The Role of the Apostates in the Twelve Tribes conflict in Germany

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Abstract: The testimonies of the apostates and their captivity narratives and atrocity tales often have a great impact on the conflict between new religious movements and general society. The reason behind this is both the great persuasive power that those narratives wield, which stems from personal experience, and the negative bias of the public that seldom questions their truthfulness and accuracy. One of the examples of apostates' narratives largely contributing to a violent solution of a conflict with a New Religious Movement, is the case of the Twelve Tribes. The article describes the role of the apostates that led to a raid on a German community of this movement in 2013 and pursues parallels with the raid on a community of the same movement in 1984 in Vermont. The text also briefly mentions other violent conflicts in new religious movements at large.

Keywords: Twelve Tribes movement, New Religious Movements, religious community, apostasy, raid, "captivity narratives", "atrocity tales"

Abstrakt: Svědectví apostatů a jejich „příběhy zajetí" a „ohavné historky" vstupují do konfliktů nových náboženských hnutí a většinové společnosti obvykle s velkou razancí. Je způsobena přesvědčivostí těchto narací vyplývající z osobní zkušenosti i tím, že negativně naladěná veřejnost obvykle nijak nezpochybňuje jejich pravdivost a přesnost. Jedním z nových náboženských hnutí, v jejichž případě narace apostatů významně přispěly k pokusům o násilné řešení konfliktů, je hnutí Dvanáct kmenů. Článek popisuje roli apostatů v okolnostech razie v komunitě tohoto hnutí v Německu roku 2013 a naznačuje paralely s razií v komunitě téhož hnutí ve Vermontu roku 1984, okrajově též s násilnými událostmi v jiných nových náboženských hnutích.

Klíčová slova: hnutí Dvanáct kmenů, nová náboženská hnutí, náboženská komunita, apostaze, razie, „příběhy zajetí", „ohavné historky"

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Topic, goal and structure of the article

In 1998, the Canadian sociologist Susan Palmer published a study titled "Apostates and their Role in the Construction of Grievance Claims Against the Northeast Kingdom/Messianic Communities".[1] In this text, Palmer described three successive stages of the conflict, which culminated in 1984, when 112 children were unwillingly removed from their families, all part of this New Religious Movement. During each and every one of these stages the apostates played an important – perhaps even crucial – role. In the three decades that followed after this Vermont incident, both the Western society and the movement (which today calls itself "the Twelve Tribes") have undergone important changes. Nevertheless, the raid that took place in 2013 in two Twelve Tribes' communities in Germany, during which 40 children[2] were taken away, shows important similarities with the Island Pond raid. One of them is the role of the apostates in the events that happened both before and after the raid. The goal of this article is to explore the influence of the apostates on the recent German case, compare it to the influence their predecessors had on the Island Pond events, and outline some general rules discernible in the apostates' role in conflicts related to New Religious Movements. This article therefore aims to follow up on Palmer's study and widen its scope on a different society in a different time.

First, I will focus on the key terms of "apostasy" and "apostate" in the context of Comparative Religions and Sociology of New Religious Movements. In the following paragraphs, I will sum up basic facts concerning the Twelve Tribes movement, the Island Pond raid, and the role of apostates as described by Palmer. In the main part of the article I will then give a concise summary of the events related to the German raid and present the available information about those apostates who contributed to it in an important manner. I will then conclude by formulating some observations about the role of apostates in general.

Apostasy as a specific way to leave a community

Although some scholarly publications contain revealing insights into the situation of ex-members,[3] any discussion of the different attitudes these ex-members have to their community of origin still forms rather a marginal part of Comparative Religions and

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[1] Susan Palmer, "Apostates and their Role in the Construction of Grievance Claims Against the Northeast Kingdom/Messianic Communities", in David, G. Bromley, (ed.), *The Politics of Religious Apostasy: The Role of Apostates in the Transformation of Religious Movements,* Westport, London: Praeger 1998, p. 191–208.

[2] According to the last academic presentation of the Twelve Tribes member, the number of seized children is 41. Jean Swantko Wiseman, "Spanking Bans and the Faith of Families: The Twelve Tribes in the European Court of Human Rights", a paper presented at CESNUR conference, Jerusalem, 3. 7. 2017.

[3] James beckford, *Cult Controversies: The Societal Response to the New Religious Movements,* London, New York: Tavistock 1985, s. 149–189.

Sociology.[4] A greater interest in the role of apostates was brought about by the examination of the tragic end of the Peoples Temple and especially the Branch Davidian movement.[5] In the latter case, the actions of Marc Breault, an apostate, were without a doubt one of the key factors.[6] Other violent events of the 90s led to the publication of a groundbreaking book on apostasy.[7] Its editor, David G. Bromley suggested a typology of ex-members by their relationship to their community of origin. Among these terms, "apostate" became the most influential and some definitions of apostasy appeared. Especially Bromley created a preliminary definition of apostasy as a "role that is constructed when an organization is in a state of high tension with its surrounding environment and that involves an individual exiting the organization to form an alliance with oppositional coalition."[8] An openly hostile approach to the abandoned community and an alliance with its opposition in a situation of tension are the core traits that also appear in other definitions of apostate and/or apostasy.[9] Typically, we may emphasize the label of "traitor" given to the apostate by his or her former co-members.[10]

This means that apostasy is a specific type of leaving a community. A great majority of the members "exit voluntarily after some period of experimentation and typically seek a low-profile re-entry into conventional networks by resuming familial, occupational and educational endeavors."[11] The reason why this low-profile exit appears so frequently is without a doubt the result of the fact that in most cases, the "membership has constituted a period of experimentation rather than a long-term commitment."[12] The exiting member typically relates his or her experience to a wider biographical context and the membership in a new religious movement may be interpreted as a necessary or meaningful step in his or her spiritual, emotional or

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[4] A classical study by STUART A. WRIGHT (*Leaving Cults: The Dynamics of Defection,* Washington: Society for the Scientific Study of Religion 1987) does not offer data or theories about these stances. Even the new chapter on leaving New Religious Movements mentions apostasy only very briefly. DAVID G. BROMLEY, "Leaving the Fold. Disaffiliating from New Religious Movements", in JAMES R. LEWIS, *The Oxford Handbook of New Religious Movements,* Oxford etc.: Oxford University Press 2004, p. 298–314.

[5] JOHN R. HALL, "The Impact of Apostates on the Trajectory of Religious Movements: The Case of Peoples Temple", in DAVID G. BROMLEY (ed.), *Falling from Faith: Causes and Consequences of Religious Apostasy,* Newbury Park: Sage Publications 1988, p. 229–250.

[6] See JOHN R. HALL, "Public Narratives and the Apocalyptic Sect", in STUART A. WRIGHT (ed.), *Armageddon in Waco. Critical Perspectives on the Branch Davidian Conflict,* Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press 1995, p. 212–228; JAMES D. TABOR and EUGENE V. GALLAGHER, *Why Waco?*, Berkeley etc.: University of California Press 1995, p. 80–93.

[7] DAVID G. BROMLEY (ed.), *The Politics of Religious Apostasy: The Role of Apostates in the Transformation of Religious Movements,* Westport, London: Praeger 1998, 244 p.

[8] DAVID G. BROMLEY, "The Social Construction of Contested Exit Roles: Defectors, Whistleblowers, and Apostates", in DAVID G. BROMLEY (ed.), *The Politics of Religious Apostasy: The Role of Apostates in the Transformation of Religious Movements,* Westport, London: Praeger 1998, p. 19.

[9] See STUART A. WRIGHT, "Exploring Factors That Shape the Apostate Role", in DAVID G. BROMLEY (ed.), *The Politics of Religious Apostasy: The Role of Apostates in the Transformation of Religious Movements,* Westport, London: Praeger 1998, p. 109.

[10] According to MASSIMO INTROVIGNE, "Defectors, Ordinary Leave-takers, and Apostates: A Quantitative Study of Former Members of New Acropolis in France", *Nova Religio* 3 (1, 1999): p. 84.

[11] BROMLEY, "The Social Construction...", p. 40.

[12] BROMLEY, "The Social Construction...", p. 39.

social development. Even though former members evaluate their experience with the new religious movement on a wide scale ranging from positivity through ambivalence to disillusion, ambivalence (which correlates with a non-conflictive type of exit) remains the most common.[13] In sum, only a minor part of leave-takers adopt the open hostility of an apostate.[14]

The probability of apostasy greatly rises in those communities where the relationship to the surrounding society is marked by high levels of tension. This kind of community is typically less able to control the exit process of its members,[15] while at the same time it may be forced to deal with more or less organized opposition formed by apostates, civil activists (family members and other critics of the movement), mass media, law-enforcement authorities etc. Due to the existence of tension and opposition, the movement may create strong and impenetrable barriers that prevent exiting. By "barriers" I mean for example demonization of the leave-takers, which implicates punishment that would befall them and those who keep in contact with them.[16] For a member of this type of movement, to cross such a barrier may lead to very traumatic experiences. Moreover, another difficult life situation may follow – those, who remain in the community, may persecute the ex-members with expressions of hate.

Such an experience can decrease the gap between former members and any opposition against their community of origin. This is because the opposition can help the leave-takers in their difficult situation that arises from the loss of their religious life goal and the breakup with their closest, sometimes even their only close friends. Pressed by a necessity to understand all the reasons and circumstances behind their membership in a new religious movement, the ex-members may be ready to adopt an explanatory framework offered by the opposition. Most frequently, they tend to adopt the terminology of the popular brainwashing theory. Identification with the role of an apostate therefore alleviates the guilt the ex-member feels as a result of the questionable acts he or she engaged in while still in the community – and also helps to reestablish his or her place in society. The apostate's role thus serves a restitutive function in the social structure.[17] The opposition acts as an audience that appreciates and affirms his or her traumatic experiences[18] and the apostate gains their approval by compliance and meeting their expectations. In this process, the apostate becomes a part of the opposition.

Conversely, the apostate also provides a great help for the opposition, as he or she becomes an important protagonist in their struggle with the movement. In the allegorical words of Susan Palmer, "the 'moves' of apostates resemble those of the knight

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[13] WRIGHT, *Leaving Cults*, p. 88–91.

[14] BROMLEY, "The Social Construction…", p. 40.

[15] BROMLEY, "The Social Construction…", p. 25.

[16] MARC GALANTER, *Cults. Faith, Healing, and Coercion,* New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999, p. 105–109.

[17] WRIGHT, "Exploring Factors…", p. 110.

[18] ARMAND L. MAUSS, "Apostasy and the Management of Spoiled Identity", in DAVID G. BROMLEY (ed.), *The Politics of Religious Apostasy: The Role of Apostates in the Transformation of Religious Movements,* Westport, London: Praeger 1998, p. 69.

in a chess game."[19] If the apostate's personal story is formulated along the lines of a captivity narrative[20] (which happens very often), the apostate becomes a deceived, blameless victim; the opposition is stylized as a group of heroes; and the conflict becomes a war against evil.[21] A similar effect is produced by the so-called "atrocity tales".[22] In other words, the apostate tells stories of moral failure whose chief actors are the members of his or her former movement, especially its leadership. Such tales may of course be entirely or partly true, but they are often one-sided and deprived of context all the same. With the help of captivity narratives and atrocity tales, the apostates sometimes succeed in degrading their former communities' moral status and ethically justify the more repressive actions of the opposition.[23] In this kind of struggle, the media are especially effective.[24]

However, we must keep in mind that it is always the oppositional audience that has the power to bestow the role of an apostate on an ex-member. Research confirms[25] that an overwhelming majority of apostates have apparently had contact with an oppositional coalition of some kind.[26] The strength and power of the oppositional public is after all well attested by the phenomenon of "apostates who never were."[27] The phenomenon probably arises in those situations when, due to a high tension between a religious movement and its surrounding environment, the demand for captivity narratives and atrocity tales surges so much that people pretend to be apostates and provide this kind of stories. Examples of specific cases of these situations may be the great surge of hostility towards the Roman Catholic Church in the second third of the 19th century in the United States, or[28] the 1980s and 1990s so-called Satanic panic in the West.[29]

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[19] PALMER, "Apostates and their Role...", p. 193.

[20] WRIGHT, "Exploring Factors...", p. 97–100.

[21] WRIGHT, "Exploring Factors...", p. 98, 110.

[22] ANSON D. SHUPE and DAVID G. BROMLEY, "Apostates and Atrocity Stories: Some Parameters in the Dynamic of Deprogramming", in BRYAN WILSON (ed.), *The Social Impact of New Religious Movements,* Barrytown: Rose of Sharon Press 1981, p. 179–234.

[23] BROMLEY, "The Social Construction...", p. 42.

[24] JAMES BECKFORD, "The Media and New Religious Movements", in JAMES R. LEWIS (ed.), *From the Ashes. Making Sense of Waco,* Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield 1994, p. 143–148.

[25] TRUDY SOLOMON, "Integrating the 'Moonie' Experience: A Survey of Ex-Members of the Unification Church", in THOMAS ROBBINS and DICK ANTHONY (eds.), *In Gods We Trust: New Patterns of Religious Pluralism in America,* Princeton: Rutgers University Press 1981, p. 275–294; JAMES R. LEWIS, "Reconstructing the 'Cult' Experience: Post-Involvement Attitudes as a Function of Mode of Exit and Post-Involvement Socialization", *Sociological Analysis,* 47 (2, 1986): p. 151–159.

[26] INTROVIGNE, "Defectors...", p. 96.

[27] DANIEL CARSON JOHNSON, "Apostates Who Never Were: The Social Construction of *Absque Facto* Apostate Narratives", in: DAVID G. BROMLEY (ed.), *The Politics of Religious Apostasy: The Role of Apostates in the Transformation of Religious Movements,* Westport, London: Praeger 1998, p. 115–138.

[28] In this case, the role of an "apostate that never was" was played by a Canadian by the name of Maria Monk, the author of *Awful Disclosures by Maria Monk of the Hotel Dieu Nunnery of Montreal* published in 1836.

[29] The probably most famous "apostates that never were" were the popular book authors Michael Warnke (*The Satan Seller,* 1972) and Laurel Rose Willson (*Satan's Underground,* published 1988 under the pen name of Lauren Stratford).

A brief characteristic of the Twelve Tribes Movement and the circumstances of the 1984 Island Pond Raid

The new religious movement of the Twelve Tribes[30] emerged in 1972 from the environment of the American Jesus movement, a current which formed a part of the Hippies movement. Today it consists of roughly 2,500 persons that live in more or less 50 communities spread across 9 countries.[31] By means of applying biblical texts on faith, liturgy, ethics and communitarian lifestyle, the Twelve Tribes fulfill their concept of an ideal organization of a Christian church, modeled on the Early Christian example and closely related to its Jewish heritage. At the same time, according to them, only their movement represents the true people of God and the origin of the community is interpreted in terms of the last era of human history. The movement aspires to become a spiritual bride of Jesus (called Yahshua) during his imminent Second Coming. Literally interpreted biblical texts along with Jewish cultural elements and communitarian principles, combined to create a typical culture, which has diligently guarded its specificity without isolating itself from its surroundings.

One of the characteristic traits of this culture is the upbringing of children, which is considered to be the most important task of a member of the movement.[32] The importance stems from the eschatological dimension of the movement: the children are going to become the fourth generation of the community[33] that has been gradually purged from the sins of the forefathers.[34] An immaculate "bride", this generation will come forward to meet the arriving Yahshua and especially the boys will play a key role in these eschatological events.[35] The most important part of their education is to learn obedience and submission to authorities.[36] Some elements of the training have become a seed of conflict and confrontation with the general society. Most of those conflicts arise from the movement's rule of physical punishment of children, which

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[30] For a general survey of this movement with a special attention to the raids against the communities see STUART A. WRIGHT and SUSAN J. PALMER, *Storming Zion: Government Raids on Religious Communities*, New York: Oxford University Press 2016, p. 47–72.

[31] ROBERT PLEYER and AXEL WOLFSGRUBER, *Der Satan schläft nie: Mein Leben bei den Zwölf Stämmen*, München: Knaur 2014, p. 177. Acording to the movement itself, the number may be as high as three thousand members.

[32] "We believe that the most important job on earth for the church is to train its children to enter the kingdom of heaven." "The Education of our Children", Island Pond, October 1979, in *Foundational Teachings of the Twelve Tribes. Book Two (Di–G)*, Parchment Press, p. 135.

[33] *Our Child Training Manual II.,* part 12: What Discipline is Not (online), 2000, retrieved 21. 3. 2017, p. 77, available online at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2994399/OUR-CHILD-TRAINING-MANUAL.pdf.

[34] Based on the Bible: "... for I the LORD your God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers on the children to the third and the fourth generation of those who hate me, but showing steadfast love to thousands of those who love me and keep my commandments" (Ex 20: 5–6).

[35] *The Purpose of Creation & Redemption* (online)*, a Twelve Tribes freepaper, *TwelveTribes.com*, retrieved 21. 3. 2017, available online at http://www.twelvetribes.com/articles/purpose-creation-redemption.

[36] *Our Child Training Manual*, p. 10.

consists of spanking with a narrow, flexible stick[37] on the buttocks.[38] The punishment is executed by parents or other adult members of the community, which must not be angry at the time of the act. This biblically sanctioned type of punishment is supposed to save the children for the eternal life.[39] Other causes for conflict have been the intent of the Twelve Tribes to offer homeschooling to their children and thus protect them from the influence of the public educational system; the joint work of parents and children; simple measures taken to protect their health; restricting the cultural influence of society at large, especially with respect to mass media; etc. Subsequently the Twelve Tribes have been accused of misusing and abusing children, inappropriate discipline methods, restricting the children's access to education and medical services, isolating the children from the society, etc. These accusations have been countered by positive testimonies, medical, psychological and pedagogical, and the ability of the second- and third-generation members to create a self-sufficient and viable community.

During most of the movement's existence, every community has been generally able to maintain a reasonable level of tension with the surrounding society and to find enough supporters and advocates to maintain a balance of forces with its opponents. Until now, breaches of this balance were mostly brought about by apostates, who nevertheless formed only a very small part of the movement's ex-members. These apostates have been recruited both from adult neophytes and adults and young adults who grew up in the movement.

As Susan Palmer described in the aforementioned study, it was these apostates who played a crucial role in the escalation of the 1980s conflict: at that time, the movement mainly consisted of one community located in Island Pond, Vermont, USA. The conflict was sparked by arguments against the movement that arose during court battles for child custody. In 1983, the courts decided to place a total of 11 children in the custody of three fathers who were apostates and were not living with the community. The doubts concerning the fairness of this decision started to appear years later when most of these children (now adults) returned to the community.[40] The most important figure among these apostates was a Chilean hippie Juan Mattatall, who had been expelled by the movement after sexually harassing community girls, which caused his wife to divorce him. Mattatall blamed the community for his divorce and allegedly wowed to destroy the movement. The following struggle of a wide coalition of media, civil activists and apostates against the community and an outbreak of a negative image of

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[37] *Our Child Training Manual*, p. 72.

