

**PACHILLA, PABLO (ED.): POSNATURALISMOS,
RAGIF EDICIONES, INVESTIGACIONES
POSNATURALES, BUENOS AIRES 2023**

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Posnaturalismos is a compilation of essays in Spanish product of a collective investigation encouraged and financed by the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation of Argentina. They all reflect, as the book's title suggests, on how to rethink nature beyond the modern conceptions. "Postnaturalism" is not employed as a concept, as if adding "pos" to a scholastic term would immediately delineate a Promised Land or a new domain of application. Postnaturalism is an "index of certain directions", "a diversity of perspectives"¹ which aims to question the classic antinomies between 'nature and culture', 'nature and technic', 'nature and humanity', 'nature and history', 'nature and politics'. In the next paragraphs I will present the main ideas of each one of the essays compiled in *Posnaturalismos*.

In the Introduction, Pablo Pachilla presents the current philosophical scene. If in other times mathematics, theology or linguistics were crucial disciplines that had an essential relation with philosophy, it is now anthropology and biology what calls the philosophical reflection. On one hand, the "ontological turn" in anthropology disrupts the classical and western assumption that the world is *one* and the one that is *ours*. Concepts such as "perspectivism" and "cosmopolitics" show the potentiality of different epistemologies to say how worlds *really* are. On the other hand, the material condition of existence and the new biotechnologies described

¹ Pachilla, Pablo (ed.): *Posnaturalismos*, RAGIF Ediciones, Investigaciones posnaturales, Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires 2023, p. 7.

by the sciences of life has interested many current authors. As it is shown by feminist and queer theories, Pachilla remarks, such as the work of Donna Haraway, Paul B. Preciado, Helen Hester, that reality is biologically embodied does not mean that the body hides a fundamental and immutable truth in genes, sexual organs. Quite the contrary, as Catherine Malabou, Scott Gilbert, Jan Snapp, Alfred Tauber and Lynn Margulis argue, biologically speaking, we have never been individuals, but always holobionts produced by symbiotic bonds.

Pachilla suggests that there is no reason to believe that biology and anthropology circumscribe two clearly defined and detached fields. Ethology, vitalism and biosemiotics expand anthropology beyond the human. First, in von Uexküll's phenomenological *ethology*, animals and mites are no human subjects without whom there could be neither time nor space (although this biology, Pachilla notes, having surpassed anthropocentrism, can easily fall into zoocentrism and the ignorance of plants, minerals and molecules). Biocentrism, on the contrary, considers non-humans' experience and conceives life as immanent, singular, impersonal and pre-individual leading to a *materialistic vitalism* (such as the theorized by Freya Mathews, Rosi Braidotti, Jane Bennett and others). In third place, Eduardo Kohn goes from anthropology to biology by *biosemiotics* for which life is a kind of semi-otic process. Thus, he managed to cross the boundaries of anthropology, biology and ontology.

Pachilla shows then that both anthropology and biology do not describe worlds without perspective or without subjectivity. The death of the modern Subject is just the death of the human and western perspective as being the only one that could apprehend what reality is. Our current task is "to reinvent subjectivity"² in times of the Anthropocene.

The crucial question that Pachilla believes needs to be considered is whether this attention to non-humans, as highlighted by both biology and anthropology, can lead us to or motivate some kind of politics. Bennett sustains that there is no immediate relation between a theory of life and politics, but all the same she argues that whereas the image of matter as something dead and inert animate our aggressive consumption, a materiality experienced as a lively force with agentic capacity, on the contrary, could motivate the emerge of a more ecologically sustainable society. Kohn, assuming the modern empirical distinction between facts and values, thinks that there is no transition from nature to politics. Nonetheless, he considers himself to be a kind of representant of the entities that would be the true author of the thoughts he transmits. Pachilla suggests in his Introduction that

² *Ibid.*, p. 16.

this distinction resembles the Hobbesian distinction between author and actor. The problem here would be in taking oneself as the speaker in the name of Nature as a whole, the delegate of a transcendent non-human entity that would allow to exert influence on human affairs.

Agustina Marín revisits in the first essay the notion of Anthropocene, advanced by Paul Crutzen in 2000, and shows its limits and problems. Comparing Jason Moore's "Capitalocene" and Enrique Dussel's "Transmodernity", Marín criticizes the idea of a homogeneous humanity that would be the unique responsible for the current climate change. The notion of a common *anthropos* erases the existent asymmetries between different populations and prevents to ask who is precisely the alluded *anthropos* in the term "Anthropocene". Whereas Moore insists that the origin of capitalism draws back to the 15th century and does not lie in the Industrial Revolution of the 18th and 19th centuries, Dussel sets the beginning of modernity in the invasion of America begun in 1492. If modernity constitutes an excluded *other* within a naïve multiculturalism that oppresses and marginalizes, transmodernity characterizes the new moment of history in which there is a self-appraisal of the peripheral cultures. Transmodernity, in Dussel's terms, is a project that seeks to affirm a different tradition from modernity, that of the American indigenous people, because these cultures live with a different nature, a more ecological and respectful one.

