *lifeworld* (*Lebenswelt*). It is the “world”, which is not disrupted by theories of sciences as well as by misuses of everyday, indigested life. It is our original world. Therefore, according to the main branch of phenomenologists, we could find the true meanings of all our concepts if we analyze them through this ideal human world.

I admit that there are many important things, which come from phenomenological analysis. On the other hand, I am suspicious when phenomenology starts to find the true meaning of concepts, especially of sport concepts. If we open one of the most respected text on philosophy of play – Eugen Fink’s *The Ontology of Play* [by citations of this text, our philosophical kinanthropologists often support meaning of their books] – we find traditional equipment, a sort of mystical insights into the nature of play. I am summarizing the text to document it: Play is commonly connected with playing of child’s games, however, the true meaning of the concept we should seek only in play of the adult people (Fink, 1988, pp. 147–148). In play, adults suspend everyday world and create “the world of play” (pp. 152–154). Human life is characterized by these constants – physicality, work, and death. We are fragile because of our physicality and that is why we have to work in order to avoid our death. Yet, there is one more constant – “play”. Play is completely different from the three preceding constants. It is an oasis of our life. It has its purpose in itself. It frees us from tragic character of life. Play gives us “present time”. In contrast to the time when we are playing, in the time of everyday providing we have to think about the future or in a mode of future; we do not live in the present. Thus play constitutes fullness of human life (pp. 148–150). However, if we set play in this way, every activity of play, which mixes play with concerns of everyday life, is an adulteration of play (p. 149).

There are nice passages on play in Fink’s text. These speak about representational character of play. They illuminate one of the most important features of play; that is the fact play helps us to understand world. Play could symbolize our too complicated world, because it could serve as a simplified model of our world. Nonetheless, this conception of play is highly metaphorical and could hardly be the key definition of play, since a football match could be taken as mirroring world features, but it *is not* mirror of the world.

In the approach of analytical philosophers, we could find the same, or (more precisely) similar, purist approach to meanings of words. Elementarily, analytic philosophy attempts to find under our confused thoughts or under our confused language their true structure which reflects the true structure of our world. Let me note as an example the well-known text of Bernard Suits.

In his paper *Words on Play*, Suits analyzes the concept of “play” and tries to differentiate the concepts “play” and “game”. He illustrates the distinction by the help of narratives from everyday life. As an analytical philosopher of ordinary language, he believes that the true shape of the world is coded in ordinary language. Therefore, analytical philosophers think, we can get to know the truth about the world through careful analyses of language. This is the reason why Bernard Suits used so many examples from everyday life. Here is one of them: “... ‘Johnny’, says Johnny’s mother, ‘stop playing with your mashed potatoes.’ It surely would be straining usage to conclude that Johnny is engaged in playing a game with his mashed potatoes ... If Johnny ... [was] playing games (and not simply playing), then presumably the following questions would be answerable: What are the goals of [the game]? What are the rules? What counts as winning? What counts as cheating?” (Suits, 1988, p. 19).

From this narrative a difference is apparent. Play (or playing) is an activity and at the same time an activity without rules. It is similar when we say, “she is playing with her hair”, there are no rules how to play with one’s own hair. It is an “autotelic activity”. (Cf. Suits, 1988, p. 19) “Autotelic” signifies here an activity that has no goal in advance. We play it for joy only. We play to lead our superfluous energy somewhere. It is the same as was said by what Huizinga and Fink.

In contrast, a game is a system of rules and, at the same time, an outcome of play – however, play which is led by rules. In other words, for constituting “game”, we need “play” (the spontaneous desire to do something for joy only) and the rules that we decide to obey.

You might be confused by this definition because it says, “a game arises where play starts to follow rules”. Does it mean that play ceases to be play and transforms itself completely into a game? It would be a strange, but coherent, explication. Play is free, unenforced, autotelic activity without constraints. However, the rules of a game are limitations, indeed. This confusion would pose this question: “Do the meanings of the words ‘play’ and ‘game’ overlap, or not?”, and, to be coherent, we should answer: “No, they do not. Having in mind that play ends where a game starts, there is no immediate connection between them.” However, many philosophers of sport would not agree with this. They want the autotelic and extraordinary character of play to be a component of meaning of the word “game”.