[38] *Our Child Training Manual II.*, part 11: Chastisement (online), 2000, retrieved 21. 3. 2017, p. 75, available online at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2994399/OUR-CHILD -TRAINING-MANUAL.pdf. The Manual goes on to say that the "objective of discipline is not to cause pain, stripes, tears, or sorrow, but to bring the rebellious child's will under control. It does not break a child's spirit to force him to obey. It causes him to choose obedience over rebellion."

[39] For more details on the education of children see SUSAN J. PALMER, "Frontiers and Families: The Children of Island Pond", in SUSAN J. PALMER and CHARLOTTE E. HARDMAN (eds.), *Children in New Religions,* New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press 1999, p. 157–161.

[40] PALMER, "Apostates and their Role...", p. 206.

the movement led to the fact that Mattatall was awarded custody of all his five children despite being suspected of child molestation. Indeed, years later doubt was cast on the court ruling, since Mattatall was subsequently convinced of child sexual abuse.[41]

Hostile actions of two other apostates, Michael Taylor and Roland Church, a dispute over an autopsy of a stillborn child in the community, and a congenital defect of another child contributed to new charges and further escalation of the tension in 1983 and 1984. This gave a chance to the opposition to include the District Attorney into the hostile actions.[42] As a result, in June 1984 a police raid was organized, during which 20 community houses were searched and 112 children taken away. Their parents accompanied them to court. Nevertheless, after 40 individual hearings the judge decided the detention order was unconstitutional and he refused to allow the children to be unwillingly examined. Quite the opposite happened – the children were returned to their parents on the same day.

The 2013 raid on the German communities and the role of apostates in the conflict

A German Twelve Tribes community had to live through a similar set of events. The Klosterzimmern community was founded in 2001 and in the early years went through a difficult struggle for homeschooling which ended peacefully in 2006. The truce between the government agencies and the German Klosterzimmern community lasted until 2013.

The incidents that took place in the second half of the year had been preceded by the Reip family's exit from the movement – this important family left the Klosterzimmern Twelve Tribes in 2010. The exit was initiated by the then 17-year[43] old Christian Reip (whose community name was Zakar) about two weeks after his older sister and her husband left the community. Christian was joined by his younger sister Amitsa[44] and then also by their parents and two other siblings. Of the whole family, only one daughter remained in the Twelve Tribes. From all the eight Reip ex-members (including the husband of the eldest daughter), only Christian Reip became an apostate in the aforementioned sense. In the media, he has mainly accused the community

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[41] PALMER, "Apostates and their Role...", p. 194–198.
[42] PALMER, "Apostates and their Role...", p. 198–201.
[43] VIVIAN HERBRICH, "Die unheimliche Sekte 'Zwölf Stämme': Ein Aussteiger packt aus" (online), *Huffington Post,* 17. 6. 2014, retrieved 10. 9. 2016, available online at http://www.huffingtonpost .de/2014/06/17/sekte-zwoelf-staemme-aussteiger-packt-aus_n_5499399.html.
[44] FRAUKE LÜPKE-NARBERHAUS, "Leben nach der Sekte: 'Ich habe keine Wurzeln und keine Kraft zu fliegen'" (online), *Spiegel Online,* 27. 1. 2014, retrieved 10. 9. 2016, available online at http:// www.spiegel.de/lebenundlernen/schule/zwoelf-staemme-wie-eine-aussteigerin-versucht-ins -leben-zu-finden-a-944962.html.

of robbing him of his childhood. His relationship to his parents has suffered as well: he has blamed them for letting the Twelve Tribes ruin his life.[45]

Christian's childhood friend, using the name Aaron,[46] joined him in his severe criticism of the movement. Aaron left the community in 2008 as a fifteen-year-old; his father accompanied him and stayed with him until his son reached adulthood. Even though the father rejoined the community after this, he is currently living outside of the community again, as do his two sons, while Aaron's mother remained in the community with her two younger daughters. Aaron expressed his anger with his former community in his 2012 article published in the Focus magazine. Nine other ex-members, most of whom belonged to the Reip family, also contributed (albeit rather marginally).[47] Aaron's (and the others') testimonies quoted in the article bear clear marks of captivity narratives. Aaron told the magazine that the community has "a perfect facade", behind which, nevertheless, the members "break children's wills" and "they chase all their individuality out of them". According to Aaron, this "brainwashing" leads to the fact that the young people are "almost incapable of an existence outside of the movement."[48]

Aaron also published his opinion of the Twelve Tribes in a text of his own.[49] Among other things, he expressed a wish to contribute to outlawing the Twelve Tribes movement not only in Klosterzimmern, but in the whole world.[50] The text contains a second-hand atrocity tale of how the leaders of the movement enjoy vast riches while many children of the community lack even good shoes or decent clothing.[51] In relation to this claim, Aaron holds that "the cult created a perfect facade" and the members of the community "spread lies" among the non-members.[52]

Just like Aaron, the most important German apostate Robert Pleyer (known as Yathar in the community) also spoke about "facade": "behind the facade of an alternative lifestyle with farmer's yard shops and happy feasts complete with goat goulash

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[45] PATRICK GUYTON, "Ich hatte keine Kindheit. Ich habe geschufftet" (online), *Der Tagesspiegel*, 17. 6. 2014, retrieved 10. 9. 2016, available online at http://www.tagesspiegel.de/themen /reportage/sekte-zwoelf-staemme-ein-aussteiger-erzaehlt-ich-hatte-keine-kindheit-ich-habe -geschuftet/10044034.html.

[46] In this way, he conceals not only his civic name but the name received in the Twelve Tribes movement as well. In this article, we respect this decision of his.

[47] In the Focus article, their names were changed.

[48] AXEL WOLFSGRUBER, „Sekten-Aussteiger: "Sie brechen Deinen Willen" (online), *FOCUS Magazin* 21 (2012), 21. 5. 2012, retrieved 10. 9. 2016, available online at http://www.focus.de/magazin /archiv/tid-26021/glaubensgemeinschaft-zwoelf-staemme-im-focus-report-sekten-aussteiger -sie-brechen-deinen-willen-nochmal-aendern_aid_762194.html.

[49] This text was published as part of the following book: ROBERT PLEYER and AXEL WOLFSGRUBER, *Der Satan schläft nie: Mein Leben bei den Zwölf Stämmen*, München: Knaur 2014, p. 157–172.

[50] AARON in PLEYER and WOLFSGRUBER, *Der Satan schläft nie,* p. 171: "Ich möchte meinen Teil dazu beitragen, dass die Zwölf Stämme in Klosterzimmern, aber auch weltweit verboten werden."

[51] AARON in PLEYER and WOLFSGRUBER, *Der Satan schläft nie,* p. 164–165: "Ich habe bespielweise damals gehört, dass der Sektengründer sich alle paar Monate für 30 000 bis 60 000 Euro ein neues Auto kauft, das nur er selbst fahren kann, während manches Kind in der Gemeinschaft nicht mal vernünftige Schuhe oder Kleidung zum Anziehen hat."

[52] AARON in PLEYER and WOLFSGRUBER, *Der Satan schläft nie,* p. 164.

and folklore dances, which aim to bring a nice experience to the neighbourhood and show them how beautiful the Twelve Tribes movement is, something monstrous is happening. Male and female seekers alike bow to a system that knows no individuality. Both individuals and families live a life that is entirely at the mercy of arbitrary rules imposed by a council of elders."[53] This so-called facade is related to Robert Pleyer's public actions as an apostate: "I want to show that behind the loving facade of the movement lurks a brutal regime that oppresses individuals and makes them unable to decide about their own life."[54]

After an initial period of doubt and crises of faith, in the 1990s Robert Pleyer became a firm part of the movement under the name of Yathar. He helped to build the German communities in Penningbüttel near Bremen and in Stödtlen-Oberbronnen in Baden-Würtenberg. In 2001 these communities founded a new base in Klosterzimmern in Bavaria and here Yathar became an important community member: he helped create a schooling system for children[55] and in 2003 he became a member of an important family by marrying Shaloma. Efraim, his father-in-law, was one of the first German disciples and since he refused to send Shaloma to a public school, he had a prison experience.[56] In the U. S., her country of origin, Yathar's mother-in-law Baruchah suffered abduction and a so-called deprogramming, after which she managed to escape back to her community under dramatic circumstances.[57] After her third child was born, Shalomah started suffering from a mental disorder and in 2009, in response to growing set of problems, the family tried for the first time to live outside of the community. An ensuing period of repeated exits and re-entries lasted until 2011 when the marriage finally broke up. While Shalomah firmly reestablished her place in the community, Yathar, along with their four children, left.[58]

A few months later, Pleyer accepted the role of an apostate. The core motivation to his struggle with his former community was – as he puts it – problems in communication with Shalomah. Their contact was complicated and protracted, as it was mediated by an elder council of the community, in which Shalomah resided. In a situation when he needed his wife's legal assent again, Pleyer announced to one of the council members his intention to go to court and ask to be the only custodial parent. The elder strictly refused this scenario and expressed the community's determination to prevent it. Both men argued and Pleyer threatened to "tell people how things work in the community." The elder responded: "If you want war, you'll get it."[59] After

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[53] Claudia Becker, „Sekten-Ausstieg: "Ich konnte einfach keine Kinder mehr schlagen" (online), *Welt,* 9. 10. 2014, retrieved 10. 9. 2016, available online at https://www.welt.de/vermischtes/article133084896/Ich-konnte-einfach-keine-Kinder-mehr-schlagen.html.

[54] Pleyer and Wolfsgruber, *Der Satan schläft nie,* p. 265.

[55] Pleyer and Wolfsgruber, *Der Satan schläft nie,* p. 48.

[56] Pleyer and Wolfsgruber, *Der Satan schläft nie,* p. 232.

[57] Pleyer and Wolfsgruber, *Der Satan schläft nie,* p. 122–125. The same story is told in "The Kidnapping of Rebecca Westbrooks" (online), *TwelveTribes.org*, retrieved 27. 3. 2017, available online at http://twelvetribes.org/controversies/kidnapping-rebecca-westbrooks.

[58] The breakup of the marriage as described according to Pleyer and Wolfsgruber, *Der Satan schläft nie,* p. 249.

[59] The conversation is reported in Pleyer and Wolfsgruber, *Der Satan schläft nie,* p. 259–260.

this Robert Pleyer started with his hostile appearances in media, he contacted other former members of the movement and possibly even encouraged Christian Reip and Aaron to appear in the media as well.[60] The author of the first article that sparkled this wave of media interest in the Twelve Tribes was Axel Wolfsgruber. Pleyer knew Wolfsgruber from 2002 when the journalist visited the Klosterzimmern community and subsequently published a news report about the struggle between the community and government agencies, which was caused by the fact that the members did not send their children to school.[61]

In 2012 (i.e. in the same year), Shalomah lost her parental rights.[62] In 2013, Pleyer was contacted by an investigative reporter by the name of Wolfram Kuhnigk[63] who worked for the RTL media company (Radio Television Luxemburg). Kuhnigk subsequently visited Klosterzimmern three times between June and August 2013 and was accepted with trust, thanks to a story about his alleged painful divorce. Acting on Pleyer's information, Kuhnigk installed hidden cameras in one of the houses, focusing them on a place that was reserved for the physical punishments of children. The cameras filmed mothers who punished their children by spanking them three or four times on their backside with a flexible rod. Kuhnigk then created a movie from the footage by adding dramatic effects and omitting scenes of reconciliatory embraces and dialogues that form a standard part of the Twelve Tribes child rearing practices. Kuhnigk showed his movie to the director of the Office of Youth Services as well as an expert on new religious movements from the Lutheran Church. Based on this movie, a decision was made to take the community's children away. This happened during a raid that took place on 5th of September, 2013.[64]

On this day at 6:00 AM, the social workers accompanied by roughly 100 policemen made a surprise visit in the Klosterzimmern community (and in a house in Wörnitz). Altogether, they took away 40 children, including those that were only visiting the community with their parents. The children were placed in children's homes and surrogate families. Several days later Kuhnigk's film was broadcasted on RTL, the most popular private television in Germany, and both this network and other media adopted the narrative according to which the children were "freed" from the community.[65] Even though none of the children showed any signs of abuse, the influence of the movie on the public was considerable and led to a discourse that used expres-

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[60] This belief was expressed by Twelve Tribes members Obadiah, Caleb and Yerushah in a conversation that took place on March 19 2017.

[61] See Axel Wolfsburger, "Der Krieg um Gottes Kinder" (online), *FOCUS Magazin* 47 (2002), 18. 11. 2002, retrieved 14. 3. 2017, available online at http://www.focus.de/panorama/reportage/reportage-der-krieg-um-gottes-kinder_aid_206210.html.

[62] Pleyer and Wolfsgruber, *Der Satan schläft nie,* p. 261.

[63] Pleyer and Wolfsgruber, *Der Satan schläft nie,* p. 263–264.

[64] The source of these informations is Susan J. Palmer, "*Sekten* in Germany: The Case of the Twelve Tribes", a paper presented at the IAHR Conference, Erfurt, 27. 8. 2015.

[65] Such as the RTL TV internet news: "Razzia bei Sekte '12 Stämme' – RTL-Reporter liefert Beweise für Kindesmisshandlung" (online), *RTLNext.RTL.de,* 5. 8. 2014, accessed 10. 9. 2016, available online at http://rtlnext.rtl.de/cms/razzia-bei-sekte-12-staemme-rtl-reporter-liefert-beweise-fuer-kindesmisshandlung-1620767.html.

sions such as "horrid cult",[66] "brutal discipline"[67] or "psychological terror".[68] Along with the theme of punishment, the following wide public discussion of the Twelve Tribes also focused on the children's education, isolation, healthcare quality, physical labour, education oriented on the relationship to ethnic and sexual minorities and many other topics. Robert Pleyer's 2014 book *Der Satan schläft nie: Mein Leben bei den Zwölf Stämmen* (*Satan Never Sleeps: My Life Among the Twelve Tribes*) provided a new impulse for this discussion.

The framework for the actions of the authorities was both German Civil Law Code from 2000 that grants a right to a nonviolent upbringing to children[69] and the principle of preventive care, which gives the governmental agencies the right to act preventively before the children are actually hurt. It is precisely this point that forms the foundation of the viewpoint of the movement's critics. They insisted that the children's physical presence in the community is harmful and limiting in itself. This principle may also be the reason why some courts have already decided to take some children away from their parents permanently and why in other cases the courts keep putting their decision off (even though more than four years have passed) and make any contact between the parents and the child quite complicated. As of yet, no proof of child abuse has been presented to the courts and the authorities' decisions have also affected children whose physical punishment did not appear on the investigative journalist's camera. Some children managed to escape from the surrogate care.[70] During 2015 and 2016, the members of the Twelve Tribes gradually left Klosterzimmern and Wörnitz. Some of them joined Czech communities, both the older one in Mšecké Žehrovice and a newly founded one in Skalná in the Cheb region.

The circumstances of the Klosterzimmern raid and their contribution to the discussion on the origins of apostasy and the role of the apostates

The circumstances of the raid on the Twelve Tribes Klosterzimmern community in September 2013 allow a preliminary formulation of these five observations:

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[66] Herbrich, "Die unheimliche Sekte…", http://www.huffingtonpost.de/2014/06/17/sekte-zwoelf-staemme-aussteiger-packt-aus_n_5499399.html.

[67] Claudia Frickel, "Die 'Zwölf Stämme': Brutale Erziehung und strenge Regeln", *Web.de*, 23. 5. 2016, retrieved 10. 9. 2016, available online at https://web.de/magazine/wissen/zwoelf-staemme-brutale-erziehung-strenge-regeln-31575188.

[68] Becker, "Sekten-Ausstieg", https://www.welt.de/vermischtes/article133084896/Ich-konnte-einfach-keine-Kinder-mehr-schlagen.html.

[69] § 1631 section 2 says: "Körperliche Bestrafungen, seelische Verletzungen und andere entwürdigende Maßnahmen sind unzulässig".

[70] The stories of the children that had been taken away during the 5th September 2013 raid are available in the following article: "Deutschland, wie behandelst Du unsere Kinder?" (online), *News Zwölf Stämme ~ Herzlich Willkommen,* 14. 6. 2016, retrieved 10. 9. 2016, available online at https://news.zwoelfstaemme.de/2016/01/14/deutschland-wie-behandelst-du-deine-kinder/.

1. The case of the Twelve Tribes strongly suggests that the creation and adoption of the role of an apostate requires not only specific personal traits, a specific individual situation and/or family circumstances, but most importantly the existence of an opposition against the movement and a wider public demand for such a role. Even though apostates such as Juan Mattatall or Robert Pleyer acted as tools for conflict escalation, a higher level of tension and therefore also the potential for this escalation was already present in the relationship of the movement and general society. In this sense, the role of these men, which may be likened to a catalyst or a detonator, is parallel to the story of Marc Breault, an ex-member of the Branch Davidians, Debora Layton Blake, an ex-member of the Peoples Temple, or Rose-Marie Klaus, an ex-member of the Order of the Solar Temple. At the same time, we need to stress that in all those cases, several factors that escalated the tension were at play.

2. On the other hand, we cannot escape the conclusion that both Pleyer's and Mattatall's adoption of the apostate role was not inevitable and they (and the rest of the influential Twelve Tribes apostates) were pushed to identify with this role by strong emotions provoked by marital and familial conflict and by separation from their close relations. We can compare the strength of these emotions expressed in Mattatall's and Pleyer's open intent to destroy the community or break its facade (which may be the same thing) to Marc Breault's religious fervor, with which he strived to destroy the Davidian community.

However, this does not mean that the personal characteristics of the ex-members were completely unimportant. Even those ex-members who suffer through a court struggle for child custody may avoid adopting the role of an apostate. In 1994, divorced American parents Stuart and Rosemary Lavin underwent a six-month-long court battle for custody in full public spotlight. All their four daughters finally remained with their mother in the Twelve Tribes community, while the father, teacher and writer Stuart R. Lavin, was allowed to visit them.[71] In 2000, he even joined the movement and spent 4.5 years in the community. After ten more years he wrote a book about the Twelve Tribes.[72] Even though the text highlights some problematic aspects of the life in the communities, it is, generally speaking, both forgiving and very positive.

3. The cases of the Twelve Tribes raids clearly show that apostates tend to support each other in their actions. At the time of their exit, both Christian Reip and Aaron had a very negative opinion of the movement. Nevertheless, their voice started being heard only after Robert Pleyer rose as an apostate. Up to seven other ex-members adopted the role temporarily after the Focus magazine article was published.[73] Thirty years before, Juan Mattatall had a similar position among the apostates as Pleyer after him.

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[71] Jean A. Swantko, "A 25-year Retrospective on the Impact of the Anti-Cult Movement on our Children" (online), *TwelveTribes.prg*, retrieved 10. 9. 2016, available online at http://twelvetribes .org/controversies/25-year-retrospective-impact-anti-cult-movement-our-children.