Tadeo González Warcalde compares the notion of *world* in Heidegger and Latour. Not only do both authors seek to go beyond the modern dualism between subject and object, but also develop a relational ontology that conceives world as "significance". First, Bruno Latour is known for locating in Modernity the invention of the binomial Nature-Culture, which resulted in the radical demarcation between an objective field, studied by sciences, and a subjective field, dealt in politics. Thus, multiple non-human agencies were deanimated and inscribed in an inert material nature. Heidegger, for his part, also criticizes the cartesian dualism that opposes an isolated subject that observes an objectified reality. Heideggerian *Dasein* does not stand in front of the world but is *being-in-the-world*. The world is constituted in a network of things defined by the significance they have for the *Dasein* that employs them. For Latour, the world is also, in terms of González Warcalde, an existential space open to the future, in opposition to the modern rigid fixation of entities. But whereas *Dasein*, according to Heidegger, is the only entity that articulates the world's significance, significance is for Latour a propriety of every agency. This is why González Warcalde concludes that even though Heidegger remains in a sense modern, the Latourian concept of world may be seen as an inheritance from Heidegger's phenomenology since both notions of world

describe an always open space that can be reconfigured, expanded or destroyed. The New Climatic Regime, by showing the agency of multiple non-human entities, clearly revokes the ontological privilege granted to *Dasein*.

Esteban Cobasky analyses the different kinds of thoughts portrayed in Eduardo Kohn's *How Forests Think* in relation with the idea of *emergence* as it is conceived by Terrence Deacon. The identification of life and semiosis, based on the premise that all beings think, and all thought is alive, leads in Kohn to the concept of a *living thought*, which is for Cobasky the central idea in *How Forests Think*. This is where Kohn's life ontology nourishes from the dynamic emergence described by Deacon. Indeed, if there is a disjunction between the properties of the substrate and those of the emergent process, for Kohn there is also a material and energetical continuity of substrate and process. The spontaneous emergence of new properties does not imply an unexplained discontinuity; on the contrary, for Deacon the dynamics of emergence involves a continuous process of transformation. There is also in Kohn, Cobasky notes, a *problematizing thought* that arises from a commotion, intervention or problem, that in times of the Anthropocene expresses itself in the question "how to survive". Lastly, if human thought faces an impossibility to think the non-human and to go beyond symbolic thought, there is, Cobasky concludes, the possibility to rethink icons and to learn to think with images thus facing the problem of our current time by creating the conditions for new kinds of thought. Kohn sets apart from the Western modern tradition that upholds the dualism between nature and culture, social human constructions and objective stuff. The problem is not, writes Cobasky, that human thought remains symbolic and differentiates signs from the world itself, but that thought is reduced to human thought: non symbolic and non-human thought is denied by the modern tradition.

German Di Iorio compares the animal gaze in the anthropologies of Philippe Descola and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro. The Amerindian perspectivism described by Viveiros de Castro considers that many non-human beings have an interior human subjectivity seen in their embodiment by other species as non-human. There is then a shared humanity between many animals that lies in the subjective perspective from which the world is seen. This does not imply, Di Iorio warns us, a multiculturalism that would sustain a common and unique nature represented in different cultural views. On the contrary, for the Amerindian cosmology studied by Viveiros de Castro, it is culture what is constant and nature what is multiple: it is not that the same thing is seen as different, but that different things are seen in the same way. This is why the Amerindian ontology described by Viveiros de Castro holds both a metaphysical continuity that results in an animism (that is,

a real equivalency between the relations that human and non-human have with themselves) and a physical discontinuity, that results in perspectivism. For Di Iorio this shows that animism is anthropomorphic, but perspectivism is theriomorphic. In his early works, Descola had described animism as a cultural human projection upon nature, thus presupposing a radical metaphysical discontinuity between human and non-humans. But, as Di Iorio suggests, even after having reconceptualized animism based on the objections raised by Viveiros de Castro, the anthropological project of Descola still is incompatible with the Amerindian perspectivism of Viveiros de Castro. Against the perspectivism of Viveiros de Castro where non-humans see us as predators or prey, for Descola the animal sees us as human, that is, with the same corporeality with which it sees itself. Descola considers that perspectivism is just a type of a general animism, but for Viveiros de Castro, as Di Iorio remarks, this classification obsession only manages to remove the political disruptive potential of perspectivism. Indeed, if everyone is potentially human for themselves, then humanity cannot be peacefully shared with the other. Quite the contrary, a cosmopolitical conflict appears. Descola ends up presupposing, Di Iorio sustains, that there is a humanity-in-itself and an animality-in-itself where I and not-I, human and non-human are clearly distinguishable. But for Viveiros de Castro everyone is at the same time human and non-human. Di Iorio concludes that Descola's animism cannot contemplate the theriomorphism inherent to perspectivism.