For example, Bernard Suits, at the end of his paper *Words on Play*, writes as if play would be a component of game. He introduces another narrative here – the story of a mixed doubles event (tennis), when Team A consists of a visitor from Utopia and a highly gifted amateur woman, and Team B consists of a woman tennis professional and a creature – a Grasshopper. The Grasshopper – moulded and named according to the ancient fable in which a grasshopper played the violin for such a long time that he eventually died – is willing to play the game endlessly until he dies. In the story, Suits wishes to point out that, excluding the amateur woman, the other three players are not playing, they ‘do’ the game only. The professional does the game for payment. The man from Utopia does the game because he cannot differentiate work time from leisure time, since in Utopia people are not urged to save their lives by work. The Grasshopper does the game as well because he spends his life for the game. The three are participating in the game, but they are not playing. In their activity, what is lacking is either the autotelic character (in the case of the professional) or the possibility of suspension of common day needs and demands (in both cases – the Utopia man and Grasshopper). According to Suits, the amateur woman is a *player* in the proper sense of this word and, at the same time, she plays *the game*. (Cf. Suits, 1988, pp. 24–25) So, we can see that, for him, play and game need not be in contradiction.

Why does he want (or need) to hold this strange position? In spite of its oddity, it is instructive to think about this attitude and its background. Why do Suits and other philosophers of his cast of mind want to preserve a close relation between play and game, although they have worked hard to define play as the wholly autotelic, free activity, which suspends the needs and demands of everyday life? The reason is, I think, that they want and need to connect the “advantages” of game, which has given rules beforehand, with the ethos of free, unforced play, which is not aimed at any profit except joy. They do it in

order to cohere their thoughts with their ideology of sport, adopted in advance of any empirical inquiry into the ancient or the contemporary sport. They make this step, although they violate their main principle and aim of inquiry, i.e. to determine one (the only true) concept. Actually, they work with more than one conception. In this case, for example, they work with two conceptions of the word “play”:

- play as the autotelic, unenforced activity; and
- play as the necessary component of game
- and then they “pragmatically” interweave them in accordance with their ideological needs.

In Suits’ work, we have found the same characteristics as in Huizinga’s (see for example: Huizinga, 1988, pp. 3–6) or Fink’s (1988, pp. 145–157) theories: Play is distorted if, during the play, people pursue other aims than the joy of play itself. Yet I cannot exclude from the class of playing people those who are professional athletes, or who are playing sport for their health, or for reason that during some play they can meet their friends and so on. These purist theories cannot help us to understand better such complicated phenomena as *play* or *sport* or *movement*, not to say the *moving human being*.

This all raises the question of whether some analysts or some phenomenologists (or kinanthropologists) really reveal the true world, or whether they create their own world with the help of their analyses and definitions. Whatever explanation is true in that case, there is the same background behind both different types of approaches. There are two kinds of presuppositions (I dare to say prejudices) that sport phenomenology and sport analytical philosophy share:

The true structure of the world is mirrored by the true structure of our language or of our consciousness; (in the case of analyticism, philosophers should carefully analyze the words or mental states to get to something immutable; in the case of phenomenology, philosophers should get into the structure of our consciousness by bracketing our world images (scientific or others) and only in this way can he reach *noemas*; in these *noemas*, the true world and the given structure of our consciousness meet each other).

Since the structures of the world as well as the right structure of our language or our consciousness are stable, timeless and ever-enduring, we do not need to use the historical point of view. Historical events have no impact on these eternal structures. That is why we meet only a synchronic attitude in both philosophies.

Of course, I simplify the story because in both camps there have been people who have started to introduce historical events and their consequences into synchronic plan of their studies. Recall Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Patočka on the one hand, and on the other Sellars, Davidson, or Putnam. However, most of the well-known philosophers of sport work in the synchronic space only and, for them, history is just a reservoir of examples, carefully chosen, selected and adjusted to their needs, so that they can use and thus “validate” their point of view before any serious research.

These presuppositions are new varieties of very old philosophical thoughts issuing from the time of Plato or Parmenides. However, how could we know that there is such a stable and timeless structure of our world? And even if it is out there, and it is stable and timeless, how could we know that our language or consciousness function as a mirror, which reflects the structure?

Yet, it is hard to find a warrantor for possible answers. Nonetheless, I am afraid that traditional phenomenologists as well as traditional analytists have been working in the wrong direction, and majority of philosophers of sport have used these blind alleys.