[72] Stuart R. Lavin, *God's People. In Search of a Destiny. A Look into the Twelve Tribes Messianic Communities*, Jerusalem House (Kindle) 2016.

[73] Wolfsgruber. "Sekten-Aussteiger", http://www.focus.de/magazin/archiv/tid-26021/glaubens gemeinschaft-zwoelf-staemme-im-focus-report-sekten-aussteiger-sie-brechen-deinen-willen -nochmal-aendern_aid_762194.html.

4. The cases of the Twelve Tribes raids also show that apostates can gain the trust of the media, activists and authorities. This is probably caused by the fact that they are able to offer insider information to the public. True, all the German opposition against the Twelve Tribes took part in preparing the ground for the raids. Still, it was Pleyer in cooperation with a journalist from an influential network who gave the crucial impulse in September 2013.

The audience interprets the apostate's information as a "disclosure" and a "revelation". This is especially true in those cases where the public distrust of either new religious movements at large or of the one particular movement had already been provoked. Apostates may thus easily create an impression of a double agenda (one private, one public) of those movements, which in turn suggests that the movements' interaction with the public is morally questionable. This is the case of the term "facade" repeatedly used both by Robert Pleyer and Aaron. This inevitably led to the fact that the effectiveness of a tolerant and compromising attitude towards the movement was suddenly called into question. Mutual trust disappeared from the gradually built good relationship between the movement and its neighbours and authorities. In such a situation of a sudden quick change, the members of the Klosterzimmern community felt helpless.[74] The aforementioned metaphor of the chess figure of a knight seems to be especially fitting in this case. It wouldn't be surprising if the movement's reaction to this kind of moral questioning became secrecy and creation of the double agenda (or, if it really existed, its strengthening).

5. The actions of the Twelve Tribes apostates also remind us that the apostates are hardly unproblematic or objective informers on their communities of origin. Their audience is often fascinated by the atrocity tales and enthralled by the captivity tales that the apostates present as firsthand experiences. On the other hand, a personal experience with the movement in itself guarantees neither a deep understanding of it, nor the ability to see its existence in a wider context. We don't have to accuse the apostates of lying or of evil intentions – we just need to understand that the atrocity tales and captivity narratives can have the biggest significance for themselves.

We can see this in the case of the children that grew up in the closed and to a great extent isolated environment of a Twelve Tribes community. After leaving the movement, they may be confronted with different types of problems. As for Christian Reip, the members of his former community think that for a long time he struggled with his love for computer games, which developed after he left the community, in which he had no access to this kind of activity.[75] Relationship trouble is also typical after leaving the community and it is probable that the stories that circulate in the movement about crazy romantic experimentation of those who left may have a kernel of truth. Captivity tales and adoption of the role of an apostate may help ex-members to lift the blame, neutralize the consequences of their acts, and serve as a confirmation of the fact that they are mere victims, both of their parents' irresponsible behavior

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[74] According to a conversation with Twelve Tribes members Caleb and Yerusha (Schüle matrimony) in the Skalná community, 23. 9. 2016.
[75] According to a conversation with Obadiah, Caleb and Yerusha in Skalná, 19. 3. 2017.

and of the restrictive rules of the movement, in which they spent their childhood and teenage years.

In Robert Pleyer's case, his apostate role as well as his captivity tale reduces his responsibility for the fact that he joined the movement, became an influential member, and advocated its educational principles and rules and acted in accordance with them for twenty years. Moreover, his collaboration with the opposition allows him to play the part of a "warrior against evil" and thus free himself of the responsibility for his actions during the previous phase in his life. Especially his book *Satan Never Sleeps* seems to accentuate this function, since the text is one big captivity narrative, showing strikingly little self-reflection. In any case, we need to consider the possibility that Pleyer, as well as other apostates, employed atrocity tales and captivity narratives not only with the conscious intent to tell the truth, warn against danger, achieve retribution, and so on, but also as an expression of unconscious aggression and frustration. Such feelings naturally follow from the disappointment with both the movement and one's own actions, as well as from the fact that all the emotions, time, money, etc.,[76] which the apostate invested in his or her former movement, turned to nothing.

Conclusion

The circumstances of the police raids both in 1984 in Vermont, which was described in detail by Susan Palmer, and in 2013 in Klosterzimmern and Wörnitz, Germany, which I have outlined in this article, show that if the opposition against a movement allows the apostates to become a major or even the only source of information for authorities or courts, there is a grave danger of unjust power execution that results in inflicting damage, grievances and unjustified violence. The role of apostates as a main source of information is constructed by the media, since the captivity narratives and atrocity tales are of a great commercial value to them. Under the influence of the apostates, the capital of long-standing good relations and trust between the members of the community and both neutral civil servants and local sympathizers may wane quickly. The movement members may be suddenly thrust into a situation of complete social isolation and cast into the role of public enemies. It is therefore not very surprising that the German Twelve Tribes communities dissolved and in 2016 sold the last remnants of their German property.

The journalists are not interested in the problem of apostasy deeply enough to ask about the apostates' motives, including the hidden ones, which even the apostates themselves may not be aware of. This means that for the media and the wide public audiences, the apostates keep playing an unproblematic role of "chess knights". Both scholarly studies and critical reflections of the apostates' actions therefore bear not only an academic, but also a wider social importance.

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[76] For more information see Rodney Stark and Roger Finke, *Acts of Faith,* Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press 2000, passim.

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The Word "Islamophobia" As a Terminus Technicus of Social Sciences?

Miloš Mrázek

Abstract: The topic of this article is the appropriateness of usage of the popular term "islamophobia" in the vocabulary of social sciences. It deals with the difference between particular academical discourses (philosophy, theology, religious studies) and especially between the academical discourse in general and ideological language. After a summary of the history of the term, its current usage is analyzed, which leads to the conclusion that social scientists should not look for a precise definition, since the term itself and its usage is part of the reality (political activism, ideology), which should be a subject of unbiased study.

Keywords: islamophobia, xenophobia, ideology, academic discourse, methodology of social scences, terminology

Abstrakt: Příspěvek se zaobírá otázkou, nakolik má dnes hojně užívaný termín „islamofobie" místo v religionistice, sociologii či obecně v sociálních vědách. Nejprve se věnuje otázce specifičnosti sociálně-vědního diskurzu ve srovnání s jinými, přičemž zvláštní pozornost je věnována ideologickému jazyku. Článek se stručně věnuje dějinám užívání slova „islamofobie", termín je dán do kontextu jiných slov s příponou „-fobie", včetně těch, které mají místo v odborném medicínském slovníku. V závěru autor konstatuje, že termín, tak jak se běžně používá, je natolik nepřesný a ideologicky zatížený, že jeho užívání v odborném jazyce není vhodné. Spíše než jako nástroj porozumění realitě je sám součástí reality, jež má být vědecky zkoumána.

Klíčová slova: islamofobie, xenofobie, odborná terminologie, ideologie, vědecký diskurz, metologie sociálnách věd

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We are used to, when talking about Islam in general and about Muslim minorities in Western countries in particular, hearing or reading the term "islamophobia".[1] The politicians, journalists, political activists, and often social scientists (in the broad sense of the word, including the Islamic and religious studies) take it for granted. Now we want to deal with this term with critical distance in the following text.[2]

The question is: Is it appropriate to call various negative attitudes and behaviors towards Islam and its followers "islamophobia"?

In fact, there are two questions here:

1) Is there any place for this word in the common language?

2) Is there any place for this term in the discourse of social sciences?

Our aim is to deal with the second one: Is there any definition of "islamophobia" in the social science language?

We are not going to express our own opinions about the position of Muslims in Europe, about immigration from Muslim countries, about Islam in general, or about anti-Muslim movements or anti-immigrant movements. We will stay on the level of methodology or theoretical terminology of social sciences.

"Islamophobia" in academic discourse

The key question, therefore, is, where this term belongs, where it was originally defined. It means what *discourse* it belongs to.

The difference between discourses lies not in different subjects, but also different starting points. Here are examples of words, the definitions of which is meaningful only in specific discourses: Terms like "nature", "knowledge", "evil" are "at home" *primarily* in philosophy; "grace", "revelation" or "sin" belong to a religious or theological vocabulary, and we can find the definitions of terms like "statistical normality", "socialization" or "social deviation" in works of social scientists. If a sociologist or even a philosopher said what sin was or wasn't, they would be crossing the boundaries of their competences, given and limited by the methodology either of philosophy of empirical science, for these concepts are not defined there.

Obviously, in many cases there are no clear boundaries between specific discourses, which may cause problems when dealing with a concept defined in one area in a different area. Sometimes one *term* gets taken over or borrowed and redefined, which means it denotes a *new concept.* Let us take for example, the term "church", which was originally used in the sociology of religion in a sense defined by early sociologists like Max Weber and which had nothing to do with the concept of Christian theology.

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[1] In October 2016, there were 5 570 000 results for "islamophobia" on Google.

[2] Some years ago, there was a discussion about the legitimacy of this term in the journal for contemporary religions *Dingir.* The following text is an extension of one contribution to this discussion. Now the topic is even more pressing, due to recent events in Europe and their reflections in both the public and academic space.

Sometimes the redefinition is not so clear, which causes problems – that is the case of the second term in Weber's "church-sect" ideal typology.[3]

Besides the above-mentioned discourses (philosophy, theology and social science), there is another one to be mentioned, for it often meets the former discourses on the same subject (people and their behavior). It is also an area with its own ways of using language and argumentation and mainly its own aims. Here are examples of terms or concepts typical for last mass ideologies of the last century: "pure race", "new man", "classless society" or "reactionary". We have experienced a tragic fusion of ideologies with sciences ("race theory", "scientific worldview"). Ideologization of scientific or academic discourse in general is again a topical issue these days. "*The ideologues who have been in the ascendancy for the last thirty years have deformed science into an instrument of agitation and propaganda […] The core scientific principle of objectivity has been ignored in practice and denied validity in theory. Thus a large number of sociologists have become active combatants in the 'culture wars', almost always on one side of the battle lines. […] In recent years this version of sociology has intoned the mantra of 'class, race, and gender',*" wrote the doyen of sociology of religion P. L. Berger, some years ago.[4]

The boundary between scientific (academic) and ideological language is to be of concern to us here if we are to deal with the term "islamophobia".

There are plenty of definitions of what ideology is.[5] For our arguments, we can use the following, quite broad one, which says that "*[a]n ideology is a more or less coherent set of ideas that provides the basis for organized political action, whether this is intended to preserve, modify or overthrow the existing system of power.*"[6]

The difference between the language of sciences and ideologies is that the goal of the former is an expression of knowledge, whereas that of the latter one is a motivation to social or political action and the language itself is one of the means of such behavior. Like religious terms, for social sciences, ideological terms are part of the subject of inquiry; a part of reality, not a means to be used for studying reality, since they do not structure their definitions.

Let us recall the words of E. Voegelin, who complained about conceptual confusions that arise when the area of reality is mixed with the area of science (theory), or – as he says – symbols of reality and the theories explaining these symbols. In the context of the study of ideologies like Fascism or Socialism, he stated, that "*movements of the suggested type, together with their symbolisms, [7] were part of reality, [and]*

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[3] See Miloš Mrázek, "Terminologické problémy studia alternativní religiosity", *Theologická revue* (1, 2005): p. 55–63.

[4] Peter L. Berger, "Whatever Happened to Sociology?", *First Things* 34 (2002): p. 117.

[5] For some of definitions see Pavel Šaradín, *Historické proměny pojmu ideologie* [Historical Changes of the term "Ideology"], Brno: CDK, 2001; or Andrew Heywood, *Political Ideologies: An Introduction*, 6th ed., London: Palgrave 2017, p. 9–10.

[6] Martin Selinger, *Politics and Ideology*, London: Allen & Unwin, 1976; quoted acc. to Heywood, *Political Ideologies*, p. 10.

[7] This means terms from the vocabulary of the particular ideology: "*If the theorist, for instance, describes the Marxian idea of the realm of freedom, to be established by a Communist revolution, as an immanentist hypostasis of a Christian eschatological symbol, the symbol 'realm of freedom' is part of reality; it is part of a secular movement of which the Marxist movement is a subdivision, while*

*that only concepts could be defined but not reality, and that it was highly doubtful wheth-
er the language symbols in question could be critically clarified to such a point that they
were of any cognitive use in science.*"[8]

The origin of the concept of Islamophobia

Let us return to the term "islamophobia". The question is whether the term is scien-
tifically definable or whether it is a "language symbol" belonging to the vocabulary of
an ideology, which is the *subject* of scientific inquiry.

First we have to make a short historical overview of this word. Sources are not
in agreement concerning its first usage. We can find statements in the *Runnymede
Trust* as late as 1997[9], with a reference to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, saying that
the neologism was coined in late eighties and in the printed form as late as in 1991.[10] In
the present, the article "L'état actuel de l'islam dans l'Afrique occidentale française"
(1910) by the French Africanist Maurice Delafosse and the following book *La politique
musulmane dans l'Afrique Occidentale Française* written by Alain Quellien, a French
colonial bureaucrat, and published in Paris in the same year are usually mentioned
as the first printed texts containing the term "islamophobia". Both authors used the
word in the context of affairs in French colonies. Quellien, criticizing the colonial
authorities for their ignorance of the real situation in the Muslim colonies, used the
term islamophobes for those who considered the Muslims to be "the natural and ir-
reconcilable enemy of the Christian and the European".[11] Afterwards, we find this ne-
ologism (without any explicit definition) in the work of the French painter and con-
vert to Islam Alphonse Étienne Dinet and his Algerian friend Slimane Ben Ibrahim.
In 1918, they published Muhammad's biography[12] dedicated to Muslims fallen in their
service in the French army, and four years later the essay *L'Orient vu de l'Occident.* The
context of the usage is criticism of the Orientalist and Jesuit Henri Lammens, whose
works are an example of "*the degree of aberration to which Islamophobia can lead
a learned man*". Here is "islamophobia" a concept of the author's prejudice, which
mean the goal of his work is not science, but rather a "*pseudo-scientific crusade in the
hope of bringing Islam down once and for all*".[13] In the review *L'Orient vu de l'Occident,*

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such terms as 'immanentist,' 'hypostasis,' and 'eschatology' are concepts of political science." Eric
Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics,* The University of Chicago Press, 1952, p. 29.

[8] Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics*, p. 30.

[9] See bellow.

[10] In journal *Insight* in the context of the hostile relationship of the Soviet regime to Afghan Muslim.

[11] Acc. to Fernando Bravo López, "Towards a Definition of Islamophobia: Approximations of the
Early Twentieth Century", *Ethnic & Racial Studies* (4, 201), p. 567. Comp. Robin Richardson,
"Islamophobia or Anti-Muslim Racism – or What? – Concepts and Terms Revisited" (online),
Insted, 2012, retrieved September 2016, p. 3, available online at http://www.insted.co.uk/anti
-muslim-racism.pdf.

[12] *La vie de Mohammed, prophète d'Allah*, Paris: H. Piazza 1918, 305 p.

[13] Etienne Dinet and Sliman Ben Ibrahim, *L'Orient vu de l'Occident*, H. Piazza 1925, p. 26 a 20.
According to Bravo, "Towards a definition...", p. 564.

in the October issue of the Oxford *Journal for Theological Studies* in 1923, we find most likely the first usage of the word "islamophobia" in printed English.[14] However, the English translation of *La vie de Mohammed* translates "*l'islamophobie*" as "*feelings inimical to Islam*".

But these and a few occasional authors afterwards,[15] "*were not employing the term in such ways that it reflects the contemporary concept or usage.*"[16] This changed as late as in 1980s. What is interesting is that the authorship of the neologism, which has been used in the public discourse since then, is claimed by (or is ascribed to) several different Muslim activists advocating the interests of their minorities in the UK[17] and the USA[18]. We should also note, that the term was used by *mullahs* during the time of the Iranian Revolution to label opponents of islamization, e. g. women denying to wear a *hidjab*.[19]

There is quite a broad consensus that the current way of dealing with this term is influenced in a large extent by publications of the left-wing think-tank *Runnymede Trust.*[20] First it was the report *A Very Light Sleeper* in 1994, where "*anti-Muslim feeling [...] also sometimes known as Islamophobia*" are mentioned in the context of anti-Semitism.[21] Three years later another report was published, this time just about this issue: *Islamophobia – A Challenge for Us All*. Its authors define the term as "*a useful shorthand way of referring to dread or hatred of Islam – and, therefore, to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims*"[22] and "*unfounded hostility towards Islam*"[23] characterized by a so called closed view of Islam as:

1) a monolithic and static bloc,
2) separated from other cultures, not having aims or values in common with them
3) barbaric, irrational, primitive and sexist, and therefore inferior to the West
4) violent and aggressive, engaged in "a clash of civilizations"
5) rather a political ideology than a genuine religion.

This view is further characterized by

6) unwillingness to discuss the Muslim criticism of the West
7) justifying discriminatory practices of Muslims in society, and as the last
8) acceptance of anti-Muslim hostility as something natural and "normal".[24]

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[14] "Certain writers in particular are blamed for their 'Islamophobia'." STANLEY A. COOK, "The History of Religions", *Journal for Theological Studies* (25, 1923): p. 101.

[15] Viz BRAVO, "Towards a definition...", p. 574n.

[16] CHRISTOPHER ALLEN, *Islamophobia*, Farnham: Ashagate 2010, p. 5.

[17] ALLEN, *Islamophobia*, p. 6.

[18] See "Moderate Muslims Speak Out on Capitol Hill" (online), *IPT News*, October 2010, retrieved September 2016, available online at http://www.investigativeproject.org/2217/moderate-muslim -speak-out-on-capitol-hill.

[19] ALLEN, *Islamophobia,* p. 6.

[20] "With the publication of the Runnymede report in 1997, not only did the report significantly influence the way in which Islamophobia was understood but so too did it ensure that Islamophobia was afforded public and political recognition." ALLEN, *Islamophobia*, p. 15n.

[21] *A Very Light Sleeper: The Persistence and Dangers of Antisemitism*, London: Runnymede Trust 1994 (reprinted November 1997), p. 55.

[22] *Islamophobia – A Challenge for Us All*, London: Runnymede Trust 1997, p. 1.

[23] *Islamophobia...*, p. 4.

[24] *Islamophobia...*, p. 5.