Georgina Bertazzo takes up the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari and analyses assisted reproductive technologies. First, Bertazzo shows that the difference between what is alive, and machines lies not in the nature of the elements, but in the relations that are assembled. Each body, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is defined by the assemblages, attachments and twists that it may establish with other bodies. Thus, the organ-machine is not a mechanic and stable functioning; on the contrary, it ignores fixed structures by configuring everything according to the flux of connections. Bertazzo then asks if it is certain that technologies only oppress the body. There are indeed other ways to think the reappropriation of biotechnological developments. Bertazzo suggests that with the Argentinian laws of Equal Marriage and of Medically Assisted Reproduction, different technologies were placed at the service of marginalized bodies, especially of those belonging to the LGTBIQ+ community, whose parenting wishes were until now ignored. Bertazzo shows that with assisted reproductive technologies it is evident that the differences between machine and human are no longer clear at all. The author concludes that the potency of a biotechnological reappropriation lies in the possibility of creating a more affirmative life and new ways of assembling bonds.

Gonzalo Santaya and Randy Haymal both provide contributions to rethink capitalism with the theories of Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari and Jason Moore. Gonzalo Santaya focusses on the Deleuzian-Guattarian notion of capitalist surplus value and on Moore's distinction between exploitation and appropriation. Santaya aims to rethink the theory of value beyond human relations of production and to consider the non-quantifiable dimensions that constitute the core of the capitalist system. The author shows how the relation between wealth and wage labor is a necessary but insufficient condition to explain capitalism. Santaya starts then by presenting the "essence" of capitalism as a differential relation between fluxes: surplus value is not then a certain quantity that could be counted and assigned to a determined magnitude, but a surplus value *of flux*. The capitalist valorization is, Santaya suggests, eminently *relational*. However, the theory of value must not only consider the exploitation and the socially necessary labor time, but also the appropriation that renders nature available and disposable with the minimum of cost (such as care work performed historically by women, slave work, and animal work). Those are capital flow-producing forces historically foreign to the wage sphere, being nonetheless crucial for the sustaining of production and exchange.

Randy Haymal Arnes aims to develop the ontological proposals of Moore, Deleuze and Guattari, and to show their confluence. Haymal suggests that whereas ecological issues are absent in *Anti-Oedipus*, Moore doesn't relate subjectivation and desire with capitalism. Nonetheless, Moore and Deleuze-Guattari assume an ontological monism of nature by which the dualism between passive matter and form, object and subject, nature and economical process of production are all left behind. Haymal compares Moore's *oikeios* with Deleuze and Guattari's *body without organs*, both concepts describing all there is as a multi-layered relation of webs within webs of relations or as an interconnected space of multiple dimensions. Then, Haymal deals with Moore's characterization of labor power and the familiar reproduction described in *Anti-Oedipus* and compares the dialectics of capitalization and appropriation described by Moore and the capitalist movements of deterritorialization and reterritorialization in Deleuze and Guattari. Haymal concludes that if capitalism expels family outside of the social field and makes it private, it also reterritorializes it in such a way that it enables productive care labor to be appropriated.

Inspired by Argentinian singer-songwriter Luis Alberto Spinetta, Juan Manuel Spinelli thinks how "*toda la vida tiene música*" (the whole life has music). Commenting on Borghi's reading of the Deleuzian-Guattarian *ritornello*, Spinelli shows that art in general and music specifically, not only belong to all beings, but also to

the whole production of reality. Thus, the convergence of aesthetics and ontology leads in Spinelli's essay to a philosophy of nature. The *Umwelt* developed by von Uexküll and the territory of Lorenz help Deleuze and Guattari to think a non-anthropocentric nature full of perceptive and agent cell-subjects. What is important to Spinelli is that each cell seems to develop with a kind of melody or little *ritornello*. Life, then, is a musical ensemble produced in and by each cell-subject conforming thus an organic melody. Commenting on Uexküll, Spinelli shows that whereas animal life can be conceived in terms of a *melody* that contains a whole spectrum of molecular sonorities, the interactions between living beings (in which the action of one being expresses as the point or counterpoint in another one) develop a perfect *harmony*. If for Uexküll Nature has then an immanent genetic music sheet, for Deleuze and Guattari, Spinelli notes, it is the chaotical plane of composition that produces what would be a regular repetition in nature's music sheet. Spinelli concludes by taking up Lorenz's theory of territoriality and aggression and shows that it is the expressivity of a domain what attests its belonging to a particular animal. Earth itself becomes expressive. With this aesthetical philosophy of nature, we then pass from the house-territory to the cosmos (which Spinelli expresses in the title of his essay alluding to Charly García's *yendo de la cama al living*).

To conclude, *Posnaturalismos* compiles different essays all rethinking and eroding modern nature, as opposed to humanity and society, aiming to show its fragility in our contemporary and anthropocenic times. It is a book long needed that offers both a panorama of current debates and strongly defended theses regarding the immanent multiplicity of nature. The complexity of the subjects dealt by *Posnaturalismos* is expressed in clear and precise phrases that make it a book of great importance to bear in mind when dealing with the current philosophical interest in anthropology and biology.