THE NEW STARTING POINT

What I propose here is an approach that could replenish moderate phenomenological and analytical attitudes. It is historically philosophical analysis and interpretation.

This approach studies carefully the historical differences not only of word meanings, but also of the practices that are connected with the meanings, and then it interprets the changes and their consequences in the social environment. The main meta-philosophical postulate of the approach is that there is no privileged reality that can be revealed. The only motivation is to find interpretations that could help us to understand complex problem situations that we need to solve. For example, we could study:

- what *gymnastics* means, exactly, in ancient Greece,
- with which social functions it was related,
- how they was related to other concepts (for example *kalokagathia*),
- how they were different from our contemporary understanding of these words (see for example: Šíp, 2008, pp. 13–24).

And thus we could understand what creates our contemporary ideology of sport and why this ideology keeps us from improvement of present-day sport machinery.

Or we could study conception of sport in the medieval times and compare it with our limited comprehension of that period. And by this way we could show what the collocation “free unforced development of games” could mean. For if we could meet a period when sports developed themselves freely without half-mafioso surveillance of various associations and organizations it was in medieval London. (See for example: Šíp, 2006, pp. 53–56)

With regard to movement, we could analyze different conception of movement in various periods. We could for example study why in the Middle Ages there was not any emphasis on movement as an inseparable part of sport. We should think hard why in the second half of the 18th century movement started to be an important topic in sport or physical education discourses. We should find the connection between the Early Modern time shift and our contemporary ideology of sport and conception of movement.

The historically philosophical approach could do these analyses or interpretations without throwing away the good things of analyticism or phenomenology. It analyzes the meanings of words and texts as well as analytists do, but it does not assert, in contrast to Suits, that by the help of this analysis it grasps the true world or the true structure. It uses the interesting and useful insights of phenomenology (for example, Fink’s conception of play as a symbol of the whole world), but it does not maintain that it is a part of a true *noema* of this phenomenon. It uses the insights as a good and helpful tool for interpretation. As an example, it could be done by using Patočka’s conception of “life movement” as a way of giving a new content to the (today empty) word *kalokagathia* (Martínková, 2008, pp. 53–62).

CLOSING WORDS

As should now be apparent, the here proposed philosophy cannot work with the term “truth” as incoherently as some of representatives of phenomenology or of analytical philosophy and almost all of the “philosophical kinanthropologists”. This approach has no image of knowledge as mirroring. It follows from the fact that there is no direct access to the only true structure of the world. Its analyses and interpretations are tools that are to help us in confused and complicated situations. I name the approach “critically historical philosophy” in order to put stress on importance of historical analyses of meanings and practices because the relation between meanings and practices could catch the changing features of reality and thus to provide us with tools for elimination or solving problems.

Unless it is a real help in our lives, philosophy remains only as playing with words. And in these circumstances, it would not be worth being a philosopher.

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KRITICKÝ HISTORICKÁ FILOZOFIE SPORTU A RUTINISTÉ: METAFILOZOFICKÉ DILEMA

RADIM ŠÍP

SOUHRN

Příspěvek se zamýšlí nad metodologickými přístupy typickými pro současnou filozofii sportu – především v ČR – přístupy analytickými a fenomenologickými. Činí tak zpočátku na příkladu pojmu „pohyb“. U obou z přístupů (především v české filozofii sportu, respektive ve „filosofické kinantropologii“) nachází obstarožní výbavu, typickou pro oba filozofické směry v 70. letech. Autor dále ukazuje na jejich absolutistické tendence, které současné filozofy sportu nutí „omílat“ dávno vyčpělá klišé, a promítat tak do současného pojetí sportu a pohybu předsudky typické pro moderní ideologii sportu. To je důvod, proč nám současná česká filozofie sportu nepomáhá pochopit přiměřeněji tento fenomén. Jako protiváhu ke zmíněným dvěma přístupům autor navrhuje

přístup kriticky historické filozofie. Ta je založena na přesvědčení, že musíme vždy pečlivě zkoumat historický a sociální kontext pojmů a praxí s nimi spojených, abychom měli v rukou kritické nástroje. Využívající je jako „komparativních objektů“, jsme schopni odhalit naše slepé skvrny, jež jsou utvářeny soudobými ideologiemi a které jsme – často nevědomě – internalizovali.

Klíčová slova: metafilozofie, filozofie sportu, fenomenologie, analytická filozofie, kriticky historická filozofie sportu, pohyb

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