As we already mentioned, this publication has fundamentally contributed to spreading the use of the term with such a definition in the language of politicians, activists, journalists, and authors of textbooks, and it is often present in many proclamations. Not surprisingly, with this spreading of the concept, its criticism has appeared too – from the part of those, who are described by this label, but also from scholars discussing both the adequacy of the aforementioned definition and the legitimacy of the term itself. The reason for the refutation of the concept is very often presented as advocacy of freedom of speech and legitimate warnings of the totalitarian tendencies of the proponents of political correctness. G. Orwell's concepts of Newspeak or Thoughtcrime are often mentioned in this context.[25] The words of Abdur-Rahman Muhammad, the former imam and member of *International Institute for Islamic Thought*, now a critic of islamization from the position of "moderate Islam", are sometimes quoted too: "*This loathsome term, is nothing more than a thought-terminating cliche conceived in the bowels of Muslim think tanks for the purpose of beating down critics.*"[26]

"Islamophobia" as a *terminus technicus*?

We therefore see, that both the usage of the term "islamophobia" and its criticism are weapons on the battlefield of political activism. It is used not as a cognitive means, but rather as "the basis for organized political action". The term then becomes a part of reality to be scientifically described, analyzed and explained. The task of science is not to look for a precise definition, like Christopher Allen, in his concise critical analysis of the *Runnymede* report[27], or Erich Bleich[28] tried to provide. Its task is to classify the term in question, to understand its development in different socio-cultural conditions etc., which requires an adequate distance.

An example of unfortunate results of an uncritical reception of the concept into the sociological vocabulary is mentioned by the German scholar Johannes Kandel from *Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung*. After his rejection of the *Runnymede* report's characteristics of islamophobia as too vague and excluding any critical discussion about Islam, he mentioned a research led by a well-known sociologist, Wilhelm Heitmeyer.

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[25] Matthew Vadum, "Lifting the Veil on the 'Islamophobia' Hoax" (online), *Foundation Watch*, December 2015, p. 1–11, available online at http://capitalresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/FW1215.pdf; Robert Spencer, "The Basics of Islam, Part 1 – 'Islamopohobia'" (online), *Jihad Watch,* April 2016, accessed September 2016, available online at https://www.jihadwatch.org/2016/04/video-robert-spencer-explains-the-islamophobia-scam.

[26] A quote from the stormy debate over the issue of whether there should be a mosque on the spot of the WTC Tweens in New York. See e. g.: Claire Berlinski, "Moderate Muslim Watch: How the Term 'Islamophobia' Got Shoved Down Your Throat, (online)" *Ricochet*, November 2010, retrieved September 2016, available online at https://ricochet.com/archives/moderate-muslim-watch-how-the-term-islamophobia-got-shoved-down-your-throat/.

[27] Allen, *Islamophobia*, p. 190.

[28] Erik Bleich, "What Is Islamophobia and How Much Is There? Theorizing and Measuring an Emerging Comparative Concept", *American Behavioral Scientist* (12, 2011): p. 1585.

He "measured" the islamophobia in German society since 2002. The claim that this phenomenon has grown was based on the ratio of affirmative and negative answers to theses such as:

9) "Muslims in Germany should have the right to live according to their own laws."

10) "It is up to Muslims alone to decide when they call the faithful to prayer by loudspeaker."

Kandel stated that according to this research, the rise of islamophobia is "scientifically proven" on the basis, that a part of society rejects physical punishments for adultery or apostasy, or does not wish to be disturbed by the muezzins' voice.[29] Regarding the fact, that the aim of such research is not knowledge but interference in society, fighting islamophobia in this case, we can consider it an example of ideologization, similar to what P. Berger warned about.

Islamophobia as an illness?

The term "islamophobia" clearly refers to a group of other terms, which signify certain mental disorders, such as claustrophobia, agoraphobia, androphobia, arachnophobia or social phobia. Needless to say, these are technical terms defined by competent scientists – psychopathologists. They describe symptoms allowing an appropriate differential diagnosis (e. g. tachycardia, trembling, difficulty breathing or dizziness).[30]

What is interesting, so called *ekklesiophobia* can be found among them. Analogically, to the concept of islamophobia as is it used today, we could think, that it would be "unfounded hostility towards Christian churches". Nevertheless, it is really a medical diagnosis; a case when a person shows symptoms of panic fear of churches or other sacral buildings. "Islamophobia" should then be a *terminus technicus* for a disorder when a person shows symptoms like tachycardia, trembling, difficulty breathing or dizziness when hearing a muezzin or touching Quran.

Of course, such mental disorder may occur and it would be similar to the *clinical* xenophobia. In fact, "islamophobia" is usually used as a specific kind of xenophobia. But this term itself is even more confusing as a terminus *technicus* in social sciences: As a diagnosis, it has its place among *specific (isolate) phobias*. Psychiatrists started to use this term for cases, when a person shows typical phobic reactions, due to some traumatic experience (as was the case of Americans veterans of wars in Korea and Vietnam), when coming into contact with anybody is similar to the person who

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[29] JOHANNES KANDEL, "Islamophobia – On the Career of a Controversial Term, (online)" *Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung* 2006, retrieved September 2016, p. 5–6, available online at http://www.fes.de/BerlinerAkademiegespraeche/publikationen/islamundpolitik/documents/Islamophobia.pdf.

[30] See e. g.: JÁN PRAŠKO, JANA PRAŠKOVÁ and HANA PRAŠKOVÁ, *Specifické fobie* [*Specific Phobias*], Praha: Portál 2008, p. 39.

caused the trauma (e. g. people with Asiatic features).[31] Such persons require treatment, just like other patients with any kind of phobia. A good illustration may be the Supreme Court of the USA decision in *Colorcraft Corp., Fuqua Industries, Inc. v. Jandrucko* in 1991, ratifying a case when an administrative law judge awarded a woman in Florida compensation, when her employer did not comply to her demand, that she be allowed not to come in contact with any African-American males in her work. Her clinical phobia toward black people developed after being attacked by a black man when doing her field job. She was able to prove, that it was not racism, but that her "negrophobia" was part of her post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), that she was trying to overcome through psychotherapy.[32]

This instance is an illustration of the need for distinguishing between socio-pathologiacal hatred towards minorities and psycho-pathological diagnoses. Every term with the suffix "-phobia", including "islamophobia", should be a part of scientific or academic vocabulary, reserved just for the second case. After all, PTSD may include a form of pathological fear of Muslims, e. g. after surviving an Islamist terrorist attack.

Advocates of the term "islamophobia" as a name for hostility toward Islam or Muslims use the argumentation that its similarity with the terms referring to clinical phobias is just phonetic. Of course, an etymological definition may be sometimes misleading – e. g. hemophilia is not a pathological affection to blood. But even just the ambiguous usage of "xenophobia" blurs the boundary between the psycho-pathological and "sociological" understanding.[33] Moreover, this is also the case of another "phobia", which is very often associated with islamophobia – *homophobia*. George Weinberg, who coined this term in the late sixties in the context of his struggle to delete homosexuality from the lists of diagnoses,[34] still struggles against classifying it as an illness, as opposed to the discrimination of homosexuals (not just a panic fear of one's own homosexuality). In the context of the official deletion of terms with the suffix "-phobia", except for their proper medical meaning, from the vocabulary of the *American Associated Press* reporters, he wrote, that "*[t]he word conveyed that gay people were not the ones suffering from an emotional problem; their oppressors were*".[35]

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31 "Xenophobia", (online), *All About Counseling*, retrieved October 2016, available online at https://www.allaboutcounseling.com/library/xenophobia/.

32 See John M. Casey, "From Agoraphobia to Xenophobia: Phobias and Other Anxiety Disorders Under the Americans with Disabilities Act" (online), *University of Pudget Sound Law Review* 17, Seattle: Seatle University of Law 1994, p. 408, 413, available online at http://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1422&context=sulr.

33 See e. g.: Peter F. Omoluabi, "Psychological Foundation of Xenophobia", in A. A. Olowu (ed.), *Xenophobia: A Contemporary Issue in Psychology,* Ile-Ife: The Ife Centre for Psychological Studies 2008, p. 53–71, where author promiscuously use both psycho-pathological and social meaning of the term.

34 Gabrielle Kuby, *Globální sexuální revoluce* [*Global Sexual Revolution*], Brno: Jiří Brauner – Kartuziánské nakladatelství 2014, p. 164n.

35 George Weinberg, "Homophobia: Don't Ban the Word – Put It in the Index of Mental Disorders", (online) *The Huffington Post,* 12. 6. 2012, retrieved October 2016, available online at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/george-weinberg/homophobia-dont-ban-the-w_b_2253328.html.

The problem of using such a term in academic vocabulary lies also in the fact that, due to its inherent reference to a sick mind (but not in the strict medical meaning), it has achieved a certain emotional nature. The term may grant the power to ostracize and "excommunicate" people from the society of "normal" and correct-thinking and -behaving persons (regardless of whether their criticism is irrational or not). On the other hand, it may also exonerate, diminsh the responsibility for one's expression of hatred.

Here lies the fundamental difference between the concept of islamophobia and the concept of anti-Semitism, which often get associated.[36] The latter does not have such an emotional charge. The counterpart to "islamophobia" is not "anti-Semitism", but "judeophobia", which is also sometimes used today.[37] Nevertheless, this word is even older that the first known usage of "islamophobia" – already at the end of the 19th cent., the physician and Zionist activist tried to introduce it Leon Pinsker, who considered hostility toward Jews to be a specific illness. Shlomo Avineri comments that "*because he was a doctor, such quasi-clinical* explanations obviously appealed to *Pinksner's mind, but the terminology, of course, begging the question. By saying that judeophobia is the cause of Jew-hatred, Pinsker really says that non-Jews fear Jews because they are affected by a malady whose main symptom is a fear of Jews. Such an explanation is simplistic and lacks an adequate historical dimension.*"[38] There is also no reason to apply such argumentation to "islamophobia".

Conclusion

The question of this text was "is there a place for the term 'islamophobia'?" in the vocabulary of social sciences (incl. islamologists and religious studies scholars) as their *terminus technicus*. Is there any possible definition respecting boundaries of this academic field? In our brief summary of the history of the term, an important fact has been noted: that originally it was used by activists (Muslims, multiculturalists), and not by scholars. Most importantly, we have noticed an overly broad and vague definition, which was introduced into public discourse by the think-tank *Runnymede Trust*. This definition covers not just socio-pathological manifestations of hatred, but also some legitimate critical studies of Islam. A comparison of "islamophobia" to definitions of clinical phobias revealed certain intrinsic negative emotions.

Social scientists should not look for a precise definition, as it is not their job to define ideological terms (such as "pure race" or "reactionary"). The usage (or rejection) of such terms, or rather symbols, in political debates is to be tied to reality, which should be the subject of critical academic study. This means a resignation to the objectivity of non-partisan inquiry.

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[36] See e. g. the Runnymede Trust report *A Very Light Sleeper*.
[37] See e. g. Pierre-André Taguieff, *La Judéophobie des Modernes*, Paris: Odile Jacob 2008, 686 p.
[38] Shlomo Avineri, *The making of modern Zionism: The intellectual origins of the Jewish State*, New York 1981, p. 77.

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Religious Belief of the Czech Population in the 1921–2011 Censuses[1]

Markéta Růžičková

Abstract: The article is focused on the definitions of religious belief in the Czech Republic in the censuses from 1921 to 2011. General information about censuses and the method of publication of the results are mentioned. The results of the main groups sorted by religious belief and their changes compared to previous censuses are described by each census. The article uses the data called Demographical Handbook 2014[2] and census data from the Czech Statistical Office.

Keywords: census, religious belief, Czech Republic, methodology, Demographical Handbook

Abstrakt: Text se zaměřuje na definici náboženského vyznání v České republice ve sčítáních lidu od roku 1921 do 2011. Jsou zde popsány hlavní informace o jednotlivých sčítáních lidu a poté také metody publikace výsledků. Tento text zmiňuje výsledky podle hlavních skupin náboženského vyznání a porovnává je s předchozími sčítáními. Pro článek jsou využita data z Demografické příručky 2014 a také data ze sčítání lidu publikovaná Českým statistickým úřadem.

Klíčová slova: sčítání lidu, náboženské vyznání, Česká republika, metodika, Demografická příručka

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In the beginning of the text we will mention important historical facts and factors, which affect the religious beliefs of the people in our state. Religious beliefs of the population have been studied in censuses since 1880. The data analyzed in this article will be from 1921 onwards, because those contain data from this area after the creation of Czechoslovakia. After the 1950 census, questions on religion were banned in official documents and renewed after the fall of Communism in the 1991 census. The government of the Czechoslovak Republic rejected any evidence of religious belief by the regulation from the 27th of July 1954 and ministers and presidents of central institutions were instructed "not to demand information about religious belief / or the fact that they have no religious belief from citizens in state offices or companies, and citizens also should not state the information about their religious belief in official documents, paper forms, and questionnaires and in new forms there should not be any question on religious belief." Religious classes in schools were also very restricted.[3]

This was abolished by the government of the Czechoslovak Republic in regulation 649/1990. There was a change in the formulation of the question on religious belief, because before 1991, formal church membership was counted, and after 1991 the question asked about religious belief by the respondents' own declaration. Despite that in 1991 census inhabitants weren't willing to fill in the question on religious belief and they thought that it was an unacceptable breach of their privacy. In consequence, it was acceptable not to answer the question on religious belief and the value of this information decreased. Both traditional and new churches in the Czech Republic had the opportunity to gain believers after the revolution in 1989, but the traditional ones didn't benefit from the situation; they had inner problems, for example the restitution of their property. Some people weren't satisfied with institutionalized churches; they weren't looking for a strictly defined religion and let themselves be influenced by many religious movements. After some time, stronger secularization trends emerged again, corroborated by the anti-Catholic attitudes of the Czech society and the atheist propaganda of the Communist regime in the past.[4] The dwindling of the number of believers was also caused by the older generations dying – and these generations were traditionally members of churches more often than their children. The percentage of religious people started to decrease sharply in the generations born between 1942 and 1950 who grew up in the 1950s'. In the next generations the percentage of religious people didn't change much and remained around one third of the population.[5] Czech people could be divided into three groups according to their religious

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[3] "Sčítání lidu, domů a bytů 2011 – Pramenné dílo" [2011 Census of People, Houses and Appartments – A Source Material] (online), *CSO* [*Czech Statistical Office*], Praha: CSO 2013, retrieved 15. 1. 2016, available online at https://www.czso.cz/csu/czso/scitani-lidu-domu-a-bytu-2011 -pramenne-dilo-2011-op37nad790, p. 3.

[4] D. Lužný and M. Navrátilová, "Náboženství a sekularizace v České republice" [Religion and Secularization in Czech Republic] (online), *Sociální studia* (4, 2001): p. 111–125, retrieved 31. 7. 2016, available online at http://socstudia.fss.muni.cz/dokumenty/080319142015.pdf.

[5] D. Hamplová, "Institucionalizované a neinstitucionalizované náboženství v českém poválečném vývoji" [Institutionalized and Non-Institutionalized Religion in Czech History After World War II], *Soudobé dějiny* (2–3, 2001): p. 294–311.

belief, but the distribution cannot be accurate for everyone: religionists (regular attendants of services, as well as those who merely formally claim a church affiliation), atheists (confirmed, as well as those who think of atheism only as unchurchedness) and a "category in between".[6] Hamplová has also dealt with this topic, for example in the book *Náboženství v české společnosti na prahu 3. tisíciletí*.[7]

Despite these facts, the census remains the only source of information about religious belief of the total population of the state, or more precisely of the half of the population who filled in the question in the last 2011 census. There are of course other, much more detailed sources of information about the religious belief of the Czech population, but censuses are the only ones that contain the data about the population overall. Among other sources, we can name the international surveys European Values Study, International Social Survey Programme, and European Social Survey, in which the Czech Republic also takes part and which contain detailed questions on religion.[8] Then there are many surveys organized to contain detailed information only about the Czech Republic or combined with some neighborhood states, for example Aufbruch, Detradicionalizace a individualizace náboženství (Detradicionalization and individualization of religion), and many others, organized by various researchers and institutions.[9] More information about the surveys could be found for example in Váně and Kreidl's article.[10]

When we want information about members of the Roman Catholic Church, it is possible to find the data from the census of participants of religious services in selected years[11] and there are also data from the yearly evidence of the vicars, which are only partly available to the public.[12]

The aim of this text is to analyze religious belief in the censuses from 1921 to 2011. For each census, the formulation and definition of the question on religious belief, legislative arrangements and the main results according to religious groups are de-

[6] O. Nešporová and Z. R. Nešpor, "Religion: An Unsolved Problem for the Modern Czech Nation", *Sociologicky časopis/Czech Sociological Review* 45 (6, 2009): p. 1215–1237.

[7] D. Hamplová, *Náboženství v české společnosti na prahu 3. tisíciletí* [Religion in Czech Society on the Verge of the Third Millennium], Praha: Karolinum 2013, 152 p.

[8] "About the European Social Survey" (online), *ESS* 2016, retrieved 8. 8. 2016, available online at http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org; "About European Values Study" (online), *EVS* 2016, accessed 6. 8. 2016, available online at http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/page/about-evs .html; "General information" (online), *ISSP* 2016, retrieved 8. 8. 2016, available online at http://www.issp.org.

[9] D. Lužný and Z. R. Nešpor, *Sociologie náboženství* [*Sociology of Religion*], Praha: Portál 2007, 232 p.

[10] J. Váně and M. Kreidl, "Přehled výzkumů mapujících religiozitu v ČR po r. 1989" [A Survey of Researches on Czech Religiosity after 1989], S*DAinfo* (3–4, 2001): p. 1–5.

[11] "Úkony duchovní správy v ČR" [Pastoral administration in the Czech Republic] (online), Plenární sněm Katolické církve v ČR [Plenary Assembly of Roman Catholic Church in the Czech Republic] 2002, retrieved 1. 8. 2016, available online at http://snem.cirkev.cz/index0156.html?menu=156.

[12] R. Tichý, "Lidé, skupiny a praktiky v české katolické církvi 1997–2005" [People, Groups and Practices of the Czech Catholic Church 1997–2005] (online), *Pražské sociálně vědní studie*, 2008, retrieved 4. 8. 2016, available online at http://publication.fsv.cuni.cz/attachments/284_015%20 -%20Tichy.pdf.

scribed. The last part then compares the data from the censuses and analyzes the differences between the groups based on religious belief. In the whole text, we analyze only data for the area of the Czech Republic, including the period of 1921–1991, when the country was a part of Czechoslovakia.

1921 Census

The last census in our state before the First World War was in 1910. After the war, the State Statistical Office was founded and was made responsible of organizing a census. According to tradition, the census should have taken place in 1920, but that was not possible because the preparations were not complete and the borders were not yet precisely defined – so the census was held on the 15th of February 1921. Its execution was in accordance with the 256/1920 act.[13] It was processed for the present inhabitants (defined by their mere presence in the country on the date of census) and the results were published in the Czechoslovak Statistics edition (7 vol.).[14] The formulation of the question on the religious belief was the same as in the censuses in the former Austria-Hungary monarchy. The question was formulated in the manual to the census sheet: "The information about the respondent's religious belief or whether the respondent has no religion is to be written here. Catholics and Protestants should state the church they belong to and members of other churches should write the answer in the same way; for example the Czechoslovak Church, Old Catholic Church etc. Persons with no religion are only those who are not members of any church".[15] Adventists also weren't considered as Christian church.

The publication of the results was interesting, because there was no difference between churches that were recognized by state and those that were not, so a church not recognized by the state with a higher number of believers would have its name stated in the publication.[16] To the date of the census, 92.8% of inhabitants declared themselves to belong to a church; it was 90.1% in the Czech part of the country, 98.2% in the Moravian part and 98.6% in the Silesian part.

In Table 1, we can see the numbers of inhabitants who declared themselves members of some churches, the percentage of them in the population and the difference between sexes. It is possible to see high percentages of Roman Catholic Church members (80.3% of men and 83.5% of women). The Czechoslovak Church, which was

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[13] "Statistika, od historie po současnost" [Statistics: From History to Today] (online), *CSO* [*Czech Statistical Office*], Praha: CSO 2006, retrieved 28. 1. 2016, available online at https://www.czso.cz/csu/czso/historie_statistiky.

[14] "Sčítání lidu, domů a bytů 2011…", https://www.czso.cz/csu/czso/scitani-lidu-domu-a-bytu-2011-pramenne-dilo-2011-op37nad790.

[15] *Náboženské vyznání obyvatelstva podle výsledků sčítání lidu v letech 1921–1991* [Religious Affiliation of the Population According to the 1921–1999 Census], Praha: CSO 1995, p. 9.

[16] *Náboženské vyznání obyvatelstva podle výsledků sčítání lidu v letech 1921–1991* [Religious Affiliation of the Population According to the 1921–1999 Census], Praha: CSO 1995, p. 9.

founded only two years before the census,[17] already had a high number of members; for both sexes, it was more than 5% of the population. The percentage of unidentified religious belief was minimal for both sexes; 1 564 inhabitants in total. The number of people without a religion was also small (compared to censuses 1991 and after); in this census it was 8.6% of men and 5.9% of women; in this group, the percentage was higher among men and it remained like that in the next censuses.

Table 1: Selected groups of religious belief, 1921 census

Religious belief	Total	Men	Women	Total (%)	Men (%)	Women (%)
Roman Catholic	8 201 464	3 854 014	4 347 450	82.0	80.3	83.5
Church of Czech Brethren	231 199	111 960	119 239	2.3	2.3	2.3
Orthodox	9 221	6 030	3 191	0.1	0.1	0.1
Czechoslovak	523 232	258 286	264 946	5.2	5.4	5.1
Unidentified	1 564	910	654	0.0	0.0	0.0
No religion	716 515	410 414	306 101	7.2	8.6	5.9
Total population	10 005 734	4 801 623	5 204 111	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: CSO, Demographical Handbook 2014 (Demografická příručka 2014), custom calculations
Notice: Only selected groups of religious beliefs are in the table; the sum is not 100%

1930 Census

The second Czechoslovak census was supposed to take place (according to the 256/1920 act) in 1925, but because of economic reasons and the example of other states where censuses took place every 10 years, the census was postponed. According to the 47/1927 act, the census took place on the 1st of December 1930.[18] The results were published in the Czechoslovak Statistics edition (8 vol.) and the information about flats was processed in a detached volume.[19] In this census, religious belief was stated in the census sheet based on the church (recognized or not recognized by state) a person belonged to. In case a person wasn't the member of any church, the person was marked "without religion". When converting to another church, it was necessary to inform the district office.[20] Catholics were also asked to write whether they were Roman, Greek or Armenian Catholics. Protestants had to write which church they belonged to, for example the Church of Czech Brethren etc. Members of oth-

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[17] *Náboženské vyznání obyvatelstva podle výsledků sčítání lidu v letech 1921–1991* [Religious Affiliation of the Population According to the 1921–1999 Census], Praha: CSO 1995, p. 10.

[18] "Statistika, od historie po současnost", https://www.czso.cz/csu/czso/historie_statistiky.

[19] "Sčítání lidu, domů a bytů 2011…", https://www.czso.cz/csu/czso/scitani-lidu-domu-a-bytu -2011-pramenne-dilo-2011-op37nad790.

[20] *Náboženské vyznání obyvatelstva podle výsledků sčítání lidu v letech 1921–1991* [Religious Affiliation of the Population According to the 1921–1999 Census], Praha: CSO 1995, p. 44.

er churches answered in the same way, for example members of the Czechoslovak, Orthodox, Old Catholic Church etc.[21]

In the 1930 census, 9,840 thousand of people declared themselves members of some church; this is 92.0% percent of the population. Table 2 shows the number of members in selected religious groups and their percentage in the total population. If we compare these values to those in 1921, the highest absolute gains belong to the Czechoslovak Church (256 440 inhabitants) and the Roman Catholic Church (176 615 inhabitants) and the structure of the population according to religious belief has also changed. The absolute increase in members of the Czechoslovak Church also translated into the increase of the percentage of the total number of inhabitants; in the 1930 census, 7.4% of men and 7.2% of women stated this church. In comparison, the Roman Catholic Church registered a gain of members in absolute numbers, but its percentage of the total number of inhabitants decreased (the share was in this case 76.6% of men and 80.3% of women). Categories "no religion" and "unidentified" were linked together, so we can't recognize precisely to which of these groups inhabitants belonged, but this category had 9.5% of men and 6.3% of women.

Table 2: Selected groups of religious belief, 1930 census

Religious belief	Total	Men	Women	Total (%)	Men (%)	Women (%)
Roman Catholic	8 378 079	3 963 583	4 414 496	78.5	76.6	80.3
Church of Czech Brethren	290 994	141 305	149 689	2.7	2.7	2.7
Orthodox	24 488	14 347	10 141	0.2	0.3	0.2
Czechoslovak	779 672	382 835	396 837	7.3	7.4	7.2
Unidentified and no religion	834 144	490 078	344 066	7.8	9.5	6.3
Total population	10 674 386	5 174 074	5 500 312	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: CSO, Demographic Handbook 2014 (Demografická příručka 2014), custom calculations
Notice: Only selected groups of religious beliefs are in the table; the sum is not 100%

1950 Census

The plans for the next census were to organize one in 1940, but this was postponed. There were only partial censuses in 1946 and 1947 and a census took place on the 1st of January 1950.[22] Similarly to the previous ones, this census was governed by the 47/1927 act, but also by government regulation 224/1949 about a census in 1950 and

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[21] Š. MORÁVKOVÁ, "Metodologie zjišťování náboženského vyznání při sčítání lidu, domů a bytů 2001" [Methodology of Religious Affiliation Investigation in the 2001 General Census] (online), *Demografie* (2, 2004): p. 116–120 retrieved 21. 1. 2016, available online at https://www.czso .cz/documents/10180/20563243/180304q2.pdf/5a9cbb0b-237e-429f-8173-288b31be5707 ?version=1.0.

[22] "Statistika, od historie po současnost", https://www.czso.cz/csu/czso/historie_statistiky.

registers connected to it. A census of agricultural, industrial and trading companies was conducted on the same day, so this event was called "the national census 1950".[23] This census was the last one processing all present inhabitants. The results were classified, published in limited amount of copies, and released between 1957 and 1958 in a small edition (4 vol.) named Census of Inhabitants and Houses and Apartments in the Czechoslovak Republic on the 1st of March 1950; the data was made public in 1962.[24] In this census, religious belief was defined in the same way as in the previous census – as the membership in a church or a religious community. If a person wasn't a member of any church or religious community, "no religion" should be stated in the census sheet. As in the previous census, it wasn't possible to change religious belief only by stating it in the census sheet. It was also recommended to Catholics to write a specific church of which they were members, the same with Protestants; religious belief of the members of other churches and religious communities, for example Czechoslovak, Orthodox, Old Catholic etc. should be mentioned in the same way.[25]

To the date of the census 8,353 thousand of people declared themselves as members of churches or religious communities – nearly 94% of total inhabitants. The information about absolute and relative data is presented in Table 3. While comparing the data from 1950 to the results of the previous census in 1930, it is very important to take into account the fact that as a consequence of the Second World War and the expulsion of Germans, the total number of population declined by nearly 1.8 million. This decrease is reflected in the reduction of absolute numbers and also percentages of the members of some churches, above all of the Roman Catholic and German Protestant Church, and the Israeli belief. For the Roman Catholic Church, the reason for the decline of this percentage could be, to a certain extent, a transfer of believers to other churches, but this church still had the biggest share of the total population; that is 75.1% of men and 77.5% of women. On the contrary, other churches, mainly the Czechoslovak and Church of Czech Brethren registered a stable rise of the number of believers and also the rise of percentage of total population in the period 1921–1950; for the Czechoslovak Church the percentage rose to 10.6% of men and 10.7% of women. The percentage of members of the Church of Czech Brethren increased to 4.5% of men and 4.6% of women. Categories "no religion" and "unidentified" were again divided in this census; in the case of people of an unidentified religious belief, there was a small increase of the percentage in comparison to the 1921 census, but it still did not go over 0.3%. People without religion registered a small decrease of the percentage compared to 1921; in 1950 7.1% of men and 4.7% of women declared themselves as "without religion".

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[23] *Náboženské vyznání obyvatelstva podle výsledků sčítání lidu v letech 1921–1991* [Religious Affiliation of the Population According to the 1921–1999 Census], Praha: CSO 1995, p. 78.

[24] "Sčítání lidu, domů a bytů 2011…" https://www.czso.cz/csu/czso/scitani-lidu-domu-a-bytu -2011-pramenne-dilo-2011-op37nad790.

[25] *Náboženské vyznání obyvatelstva podle výsledků sčítání lidu v letech 1921–1991* [Religious Affiliation of the Population According to the 1921–1999 Census], Praha: CSO 1995, p. 78.

Table 3: Selected groups of religious belief, 1950 census

Religious belief	Total	Men	Women	Total (%)	Men (%)	Women (%)
Roman Catholic	6 792 046	3 248 882	3 543 164	76.4	75.1	77.5
Church of Czech Brethren	401 729	193 329	208 400	4.5	4.5	4.6
Orthodox	50 365	25 359	25 006	0.6	0.6	0.6
Czechoslovak	946 813	458 371	488 442	10.6	10.6	10.7
Unidentified	22 889	12 764	10 125	0.3	0.3	0.2
No religion	519 962	305 886	214 076	5.8	7.1	4.7
Total population	8 896 133	4 325 641	4 570 492	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: CSO, Demographical Handbook 2014 (Demografická příručka 2014), custom calculations
Notice: Only selected groups of religious beliefs are in the table; the sum is not 100%

1991 Census

The last Czechoslovak census was organized on the 3rd of March 1991 and processed all permanent residents in the area by the date of census. 1,172 publications containing the results were released (including 848 for the territory of the Czech Republic), a really important publication being Pramenné dílo.[26] The publication Inhabitants of the Czech Republic According to Religious Belief (Obyvatelstvo ČR podle náboženského vyznání) was focused on religion and included an analysis of the information about the distribution of inhabitants according to religious belief; it also compared the results with the available data from 1950. This publication was issued in 1992. The census was regulated by the 21/1971 act about the unified system of socioeconomic information and some additional government regulations.[27] The question on religious belief was again included in the census after 40 years. The government of the Czechoslovak Republic had to issue the 649/1990 regulation to cancel the still valid 1410/1954 regulation about the cancellation of the evidence of religious belief. Nevertheless, because of the big publicity of this issue and the contextual negative opinion of some inhabitants, this question was often left unfilled. Religious belief was defined as participation in the religious life of some church (religious community) or a relationship to it. Every person could freely decide his or her own religious belief or write "no religion".[28]

   More than 4.5 million of inhabitants declared themselves as members of some church in 1991 census; this was nearly 44% of the state population. Another nearly 4.1 million of inhabitants specified that they had no religion and nearly 1.7 million of inhabitants didn't fill in this question. Srb and Andrle[29] write that in this census,

[26] "Statistika, od historie po současnost", https://www.czso.cz/csu/czso/historie_statistiky.

[27] "Historie sčítání" [A History of Census] (online), *CSO* [*Czech Statistical Office*], Praha: CSO 2015, retrieved 29. 1. 2016, available online at https://www.czso.cz/csu/sldb/historie_scitani.

[28] *Náboženské vyznání obyvatelstva podle výsledků sčítání lidu v letech 1921–1991* [Religious Affiliation of the Population According to the 1921–1999 Census], Praha: CSO 1995, p. 128.

[29] V. Srb and A. Andrle, "Náboženské vyznání obyvatelstva České republiky ke 3. březnu 1991" [Religious Affiliation of Czech Republic Inhabitants in 3. 3. 1991] (online), *Demografie* (3, 1994):

inhabitants in the age of 40–49 and younger (generations 1941–1950 and younger) didn't answer the question more frequently (it is a considerable turning point in the percentage of unidentified answers by age in comparison to the older inhabitants). They explain it by the fact that these generations were exposed to a systematic influence of antireligious propaganda. As Kučera[30] mentions, we can expect that only a small amount of people were afraid to state their religious belief. But on the other hand, a huge amount of people declared in this census that they were believers, even if it could be more a manifestation that they were baptized (not that they had a strong relationship to the church). Another group could consider being religious a "modern trend" when it wasn't prohibited to declare it, or they could declare themselves as religious "out of spite" when they couldn't do so in the previous 40 years. There was of course the biggest part of believers who considered themselves to be religious as a declaration of real faith and participation of the religious life of the church, but most of them didn't attend church services regularly.

42.3% of men and 37.7% of women were without religion as we can see in Table 4; it is a huge increase compared to 1950 (but we can't correctly compare these two censuses because of the different definitions). There was also an increase of the percentage of people who didn't fill in the answer compared to 1950; it was 17.0% of men and 15.4% of women. Christian churches (mostly Roman Catholic, Church of Czech Brethren and Czechoslovak Hussite Church) had a decisive majority in the overall number of believers. There was a huge decline in the percentage of members of the Roman Catholic Church compared to 1950; 36.4% of men and 41.5% of women stated they were members in 1991. The Czechoslovak Church also noted a decrease of members; 1.4% of men and 2.0% of women wrote themselves as members of this church in 1991.

Table 4: Selected groups of religious belief, 1991 census

Religious belief	Total	Men	Women	Total (%)	Men (%)	Women (%)
Roman Catholic	4 021 385	1 819 482	2 201 903	39.0	36.4	41.5
Church of Czech Brethren	203 996	89 297	114 699	2.0	1.8	2.2
Orthodox	19 354	8 275	11 079	0.2	0.2	0.2
Czechoslovak	178 036	70 759	107 277	1.7	1.4	2.0
Unidentified	1 665 617	850 426	815 191	16.2	17.0	15.4
No religion	4 112 864	2 116 547	1 996 317	40.0	42.3	37.7
Total population	10 302 215	4 999 935	5 302 280	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: CSO, Demographical Handbook 2014 (Demografická příručka 2014), custom calculations
Notice: Only selected groups of religious beliefs are in the table; the sum is not 100%

p. 181–188, retrieved 28. 1. 2016, available online at https://docs.google.com/folderview ?pli=1&id=0Bwo5H2vnLAxYR1JRNjZCY3ZoZXc.

[30] M. Kučera, "K interpretaci výsledků sčítání 1991 o náboženském vyznání" [Towards an Interpretation of the Results of the 1991 Census Related to Religious Belief] (online). *Demografie* 46 (3, 1994): p. 189–191, retrieved 29. 1. 2016, available online at https://docs.google.com/folderview ?pli=1&id=0Bwo5H2vnLAxYR1JRNjZCY3ZoZXc.

2001 Census

The decisive moment of the 2001 census was midnight between 28th February and 1st March. The evaluation of the data was complicated by different types of census sheets and a big number of inhabitants who were away from their permanent address on the date of the census (nearly 750 thousands of people). The results were processed by place of permanent residence.[31] Many outputs were released (available printed or online), among them the very important Pramenné dílo.[32] This census had, for the first time from 1930, its own act concerning its execution – it was the Act of Census of Population, Houses and Apartments in 2001 158/1999, while the design of census sheets was modified by the 354/2000 regulation.[33] Religious belief was (just like nationality) among the questions which should be filled according to one's own decision, with a possibility of not answering at all. In the explanatory text, a list of churches recognized by the Czech state was included to serve as an informational aid, but it was also possible to write different religious communities or faiths. This census was accompanied by a negative media campaign both before and in the process; the public was made aware of the potential misuse of the data and could decide to boycott the census. Nevertheless, census papers were collected for a majority of the population in the end; only around 1% were unidentified.[34]

The International Recommendations for the 2000 censuses of population and housing in the ECE region proposed 3 approaches to the question on religious belief: 1) formal (official) churchmanship in a specific church or religious community, 2) attendance to religious services of the church or religious community, 3) faith or religious belief. The Czech Republic chose the third one of these possibilities – the most liberal approach. The reason was tradition and comparability of the data with previous censuses. The question on religious belief offered two possibilities, first one wasthea text "no religion" and the second one "believer, write to which church or religious community you belong in the most precise way possible". There were no restrictions on the formulation of a particular church in the field.[35]

There was a big decrease of the percentage of believers in this census in comparison to 1991; however, the situation could be explained by a unique atmosphere in society after the fall of Communism and because of that, it is possible that the results

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[31] "Náboženská víra obyvatel podle výsledků sčítání lidu" [Religious Beliefs of the Population According to the Census] (online), *CSO* [*Czech Statistical Office*], Praha: CSO 2014, retrieved 22. 1. 2016, available online at https://www.czso.cz/csu/czso/nabozenska-vira-obyvatel-podle-vysledku-scitani-lidu-2011-61wegp46fl.

[32] "Historie sčítání lidu. Statistika a my" [A History of Census: Statistics and Us] (online), *CSO* [*Czech Statistical Office*], Praha: CSO 2011, retrieved 28. 1. 2016, n. 2, p. 17–21, available online at https://www.czso.cz/csu/czso/statistika-my-c-22011-rtqoo02vcb.

[33] "Demografická příručka 2014", https://www.czso.cz/csu/czso/demograficka-prirucka-2014.

[34] "Historie sčítání", https://www.czso.cz/csu/sldb/historie_scitani.

[35] Morávková, "Metodologie zjišťování náboženského vyznání…", p. 116–120.

from 2001 are more precise.[36] In 2001 3.3 million of inhabitants declared themselves believers; one third of the total population (in 1991 43.9% of inhabitants declared themselves as believers). On the other hand, there were more than 6 million people without religion in 2001, which means nearly three fifths of the whole population (62.2% of men and 56.0% of women), whereas in 1991 only 39.9% of the population were without religion. The rest of the population (because of the possibility of not answering the question) is in the unidentified category (9.2% of men and 8.5% of women); you can find the data in table 5. The unidentified category constitutes 901 thousand inhabitants; nearly one tenth of the whole population. There was a decrease in this category compared to 1991; at that time it constituted 16.2% of inhabitants.

The Roman Catholic Church still held a dominant position, although in comparison to the previous census, there was a further decrease of the percentage of its members in the total number of inhabitants – 23.8% of men and 29.7% of women declared themselves as members of this church in 2001 census. In a majority of other churches there is also a decline, but for the Orthodox Church, the percentage of believers rose a little, to 0.2% of men and 0.3% of women. An increase of members can be seen for churches registered after 1989 (for example Jehovah's Witnesses who registered one of the highest increases: from 14 575 members in 1991 to 23 162 in 2001, which makes an increase of 58.9%, but there were some even greater increases).

Table 5: Selected groups of religious belief, 2001 census

Religious belief	Total	Men	Women	Total (%)	Men (%)	Women (%)
Roman Catholic	2 740 780	1 184 162	1 556 618	26.8	23.8	29.7
Church of Czech Brethren	117 212	49 137	68 075	1.2	1.0	1.3
Orthodox	22 968	10 019	12 949	0.2	0.2	0.3
Czechoslovak	99 103	37 717	61 386	1.0	0.8	1.2
Unidentified	901 981	457 841	444 140	8.8	9.2	8.5
No religion	6 039 991	3 099 810	2 940 181	59.0	62.2	56.0
Total population	10 230 060	4 982 071	5 247 989	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: CSO, Demographical Handbook 2014 (Demografická příručka 2014), custom calculations
Notice: Only selected groups of religious beliefs are in the table; the sum is not 100%

2011 Census

The 2011 census had its decisive moment at midnight from 25th to 26th March 2011. Actual residency was taken into account for the first time, meaning the place where people usually stay in their everyday lives. The census sheet could also be filled online

[36] "Náboženské vyznání obyvatelstva České republiky" [Religious Affiliation of the Czech Republic Population] (online), a press release, *CSO* [*Czech Statistical Office*], Praha: CSO 2004, retrieved 21. 1. 2016, available online at https://www.czso.cz/csu/czso/nabozenske_vyznani_obyvatelstva _ceske_republiky_23_12_04.

and the results of the census are available both online and printed in a large number of publications.[37] Similarly to the previous census, this one also had both a specific act and a regulation, 279/2010. Within the frame of the § 6 296/2009 act, which specified the contents of the census the information about religion and nationality were specified as voluntary and this was also noted in the census sheet. In the case of the religious belief question, it became clear that with rising age the willingness to answer the question also increases. The region also had some influence: the respondents from the Zlín region answered most often.

The fact that everyone was supposed write the answer according to his/her own decision was included in the explanatory text and there was a possibility to declare oneself to be a "believer not in a church", while the fields "no religion" and "believer, in a church" remained. More than 705 thousand of inhabitants used this new possibility; it was 6.2% of men and 7.3% of women. This number of inhabitants could be the confirmation of the shift of participants of traditional churches towards alternative faiths and religions.

There was also a shift in the number of registered churches and religious communities which could be stated in the census paper. 11 new churches got registered between 2001 and 2011, so by the date of census the inhabitants could choose from 32 registered churches.[38]

This census was regulated not only the acts of the Czech Republic, but also international recommendations, specifically the World Programme of Population, Houses and Apartments Censuses Around 2010 resolution. Following this resolution, the document Recommendation of the European Statistician Conference to the Population, Houses and Apartments Censuses Around 2010 specified the key topics. The Czech Republic followed these recommendations and prescriptions of the European Union, with the intention to be in agreement with these documents, but it was also important to have some continuity and a long-term comparability of results; therefore, traditional questions, which weren't obligatory according to the prescriptions of the European Union, were also included in the census.[39]

More than 2,168 thousand of people declared themselves religious, constituting only a fifth of the inhabitants of the Czech Republic. Nearly 1.5 million of people also noted a specific church or religious belief in the census sheet. People who wrote "Catholic", "Protestant" or "Christian" are also included in this number; this kind of answers amounted for nearly 92 thousand, while a further 53 thousand answers could

[37] "Demografická příručka 2014", https://www.czso.cz/csu/czso/demograficka-prirucka-2014.

[38] "Data registrace církví a náboženských společností a svazů církví a náboženských společností" [Registration Dates of Churches, Parishes, and Religious Communities] (online), *Ministerstvo kultury České Republiky* [Ministry of Culture of the Czech Republic], Praha: MKČR 2016, retrieved 20. 1. 2016, available online at http://www.mkcr.cz/cz/cirkve-a-abozenske-spolecnosti/registrace-a-evidence/data-registrace-cirkvi-a-nabozenskych-spolecnosti-a-svazu-cirkvi-a-nabozenskych-spolecnosti-11263/.

[39] "Sčítání lidu, domů a bytů 2011...", https://www.czso.cz/csu/czso/scitani-lidu-domu-a-bytu-2011-pramenne-dilo-2011-op37nad790.

not be classified, so they were put in the category "other".[40] In comparison with 2001 there was an increase in missing answers; in this census 45.2% of men and 44.2% of women didn't write any answer. The increase in unidentified answers might be the reason for the decrease of the percentage of inhabitants who declared themselves without religion; 36.0% of men and 33.1% of women stated they were "without religion," as we can see in Table 6. The increase in missing answers also partly resulted in the decline of members of some churches. There was an increase of member numbers (among the traditional churches) in the Greek Catholic Church (of 29%), the Church of Czech Brethren (of 9%) and the Old Catholic Church in the Czech Republic (of 8%). Some growth was registered also by the International Society for Krishna, but in absolute numbers, it wasn't an important increase. There were more members of the Orthodox Church in this census compared to 2001 (in 2001 it was 0.2% of total inhabitants and in 2011 0.3%); the reason may be a newly registered Russian Orthodox Church, jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Moscow and all of Russia in the Czech Republic.[41]

The Roman Catholic Church registered a further decrease in the percentage of believers, as 1,082 thousand of inhabitants declared themselves members of this church; 9.2% of men and 11.5% of women. Similar trend could be observed in the Church of Czech Brethren, which had 51 thousand members in the 2011 census; 0.4% of men and 0.6% of women. The third traditional Church – Czechoslovak – was named by 40 thousand inhabitants and similarly to the previous churches, there was a decline to approximately one fourth of the size in 1991.

Table 6: Selected groups of religious belief, 2011 census

Religious belief	Total	Men	Women	Total (%)	Men (%)	Women (%)
Believers not in church	705 368	316 694	388 674	6.8	6.2	7.3
Roman Catholic	1 082 463	467 493	614 970	10.4	9.2	11.5
Church of Czech Brethren	51 858	22 214	29 644	0.5	0.4	0.6
Orthodox	26 350	12 636	13 714	0.3	0.3	0.3
Czechoslovak	39 229	15 150	24 079	0.4	0.3	0.5
Unidentified	4 662 455	2 310 094	2 352 361	44.7	45.2	44.2
No religion	3 604 095	1 838 898	1 765 197	34.5	36.0	33.1
Total population	10 436 560	5 109 766	5 326 794	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: CSO, Demographical Handbook 2014 (Demografická příručka 2014), custom calculations
Notice 1: Only selected groups of religious beliefs are in the table; the sum is not 100%
Notice 2: There is newly also the Russian Orthodox Church, jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia in the Czech Republic in the Orthodox category, registered on the 26th of May 2007 (MKCR, 2016)

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[40] "Demografická příručka 2014", https://www.czso.cz/csu/czso/demograficka-prirucka-2014.
[41] "Data registrace církví a náboženských společností…", http://www.mkcr.cz/cz/cirkve-a-abozenske -spolecnosti/registrace-a-evidence/data-registrace-cirkvi-a-nabozenskych-spolecnosti-a-svazu -cirkvi-a-nabozenskych-spolecnosti-11263/.

Conclusion

This article focuses on the summary of the findings about religious belief in censuses from 1921 to 2011. There were some changes in the definition of religious belief (as well as the omission of the question in the censuses in 1961, 1970 and 1980) and the definition of who is an inhabitant has also changed. An outline of these changes can be seen in the table 7.

Table 7: Definition of religious belief and inhabitant in censuses from 1921 to 2011

Year of census	Definition of inhabitant	Definition of religious belief
1921	present	member of church
1930	present	according to register
1950	present	according to register
1991	permanent residents	own declaration of religious belief
2001	permanent residents	own declaration of religious belief
2011	actual residents	own declaration of religious belief

Source: CSO, 2014b, CSO, 2013, Morávková, 2004, custom form

There were many changes in the results of the question on religious belief in censuses between 1921 and 2011; the most impressive one being a huge decline in believers. As we can see in Table 7, the definition of religious belief (and inhabitants) changed between 1950 and 1991, so we have to take the censuses between these years into account separately. As Kučera mentions,[42] there is the change in the definition of religious belief in the census, but also 40 years of changes in the life of people; in 1991, only 43% of the people who lived in the time of the 1950 census were alive. In 2011 there was also a change in the definition of religious belief (and a new option in the form of "a believer without a church affiliation"), so this census is also separate from the others. Results of the censuses between 1921 and 1950 aren't very different; there is only a slight decrease in the Roman Catholic category, as we can see in picture 1 (the graph shows the percentage of each group in the total population in the selected year).

After the reintroduction of the question on religious belief in 1991, the first decline of believers was toward the category of non-believers (even more visible in 2001), while later a big percentage of population didn't answer the question at all (in 2011 44.7% of inhabitants were unidentified). The development of population according to religious belief can be seen in the picture 8. As we can see, in 2011 there were even more people who didn't fill the question than who declared themselves non-believers.

We can see the data from 1991, 2001 and 2011 censuses in more detail analyzed in Tables 8 and 9. There was a decline in believers in all age groups between the analyzed years; in 2011 this is even more visible in older age groups (this is also true when we add together the believers not in a church and believers in a church in 2011). When we

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[42] Kučera, "K interpretaci výsledků sčítání…", https://docs.google.com/folderview?pli=1&id=0Bwo 5H2vnLAxYR1JRNjZCY3ZoZXc.

Picture 1: Percentage of total inhabitants without religion, believers and members of the Roman Catholic Church, censuses 1921–1950, Czech Republic

Source: CSO, Demographical Handbook 2014 (Demografická příručka 2014), custom calculations
Notice: In 1930, the categories "unidentified" and "no religion" were together in one category; these people are in the "no religion" category in this chart

Picture 2: Percentage of inhabitants without religion, believers, unidentified and members of the Roman Catholic church, censuses 1991–2011, Czech Republic

Source: CSO, Demographical Handbook 2014 (Demografická příručka 2014), custom calculations
Note: Actual residents were taken in account in 2011, so the results are not comparable to the previous censuses. In 2011 there was an option to declare oneself as a believer without church affiliation, so there is a new category. Believers in this year in the picture are people, who declared themselves as believers of some church.

look at the group of believers not in a church, the distribution is (with the exception of the age of 15–19) nearly the same in the whole adult population. The distribution of believers in a church increases with age, and the ratio of older and younger age groups is nearly the same in 2001 and 2011, but on a different level.

Table 8: Change of the proportion of believers in age groups between the 1991, 2001 and 2011 censuses (% of total inhabitants in the selected age group)

Age group	1991	2001	2011	
			Believers in church	Believers not in church
15–19	33,6	20,1	10,0	5,2
20–29	31,7	20,5	9,8	7,0
30–39	32,7	22,1	10,3	7,4
40–49	49,1	26,1	11,2	7,5
50–59	67,0	41,0	12,7	7,5
60–69	68,9	61,9	20,0	8,2
70–79	73,3	64,6	31,3	7,9
80+	75,3	67,9	32,6	7,2

Source: CSO, 1995 and CSO Pramenné dílo census 2001 and 2011
Notice: In 2011 believers were divided into two groups – believers in a church and believers not in a church

When we focus on the years 2001 and 2011, there could be a difference because of a change of the definition of inhabitants (permanent residents and actual residents), but the difference in census results on the state level is marginal. The difference between the share of unidentified in 2001 and 2011 is high. There could be a shift from believers in 2001 to unidentified in 2011, but also from people who wrote "no religion" in 2001 to unidentified in 2011, which is even more visible.

Table 9: Change of the proportion of unidentified and without religion in age groups between 2001 and 2011 censuses (% of total inhabitants in selected age group)

Age group	Unifentified		No religion	
	2001	2011	2001	2011
15–19	8,2	45,0	71,8	39,9
20–29	8,7	43,1	70,8	40,0
30–39	9,1	43,9	68,8	38,4
40–49	9,0	44,3	64,9	37,0
50–59	9,1	44,4	50,0	35,4
60–69	6,7	44,6	31,4	27,2
70–79	5,6	41,9	29,9	19,0
80+	6,9	40,6	25,2	19,6

Source: CSO, 1995 and CSO Pramenné dílo census 2001 and 2011
When we see the willingness to fill in the information about the religious belief in the census, there is still the question of what percentage of inhabitants will answer it in the 2021 census – if it remains there, despite the increased emphasis on protection of personal data.

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Advertising and Methodology
What advertising has to teach us about (the study of) Thai Buddhism
Part two

Miloš Hubina

Abstract: In this paper I make proposals regarding further advances in the studies of Theravada Buddhism along the lines suggested by Justin McDaniel in his *The Lovelorn Ghost and the Magical Monk* (2011). The benefits of Mc-Daniel's approach lie in his de-emphasis of doctrinal tradition and his focus on local frames of reference in explaining Thai Buddhism. Its faults lie in a disregard for the developments outside the socio-cultural paradigm. I argue for the integration of socio-cultural and naturalist approaches to the study of religion. Balancing the over-accentuation of the explanatory power of either socio-cultural or cognitive concepts, such integration would also permit a move from the socio-cultural metaphorical models to causal and more controlled explanations of religious phenomena.
I illustrate my suggestions through an example of a Thai *wat* (shrine/monastery). One of these suggestions, implied by the de-emphasis of the doctrinal tradition, is to recognize the predominantly advertising and ritualistic function of wats' visuals, effigies, and architecture rather than reading them as symbolic expressions of doctrinal tenets.

Keywords: Thailand, Buddhism, Theravada, Advertising, Wat, Shrine, Cognitive Science of Religion

Abstrakt: Ve svém článku se pokouším o další rozvinutí metodologie studia thajského buddhismu navrhnuté Justinem McDanielem v jeho knize *The Lovelorn Ghost and the Magical Monk* (2011). Pozitivem přístupu vypracovaného Mc-Danielem je, že ve snaze osvětlit charakter thajského buddhismu přesouvá důraz ze studia doktrinální tradice na prvky lokálního kontextu. Negativem pak je opomíjení výsledků bádání a teoretických postupů souvisejících bezprostředně s jím navrhovanými řešeními, formulovanými však mimo standardní socio-kulturní paradigma. Na příkladu situace v thajském *watu* (klášter/svatyně) Thámai ilustruji možnou integraci socio-kulturních a naturalistických přístupu, která umožňuje postup od užitečných metafor socio-kulturních modelů ke kauzálním a více kontrolovatelným vysvětlením náboženských fenoménu a vyvažuje přeakcentovávání explanační síly jak sociokulturních, tak kognitivních konceptů. Jedním z důležitých motivů, které bezprostředně vycházejí z metodologického odklonu od důrazu na doktrinální stránku při vysvětlování "žité" náboženské tradice, je potřeba rozeznat primárně reklamní a rituální charakter thajských buddhistických vizuálů, architektury a podobizen, které tradičnější přístup interpretuje jako symbolické vyjádření článků doktríny.

Klíčová slova: Thajsko, buddhismus, theravada, reklama, wat, svatyně, kognitivní religionistika

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Where the wat begins?

Wat Thāmai, rebuilt in 1989 from an abandoned *wat* into a prosperous and popular site, is located 60 km West of Bangkok in Samut Sakhon province, and concentrates the divergent elements of Thai Buddhism scattered across more than 40 000 Thai monasteries. In condensed form it reveals religious sentiments, and values of a large sample of Thai population.

The Thai *wat* is typically thought of as an enclosed compound whose high roofs, *stūpas*, *prangs*, or elevated geographical position announce its presence far beyond its walls.

Wat Thāmai, remote from Bangkok's historical hot-spots and urban centers, makes its presence noted broad and wide by means of car-stickers (pic. 1), billboards (pic. 2), a web page (http://wattamai.org/), a Facebook profile, and publications. For practical reasons I will limit my discussion to the most direct and accessible forms of advertising which don't require an active search on the part of targets. This will leave aside web-pages, books, pamphlets and journals.

The most visible advertising material is car-stickers with the name of the *wat*. In the streets of Bangkok one has a chance to meet a car with such a sticker as often as about once per hour. Some other *wats* e.g., wat Phutthavāt, wat Khunjan, or wat Thākhrabɯ have also adopted this advertising strategy but with a much lesser presence. Luang Pī Sɵ (หลวงพี่สอ), a monk responsible for advertising at wat Thāmai told me that the stickers originally identified cars belonging to the *wat*. Later, on request of frequent visitors, they started producing them on a large scale.

In their capacity to make the *wat* visible far beyond its actual location, the trifling stickers are the equivalent of towering *stūpas*, shrines, and effigies. Unlike the monuments, however, they have to stimulate the drivers' active participation in what Luang Pī Sɵ, upon my prompt, to be a form of "indirect advertising".

The appeal rests in the stickers' protective function. They are blessed (T. athitthān-jit, อธิษฐานจิต) by the abbot Luang Pī Uthēn (หลวงพี่อุเทน) though, unlike amulets and other more powerful objects, they are not subject to the T. *pluksēk* (ปลุกเสก) ritual charging them with magical power (T. *sagsit*, ศักดิ์สิทธิ์). Some informants expressed the belief that the protective blessing helps them to drive safely. More often, however they responded echoing the message written on the banner next to the shop where the stickers, amulets, religious statues and other objects can be obtained.[1] It reads: "Wherever adherents/disciples (T. *lūksit*, ลูกศิษย์) of wat Thāmai see the sticker wat Thāmai they behave to each other with love and loving kindness, and help each other." (pic. 3) People expressed the belief that attached to cars the stickers create a community among anonymous drivers who are then more likely to help each-other, show respect, and exhibit less aggression in driving. To be sure, the line between a magical and non-magical view of the same practice is often blurred and people can

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[1] The stickers are kept in a small basket on the counter. No price is given; anybody can take them and leave a small donation, if they wish, in a donation-box next to the counter.

entertain both views simultaneously. At any rate, these were the only answers I have been getting through dozens of informal talks and casual questions.

Let me now delineate the tentative "stabilizing dint" of the practice.

According to general cognitive theory of magical thinking, in the absence of an obvious causal link between magical action and its presupposed effect, the mind spontaneously seeks "weak" causal connections. These consist of perceptual associations of contiguity, similarity, and force dynamics[2] and are organized through various "image schemata".[3] The image schemata, pre-conceptual structures ordering our perceptual experience, include the "object – container" schema.[4] The structure of these intuitions makes it feel natural that a substance – "magical power" (T. *sagsit*, ศักดิ์สิทธิ์) – can be transmitted via physical contact (contagion, continuity)[5] from its source (a monk) to a "container" (sticker) and then further to a car. This is not to say that we are bound to believe in the efficacy of particular practices or magic in general. The point is that magical practices structured in accord with these intuitions will feel more "natural" and believable than those which defy them (e.g., magician inserting his own, instead of the victim's, hair into the voodoo doll).

As for the non-magical explanation of the stickers' attractiveness, the general human tendency to join groups, "groupishness",[6] encoded in our cognitive architecture explains the human proclivity for forming groups with a variety of membership criteria.

Both of these are general theories which sufficiently explain magical thought and the general human tendency to form groups. They, however, do not suffice to explain the recruitment of these structures in this particular context. To answer McDan-

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[2] Things once connected may mutually influence each other even after disconnection (e.g., a voodoo doll containing hair, nails, or another part of the intended victim's body), like affects like (e.g., pouring water may cause rain), the more effort invested the more probable or greater the effect will be.

[3] For a thorough description of magical thinking see Jesper Sørensen, "Charisma, Tradition, and Ritual: A Cognitive Approach to Magical Agency", in Harvey Whitehouse and Robert M. McCauley (eds.), *Mind and Religion: Psychological and Cognitive Foundations of religion,* Lanham: Altamira Press 2005, p. 167–186; and Jesper Sørensen, *A Cognitive Theory of Magic*, Lanham: Altamira Press 2007, *passim.*

[4] E.g., we expect that the soul, or mind, although immaterial is in the body. Image schemata orient our intuitions about the words according to our tactile experience. Our language reflects them when we for example say that we are in troubles (object-container schema), etc.

[5] Kumer explains that contiguity is the main cue for causality. As he says "contiguity is a major cue of weak cause detectors because, without stronger knowledge concerning what events can or cannot have been the cause of a particular event, the number of candidate environmental events that occurred (even in the preceding five minutes before the effect) is too large to be analyzed from an acceptable number of repetitions." Hans Kumer, "Causal Knowledge in Animals", in Dan Sperber, David Premack and Ann J. Premack, *Causal Cognition: A Multidisciplinary Debate*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, New York: Oxford University Press 2002 (first published 1995), p. 26–36.

[6] See Matt Ridley, *The Origins of Virtue*: *Human Instincts and the Evolution of Cooperation*, Penguin Books 1996, p. 39 ff.; Pascal Boyer, *Religion Explained*: *The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought*, New York: Basic Books 2001, p. 126; Jonathan Haidt, *The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion*, New York: Vintage 2012, chapter 9.

iel's questions – Why is this practice popular (or likely to be popular) among Thais? Why is this *wat* popular? We need to attend to the cultural aspect of the stabilizing dint. It is relatively easy to find religious practices isomorphic with the magical explanation of the stickers' protective power. The craze for "lucky" numbers on cars' registration plates is one example. Another is the practice of attaching the stickers "This car is red" (or of any color determined by a specialist, usually a monk, as auspicious for the car) to cars of a non-corresponding color. It is believed that the sticker substitutes for a much more expensive re-painting of the vehicle. These and similar phenomena echo more traditional apotropaic routines of drawing protective *yantras* on objects of utility, which nowadays includes the cars. (pic. 4) The practices thus reinforce each other as each of them derives part of its stability from belonging to an established belief. This cluster is in turn nested in the broader cultural system and stabilized via correspondence with specific cultural values and practices. The nesting also permits the non-religious explanation of its practices.

The symbolic indication of social status, institutional affiliation, or connection to centers of power has been identified by anthropologists and psychologists as a part of Thai protective social strategy.[7] It includes massive purchasing of real and fake brand apparel and accessories, popularity of registration plates with the EU flag, uniforms, or jackets with logos and badges. Much more visible than in Europe are small emblems attached to the inside of a car's window signaling the driver's affiliation to a specific institution. A few years ago the Nazi swastika and other Nazi motifs were popular, attached to a vehicle or worn printed on a t-shirt. Though less visible today, they haven't disappeared utterly despite a criticism in the media stimulated by the Westerners' reactions rather than a genuine domestic knockback. (pic. 5)

The protective function of these signs and symbols is achieved by turning the person from a nebulous social unit to a recognizable T. *khon mī sī* (คนมีสี). Engel defines "*khon mī sī* (people who have colors)" as an expression for "people who are set apart from the general population because they wear uniforms, such as the police, military, or other government officials"[8] but as a principle the concept stretches far beyond these groups. If no real or feigned association with a prestigious institution is

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[7]　As Mulder observes, "Even in the most casual encounters, people soon want to find out who the other person is in terms of his social rank, and consequently, their relative social distance: What is the work he does? *To what institution or group does he belong?* What rank does he hold? Is he rich or poor? Has he studied, and where?" NIELS MULDER, *Everyday Life in Thailand: An Interpretation*, Bangkok: Duang Kamol 1979, p. 68, emphasis mine. Or elsewhere "Any attributes of status that one can muster are brought to the fore to demonstrate relative rank and position, ranging from nuances of speech to the displaying the insignia of rank, from one's dress to a style of life. It appears that one's security is highly dependent on the symbols and material resources that one can muster, everybody is striving to be พี่ (*phii*, 'older brother'), *phuujaj*, or เจ้านาย (cawnaaj, 'boss'). MULDER, *Everyday Life in Thailand*, p. 70.

[8]　DAVID M. ENGEL and JARUWAN D. ENGEL, *Tort, Custom, and Karma*: *Globalization and Legal Consciousness in Thailand*, Stanford: Stanford University Press 2010, p. 173.

possible, the Nazi swastika or other symbols of dangerous naked power wielded by hooligans, T. *naklēng* (นักเลง), do the same job.[9]

McDaniel is right in marking out security as a motive associated with religious behavior. Indeed, the arguments to the effect that "feelings of vulnerability to physical, societal, and personal risks are a key factor driving religiosity" (Norris, Inglehart 2004: 4) has been made repetitively and from various theoretical perspectives in the history of religious studies. But security seems to be a universal,[10] not uniquely Thai value. It can also mean different things in different contexts. As Norris and Inglehart also observe, "[t]he wide range of dangers means that the concept of human security can become so broad and overloaded that it can lose all coherence and practical utility, as well as becoming difficult or even impossible to gauge with a single composite measure. Nevertheless, the core idea of human security, irrespective of the specific nature of the risks, is one that is widely recognized as important to well-being, and we regard the absence of human security as critical for religiosity."[11]

Given this universality and large scale of domains, unless a range of dangers, insecurities, and ways of dealing with them endemic to Thai reality are specified, "security" cannot tell us anything about Thai Buddhism in particular. McDaniel fails to provide any such specifications and all his values are presented in the same way.

Besides enthusiastic and advertising descriptions of "smiling people" produced by tourist authorities, also many official documents on "Thainess", reflecting their political agenda, present an idealized form of Thai culture and a prescriptive rather than

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[9]   "The marginal persons follow a different strategy, and their power inspires fear rather than respect. [...] They present themselves as naked power, to be feared and respected like malicious spirits, and in everyday life it is recommended to stay out of their way or to buy them off" (MULDER, *Everyday Life in Thailand,* p. 77). Mulder analyzed both the Thai social structure and the structure of supernatural beliefs in terms of two main forms of power recognized by Thais. One is strictly moral T. *khun* (คุณ) – goodness, the other amoral T. *dēt* (เดช). He emphasizes that *khun* is to be found in the family circles while "[i]n the overall Thai social process a person equates with his status and relative position of power, from which he derives intense satisfaction. There is no morality or goodness implied although they may be present; it is rather the show of being superior, powerful, and prestigious that matters." (Mulder 1979: 71) In the public sphere or "third person interaction" as Mulder calls it "the attributes of power seem to predominate the interaction: one wards it off by polite (สุภาพเรียบร้อย) and humble (ถ่อมตัว) behavior and expects that the powerful expression of the other is so subdued" (Mulder 1979: 75). These concepts of power also inform Ockey's political analysis. He identifies "two broad styles of traditional leadership: the *phudi*, based on *khunna* [*khun*], or virtue, and the *nakhleng*, based on *decha* [*dēt*], or power" (JAMES OCKEY, *Making Democracy: Leadership, Class, Genders, and Political Participation in Thailand*, Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books 2004, p. 15). While a *phūdī* (ผู้ดี) (good man) is considerate, compromising set firmly in and respecting the social structures, a *nakhlēng* (นักเลง) is a maverick, a hooligan executing his will through his personal rather than institutionally vested powers.

[10] See SHALOM H. SCHWARTZ, "Universals in the Content and Structure of Values: Theoretical Advances and Empirical Tests in 20 Countries" (online), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* 25 (1992), accessed May 2016, available online at http://kodu.ut.ee/~cect/teoreetiline%20 seminar%2023.04.2013/Schwartz%201992.pdf.

[11] PIPPA NORRIS, and RONALD INGLEHART, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press 2004, p. 4.

descriptive system of Thai values.[12] Still, some politically motivated documents do aim beyond merely inculcating desirable values. The document issued by the National Security Council in 1976, for example, identifies both the negative and positive Thai characteristics in an attempt to create a basis for the "development of national identity". The list includes: love of freedom; loyalty towards the monarchy; respect of religion; dislike of violence; assimilation; coordination of interests; elevation of money, power and knowledge, seniority, generosity, forgiving, fun and risk-taking; belief in the supernatural; doing whatever one pleases; upholding of tradition and custom; a Buddhist contentedness; and an attitude supportive of non-interference in other people's affairs."[13]

Turning to academic writings, Khruakaew in his "Thai Social Characteristics" mentions wealth, power, seniority, *naklēng* spirit (*naklēng* is "hooligan", "rouge", T. *huamai*, หัวไม้), social status, generosity, gratitude, wisdom, propriety in etiquette.[14]

Suntaree Komin, in what is still the most complex analysis of Thai social values and behavioral patterns,[15] identifies nine value clusters according to their relative significant position in the Thai cognitive system: 1. ego orientation, 2. grateful relationship orientation, 3. smooth interpersonal relationship orientation, 4. flexibility and adjustment orientation, 5. religio-psychical orientation, 6. education and competence orientation, 7. interdependence orientation, 8. fun-pleasure orientation, 9. achievement-task orientation.[16]

Though the value of safety doesn't appear explicitly on her list, Komin discusses it in the context of religious-psychical orientation. She notes a high correlation between the concept of "national security" and "religion": "An inspection of these two values shows a correlation of + 32, the highest correlation of religion with any variable."[17] She also notes that "for the Thai, **National security** is the top concern and more so in the rural areas than in Bangkok."[18] Less specifically she discusses the issue of inter-

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[12] Recently the National Council for Peace and Order issued the list of the twelve Thai values to be nurtured (ค่านิยมหลักของคนไทย 12). These are actually twelve clusters of values and include: loving the nation, religion and the monarchy; honesty, sacrifice, patience; gratitude to parents and teachers; continuous learning – Institutionalized or self-learning; ethics, honesty, concern about other people; the correct understanding of the principles of the democracy with the king as the head of state; discipline, law-abiding, respect to superiors, and others. The list has been then published on webpages of many governmental institutions. See "The Twelve Thai Values" (online), Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, accessed February 2016, available online at http://www.mnre.go.th/ewt_news.php?nid=3230.

[13] Determining factors of national ideology, in *National Ideology [Udomkan khong chat,* อุดมการณ์ ของ ชาติ*],* 1983, p. 21–22; quoted in Michael K. Connors, *Democracy and National Identity in Thailand*, New York, London: RoutledgeCurzon 2005, first published 2003, p. 138.

[14] Phaithun Khruagaew Na Lamphūn, Lagsana Sangkom Thai, Nāi Yōt Ying Sōphon Phū Phim Phū Khōsanā 1975 , p. 69–79.

[15] Komin's study is based on data derived from two national samples, 1978 with a total of 2469 samples and 1981 with 2149 samples, collected via multistage sampling technique. Suntaree Komin, *Psychology of Thai People: Values and Behavioral Patterns*, Bangkok: NIDA 1990 p. 290.

[16] Komin, *Psychology of Thai People*, p. 160 ff.

[17] Komin, *Psychology of Thai People*, p. 133.

[18] Komin, *Psychology of Thai People*, p. 143, emphasis original.

personal and social insecurity. It appears passim in her study but doesn't receive concentrated attention. Starting with the early serious studies of Thai society in the late fifties scholars have emphasized the insecure nature of social relationships and overall flexible, unpredictable, non-committing, and opportunistic Thai behavior.[19] General distrust from Thai people towards their legal system and unreceptive police described by Engel & Engel[20] underlines this insecure quality of an environment where weak institutionalized protection and law enforcement makes the whims of the powerful an unfathomable threat. At the present, Thailand occupies the 125th position (out of 163) on the list of the Global Peace Index ranked with the most peaceful countries on top. In terms of Societal Safety & Security it occupies 131th position.[21]

The Thai value system seems to strongly contribute to this social insecurity. Go Sawatdipanit ponders that in his personal opinion "the most prominent characteristic of Thai people is acting feely."[22] Mole,[23] referring in this respect also to David Wilson's *Politics in Thailand,*[24] sorts out the Thai's "[d]esire to be free of supervision" as a commonly discussed characteristic Thai quality. In the Komin's study the value figures as "flexibility and adjustment orientation" or "flexibility over principle and ideology".[25]

This "freedom" is closely related to the elevated status of "power" in the Thai value system since power augments the opportunity to "do whatever one pleases". As will become clearer presently, the ego orientation, *naklēng* spirit, and social status values are understood in the context of the two values. In actual fact, power-structures guide most of Thai social dynamics which, floating freely over institutional structures, are fueled by individuals' differential capacities to bestow or deny benefits on the basis of personal rather than institutional criteria.

Mulder makes the concept of power central to his analysis of Thai society and religion, and in both areas it proves a useful heuristic tool. Many Thai sociologists make the same emphasis.[26] In my further discussion of the Thai value system and behavioral patterns I will draw mainly on his and Komin's studies.

The proverbial Thai smooth and highly formalized interpersonal relationships often stand, as both scholars concur, as the only buffer between one and the unchecked exercise of power in the highly unpredictable world. In Mulder's own words:

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[19] See KOMIN, *Psychology of Thai People*, p. 197.
[20] DAVID M. ENGEL, and JARUWAN D. ENGEL, *Tort, Custom, and Karma*: *Globalization and Legal Consciousness in Thailand*, Stanford: Stanford University Press 2010, 190 p.
[21] "Global Peace Index 2016" (online), *Institute for economics and Peace*, accessed June 2016, available online at http://static.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/GPI%202016%20Report_2.pdf, p. 9, 111.
[22] GŌ SAWATPHĀNIT, "Lagsana Sanghom Thai", in PHANĒK ISARA SANGKOM VITHAIĀ LAE MĀNUSAIAVITHAIĀ MAHĀVITHAIĀLAI THAMMASĀT, Rāingān Gān Sammanā Thāng Vichāgān Rɯang Lagsana Sangkhom Thai, HJG. Gān Phim Phranakhon, 1979, p. 151.
[23] ROBERT L. MOLE, *Thai Values and Behavior Patterns*, Rutland: Charles E. Tuttle Company 1973, p. 51.
[24] DAVID A. WILSON, *Politics in Thailand*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1963.
[25] KOMIN, *Psychology of Thai People*, p. 197–207.
[26] See MULDER, *Everyday Life in Thailand*, p. 61.

"Behind the smile of smooth interaction we will often find insecurity and the feeling of *kreengklua* [fear, awe ...]. [P]ersons meet with each other as with potentially harmful forces that need to be subdued by nice, polite, and pleasant behavior. The ritual smile and presentation are the primary (and often ultimate) defense mechanisms to deal with each other."[27]

Elaborating further on this point he brings to light the connections between the role of social presentations, the ego, social status and insecurity:

"Some people identify highly with their social performance, invest heavily in presentation, and are consequently highly vulnerable in their presentation. Status anxiety and insecurity would therefore seem to be endemic, eventually coupled with feelings of inferiority and of revenge and vindication. The powerful element of presentation being that important and so potentially dangerous, one may also expect deep seated feelings of suspicion, fear, and techniques to avoid confrontation with power: *kreengklua*, *kreengcaj*, and non-commitment becoming deeply internalized attitudes."[28] Though tempering Mulder's claims that Thais' "'pleasant' presentation is a defense mechanism generated mainly from fear",[29] Komin also asserts that "[t]he Thai are first and foremost ego oriented" and that "[t]his ego orientation is the root value underlying various key values of Thai."[30] She then draws a portrait of an unstable inter-individual environment in which Thais "can be easily provoked to strong emotional reaction, if the 'self' or anybody close to the 'self' like one's father or mother, is insulted" and doesn't fail to mention the "countless number of examples in the media, where people can readily injure or kill another person for seemingly trivial results."[31] Her description thus reveal an emotional landscape where, as in Mulder's and others accounts, the symbolic regulation of behavior serves as a buffer against irrational outbursts whenever one's "ego" is threatened. Criticizing the Buddhism-explains-it-all approach she goes on to say that "[t]his is why many analyses using Buddhist influence to explain about the Thai being so gentle, ever-smiling, non-aggressive, affable and have high tolerance for uncertainty, fail to explain the sudden emotional outburst of Thai behavior."[32]

The outbursts provoked by a threat to the socially constructed "ego" are ruptures in otherwise neatly controlled behavioral patterns, sensitized to social hierarchy, constantly reading the surrounding power-structures and what do they mean for one's "ego".

It should be noted that the social and religious practices discussed above are not designed to reduce the overall uncertainty by making the environment more transparent, predictable, and rule-based. With the high tolerance to uncertainty among the Thai people, the focus is on protecting oneself through mustering as much power

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27 MULDER, *Everyday Life in Thailand*, p. 73.
28 MULDER, *Everyday Life in Thailand*, p. 82.
29 KOMIN, *Psychology of Thai People*, p. 17.
30 KOMIN, *Psychology of Thai People*, p. 161.
31 KOMIN, *Psychology of Thai People*, p. 161.
32 KOMIN, *Psychology of Thai People*, p. 162.

as one can in a fundamentally uncertain world. Of course, the fact that the power one wields is most functional in social situations when it is recognized but doesn't have to be exercised, boosts the importance of symbolic means which indicate one's power and status.

As suggested above, the "ego" is strongly dependent on appearance and symbolism. Komin notes the general Thai tendency to prefer "form over content"[33] and maintains that one's ego is identical with façade, "the face", and is very sensitive.[34] She warns that "[t]o make a person lose "face", regardless of ranks, is to be avoided at all costs."[35] Mulder, speaking in one voice with Komin, puts in plain words that "[p]resentation is one's social being, at which one is measured, more according to qualities of conformity and power than of knowledge, integrity or morality."[36] He also shows how the fragility of the symbolically construed ego piles on the overall insecurity of the environment:

"That presentation, or face, however, is easily insulted. Like any other spirit, power wants to be *kreengklua* and to be shown honour and respect. If not, power may turn vengeful, and revenge for insult of power and position is highly endemic to Thai society, for which we only need to read the daily newspaper, to reflect upon the rich vocabulary to express feelings of hatred and revenge, and the ease with which competitors are killed and done away with." (Mulder 1979: 75–76) As I am writing these lines the Channel 3 is presenting news about a senior lecturer from Phranakhon Rajapath University (มหาวิทยาลัยราชภัฏพระนคร) shooting dead his two colleagues in response to what he called offenses and wrong-doing.

Overall, Thais are born into a highly formalized environment where a successful and mentally satisfying life is conditioned by continuous detection of, and self-adjusting to, symbolic representations of power. Not only powerful and respected personages are shown respect. Respect is paid, by a slight bow with palms joined in front of one's chest (T. wai, ไหว้), also to the statues of the Buddha, deities, kings, omnipresent spirit-houses or distant roofs of a *wat*. This is not to say, however, that people live in constant fear, bowed down under an ominous shadow of power. Exactly because the power is universally acknowledged and sufficiently indicated to prevent a confrontation, it typically assumes a coercive form only in extreme and foreseeable situations. As with the Thai approach to ghosts, captured in the popular saying "you may not believe, but never offend", it is more a matter of constant vigilance rather than immediate confrontation.

Wat Thāmai stickers resonate with this dominant cultural pattern of protective association through powerful symbols. The protective power of symbols in this case doesn't depend on any particular doctrinal tenet or necessarily "religious" – i.e., "related to extra-empirical entities" – beliefs. It draws on overall cultural recognition of

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[33] KOMIN, *Psychology of Thai People*, p. 226.
[34] KOMIN, *Psychology of Thai People*, p. 162.
[35] KOMIN, *Psychology of Thai People*, p. 162.
[36] MULDER, *Everyday Life in Thailand*, p. 83.

the power of symbols, re-affirmed everyday through the character of interpersonal relations, socio-political practices and, ultimately, the very nature of one's "ego".

Karma and Billboards

Large billboards and smaller posters and banners are other uses of media to extend a *wat's* presence beyond its walls. In Bangkok, five paid billboards advertise wat Thāmai's activities, usually one month in advance. A freelancer hired to make their design draws on the abbot's suggestions, who also decides about the billboards placement. No part of the process is supervised by a higher ecclesiastical authority. In addition to these temporary billboards a few permanent installations produced and managed by the *wat's* followers can be seen in the streets of Bangkok. One of them is hanging from a three-story building at the busy Krathum Baen intersection. (pic. 6) It says "The place of Siamese belief – wat Thāmai". The word "belief" is expressed by Thai word "*satthā*" (ศรัทธา) (Pali. *saddhā*) typically denoting the attitude of trust in the Buddha's teaching while blind faith or superstitious beliefs are referred to as "*khwāmchʉa*" (ความเชื่อ). The statues represented in the pictures announce the objects of this belief. They include the Buddha, the "Hindu" gods Ganesa and Shiva, the Chinese Guan Ying, and the demon Rāhu (T. Phra Rāhū, พระราหู). The composition also contains a picture of a senior Theravāda monk, Luang Pī Rung (หลวงพี่รุ่ง), teacher of the present abbot, the *uposatha* hall, and – aligned along the bottom edge – a group of young, good-looking Thai movie-stars. The message is clear – this panoply of supernaturals, personages and values they represent doesn't refer to a cultic movement, a lower form of a higher tradition but to complex practices and aspirations of mainstream Thai Buddhists.

   Banners along the road to the wat's main entrance, posted in the adjacent parking lot or inside the *wat* provide a straight insight into the values directing, at least from a significant part, Thai religious life. On the road, the banners announce "strength", "wealth", and "prosperity"; those in the parking lot feature Thai movie-stars, magical amulets produced in the *wat*, and words announcing the benefits for those who contribute to the building the *wat's bōt* via purchasing[37] them. These benefits include fame, safety, loving kindness (P./T. *mettā,* เมตตา), wealth, success in business or avoiding danger and harm.[38] (pic. 7) Similar inscriptions can be seen on the outside and inside walls of the hall dedicated to the worship of demon Rāhu. They read:

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[37] The correct word is "renting" (T. chau, เช่า) since monks cannot engage in merchandise. This linguistic trick is yet another illustration of the practical relevance of symbols and symbolic proclivity characterizing Thai culture. Though in many wats monks themselves sell the amulets, the actual selling is done by a layman in wat Thāmai.

[38] For a more rounded account, the pictures of movie-stars worshiping religious effigies, paying respect to the abbot or cleaning toilets at the *wat* should also be mentioned as these express the values of lowliness and modesty vis-à-vis religion.

"happiness", "avoiding the danger", "safety", "prosperity", "possessing", "success and well-being", "virtue", "wealth".

An interesting expression of the practices related to these values is represented by the statue of Buddha sitting in the lotus position with his eyes closed, covering his ears. (pic.8) The effigy defies Theravāda iconographic conventions; the position is not listed among the forty standardized positions to depict the Buddha compiled by Prince Paramanuchit Chinorot (พระปรมานุชิตชิโนรส) during the third reign of the Chakri dynasty (A.D. 1824–1851)[39] or in an extended catalogue provided by L. I. Matics in her *Gestures of the Buddha*, which includes 107 gestures.

Luang Pī Uthēn, the abbot, has stated that the effigy, referred to as Phra Pit Hū (พระปิดหู) – the Buddha Covering his Ears, or Phra Pit Khrø (พระปิดเคราะห์) – the Buddha Eliminating *Khrø*, doesn't depict any event of the Buddha's life, the typical point of reference of traditional Theravāda iconography. The symbolic meaning of the statue is to eliminate, unlock, cut off, ward off, dilute bad luck, stars, fate or bad kamma (*khrø, khrøgam,* เคราะห์, เคราะห์กรรม) and "atoning for all wrongdoings".[40] As one informant explained – "If the Buddha doesn't see it, it doesn't exist". Yet the statue is not a symbolic Berkeleyan ontological statement but an autonomous expression of an important, if not the primary, focus of the religious activities and sensibilities of the place. The abbot is famous for his astrological predictions, a practice which the monastic code (P. *Vinaya*) classifies as a violation of rules entailing initial and subsequent meetings of the Community (P. *sanghādisesa*).[41] Also "[p]erforming ceremonies to counteract the influence of the stars" falls under the same category.[42]

Heedless of the canonical dictum, the astrological charts, banners explaining palmistry are ubiquitous here and the Chinese zodiac signs have found their way even to the wat's *uposatha* hall. To get the horoscope reading one has to arrive at the wat before 8 a.m. to pick up the queue number for that day. Signs advertising rituals counteracting the influence of the stars and other adverse powers permeate the place. It would be a mistake to see all this as an individual rebellion against the rules. Palmistry, horoscopes, production of magical amulets, potions, tattoos and other practices of "lower arts" pervade Thai *wats*.

The laxity with regard to this and others monastic rules is typically excused, whether by monastics or laypersons, as acts of help (T. chuai, ช่วย). Monks sell protective amulets to "help" to those who believe in their efficacy. The abbot built the pavilion

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[39] The list is not an absolute authority but deviations from it are very rare.

[40] The statue, as with virtually every object and practice of Thai wats, also has its more doctrinal interpretation. The abbot has explained to me that the closed eyes and covered ears of the Buddha symbolize that the doors through which mental defilements (P. *kilesa*, T. gilēt กิเลส) enter are closed. But none of my informants ever even alluded to this interpretation. Also, as the popular name of the statue suggests, this is not how the effigy is understood.

[41] "Saṅghādisesa are classified as heavy offenses (*garukāpatti*), both because of the seriousness of the offenses themselves and because the procedures of penance, probation, and rehabilitation are burdensome by design, not only for the offender." Thānissaro, *The Buddhist Monastic Code: The Pāṭimokkha Training Rules Translated and Explained,* The Mahāmakuṭa Educational Council 1993, p.136.

[42] Thānissaro, *The Buddhist Monastic Code,* p. 133–134.

for worship of the demon Rāhu to help those who want to worship him.[43] Along with this, wrong decisions, and inappropriate or criminal acts are, in the wider context of Thai society, stereotypically amended as motivated by a wish or need to help someone and the appeal is typically heard. I have no intention to judge the genuineness of this attitude. I am concerned here with a powerful concept which allows people to easily cross the established institutionalized lines, benefit from such transgressions, or ameliorate the graveness of wrongdoings. The concept of "help", resonant with the ego-orientation, elevated status of power and the "flexibility over principle and ideology" overrides institutional guides.

As I have mentioned above, there is a strong tendency in contemporary scholarship to explain away these values and practices, including their advertising, as "prosperity" or "commercial" Buddhism, (T. *phuttha phānit*, พุทธพาณิชย์)[44] symptomatic of "[t]he commercialization of Thai Buddhism [which] is perhaps the single most influential concept defining Thailand's multiple forms of prosperity religion."[45]

Kitiarsa proposes to see "[*p*]*huttha phanit* as the dominant form of commodification of Thai Buddhism" and "a recently-emerging threat to established Buddhism and its institutions."[46]

He also claims that "Thai Buddhism has embraced, rather than rejected or estranged itself from, modernizing and secularizing forces. Thai Buddhist practices are redefined and redirected towards more materialistic and worldly goals in order to situate itself in the hybrid religio-cultural environments. The commercialization of Thai Buddhism (*phuttha phanit*), arguably the Thai variant of Comaroff and Comaroff's[47] occult economy, shows contemporary needs as a key factor in how religion has maintained its strongholds in modern Thai life. Despite criticism and outrage from the Thai middle-class intellectuals and a segment of the Sangha, the cult of the *phuttha phanit* has profoundly shaped the rationality and sensibility of 'being worldly-engaged Buddhists' to the Thais. Pushed by the large-scale merit making industry, the prosperity cult of *phuttha phanit* represents a religo-cultural space where popular Buddhism has converged with the market economy, consumerism, and the quest for personal and cultural identities."[48]

I don't think the commodification thesis does justice to the phenomenon. Contrary to the claim that this commodification is a (post-) modern phenomenon stands

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[43] S. Sutthipan, *Gae Gam Phon Thuk Ānisong Haeng Satthā Jāk Luang Pū Rung Thung Phra Ājān Uthēn*, Borisat Sathāpon Buk Jamgat 2009, p. 87.

[44] See also Justin T. McDaniel, *The Lovelorn Ghost and the Magical Monk*, New York: Columbia University Press 2011, p. 190.

[45] Pattana Kitiarsa, "Buddha Phanit: Thailand's Prosperity Religion and its Commodifying Effect", in Pattana Kitiarsa (ed.): *Religious Commodifications in Asia: Marketing Gods*, London, New York: Routledge 2008, p. 124.

[46] Kitiarsa, "Buddha Phanit", p. 127.

[47] John Comaroff and Jean L. Comaroff, "Occult Economies and the Violence of Abstraction: Notes from the South African Postcolony", in *American Ethnologist* 26 (3, 1999): 279–301; John Comaroff and Jean L. Comaroff, "Millennial Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second Coming", in *Public Culture,* 12 (2, 2000): p. 291–343.

[48] Kitiarsa, "Buddha Phanit", p. 120–121.

historical evidence for the client-like relationship between monks and their lay supporters in the early phases of Buddhist monasticism.[49] Rather than wandering lonely in search of salvation, the early Buddhist monks offered "goods" in terms of services to their lay followers. They "settled in monasteries and became familiar components in the local scene with priest-like functions. This was probably an inevitable process, reaching some kind of mature development about 250 years after the founding of Buddhism."[50]

   Also speaking against the explanations of the commodification and commercialization of Thai Buddhism as a result of either the state authorities' loosening their control over the *sangha*[51] or as an endemic "postmodern" fragmentation and de-centralization of social space,[52] Richard O'Connor[53] has credibly argued that it was exactly the state-imposed national Buddhism and centralized state control over the sangha in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that alienated people from Buddhism and opened a market for variety of "unorthodox" religious forms.[54] In brief, "[i]nstead of seeing this commercialization as a modern phenomenon or a sign of the decline of Buddhism, scholars need to take a historical view and attend to 'multiple ethnographies of multiple Buddhisms.'"[55]

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[49] Gregory Schopen, *Bones, Stones, and Buddhist Monks: Collected Papers on the Anthropology, Epigraphy, and Texts of Monastic Buddhism in India*, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press 1997, passim.

[50] Greg Bailey and Ian Mabbett, *The Sociology of Early Buddhism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003, p. 7–8.

[51] Peter A. Jackson, "Withering Centre Flourishing Margins. Buddhism's Changing Political Roles", in Kevin Hewison, (ed.), *Political Change in Thailand. Democracy and Participation*, London, New York: Routledge 1997, p. 75–93.

[52] James Taylor, "(Post-) Modernity, Remaking Tradition, and the Hybridisation of Thai Buddhism", *Anthropological Forum* 9 (2, 1999), p. 163–187; James Taylor, "Cyber-Buddhism and Changing Urban Space in Thailand" (online), *Space and Culture* 6 (3, 2003; accessed May 2016), p. 292–308, available online at http://sac.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/6/3/292.

[53] Richard A. O'Connor, "Interpreting Thai Religious Change: Temples, Sangha Reform and Social Change", *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 24 (2, 1993), p. 330–339.

[54] "The other impetus, centralizing Sangha reforms, countered the wat's localism but failed to win control of religion. What it did was turn the laity out of the wat, breaking them out of communities and making them into religious free agents. That created a clientele for today's religious entrepreneurs, lay and monastic alike." O'Connor, "Interpreting Thai Religious Change", p. 335.

[55] McDaniel, *The Lovelorn Ghost and the Magical Monk*, p. 193. The "commercialization" thesis makes also unrealistic presumptions about contemporary Thai Buddhism. Even in its most modest and sober forms, as for example Luang Pō Teean's lineage dismissal of all forms of superstitions, material excesses and distractions from meditation practice, make the concerns of prosperity and well-being part of its rhetoric: "When awareness comes in to know the body and mind, then all things are stopped or 'tamed'. This is the result of being aware of the body and mind. This is the most complete development of life: all suffering disappears, one gains good health and (even) the economy goes better. … I am not boasting, but since I have been practicing I hardly ever get sick, my health is really excellent. It is because of the improvement of life, and I am looking after it. The Dhamma will protect one. The Dhamma inevitably looks after the practitioner." Kamkee-an Suvanno, *Watching: Not 'Being': Developing Awareness According to the Practice of Loo-ang Por Tee-an Cittasubho*, compiled and translated by Venerable Tone (Tony) Jinavamso (Antoine van der Bom), 2006, p. 168.

Historical circumstances shape the "commodification of religion" and can make it more or less pronounced, but they do not cause it. An ideology of materially unproductive monastics who are economically dependent on the laity cannot be divorced from the concerns of prosperity or hostile to the production of surplus.[56] Buddhist monks are a source of magical power (*sagsit*) and merit (T. *bun*, บุญ) in which the laity can share, and thus keep the exchange going. The "center-periphery dialectics", to borrow Tambiah's[57] term for the mutual legitimization of other- and this-worldly orientations in one religious system, is an adaptation, not a mere historical contingency.

Critics of the practices performed at wat Thāmai point out that the originally ethical law of *kamma* has been turned into a quasi-material substance marketed and manipulated as any other commodity. The roots of this of reification of kamma, however are not a mere rhizome in the soil of post-modern "commodity logic" but go deep into our cognitive structures.

Justin Barrett coined the term "theological correctness"[58] for multiple representations of religious concepts in single individual.[59] He has experimentally demonstrated that subjects who explicitly hold the notion of God as an intangible formless, omnipresent and omnipotent being, in practical everyday situations tend to impose on God human limitations, e.g., serially attending to actions instead of performing them at once. This proclivity of the mind to transform cognitively costly, abstract concepts into more intuitive forms has been explained through the "dual-processing" model of reasoning in which disparate conditions – practical everyday situations on the one hand and reflective times unaffected by real-time exigencies on the other – affect the representations of abstract concepts. In everyday practical situations our mind tends to push abstract concepts towards one of the five ontological categories – the broadest categories into which we organize our perception of the world.

Barrett focuses on anthropomorphism – i.e., the process of attributing human-like characteristics to an abstract concept, approximating thus the ontological category of person. But it is plausible that, when such a move is blocked for conceptual reasons, (as, for example, by the fundamental Buddhist dictum that there is no I, no Self,

[56] See BAILEY and MABBETT, *The Sociology of Early Buddhism*, p. 66 ff.
[57] STANLEY J. TAMBIAH, *The Buddhist saints of the Forest and the Cult of Amulets: A Study in Charisma, Hagiography, Sectarianism, and Millennial Buddhism*, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press 1984, p. 183 ff.
[58] "I propose one may think of religious concepts as lying on the continuum of abstractness or cognitive complexity. Orthodox theological dogma of a tradition or culture (typically) anchors the complex end of the continuum. On the simple or concrete end is naïve intuitive knowledge about things in the world and the causal relationships that govern them. In between these endpoints lie religious concepts as actually represented by individuals and groups of individuals. They range between the two anchors depending on the cognitive demands of a particular context." JUSTIN L. BARRETT, "Theological Correctness: Cognitive Constrains and the Study of Religion", *Method & Theory in the Study of Religion* 11 (4, 1999): p. 325. See also JUSTIN L. BARRETT, "Cognitive Constraints on Hindu Concepts of Divine", *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 37 (4, 1998): p. 608–619.
[59] BARRETT, "Theological Correctness", p. 325.

(P. *anattā*)) the change will be directed towards one of the four remaining ontological categories – animal, plant, tool, or natural object.

This general human tendency to make abstract religious concepts more intuitive and manipulable in day-to-day situations exists, commercialization or not.[60] Its understanding helps balance the over-accentuation of concepts like "commodification" in the explanations of religious representations and practices.

The rituals routinely performed at wat Thāmai manipulate impersonal powers. They neutralize, improve (T. *gae*, แก้) or magically unlock (T. *sadɵ,* สะเดาะ) people's kamma (T. *gam*, กรรม), bad luck (T. *khrɵ*, เคราะห์) or bad-luck-kamma (T. *khrɵgam,* เคราะห์กรรม) rather than interact with intentional agents. This may be ascribed to the fundamental Buddhist anti-agentive conceptual framework based on the central teaching of *anattā* (no-I, no-Self) which steers the transformation of kamma away from gods, demons, and other intentional agents and towards the direction of impersonal, malleable, inanimate matter.

Explaining these rituals, officiant monks as well as their clients, whether at wat Thāmai or elsewhere, used the terms associated with material substances. Kamma was being diffused, scattered, powdered (T. tham hai gamgrajāi, ทำให้กรรมกระจาย).[61] Also the precautions taken against bad kamma leaving the body during the ritual indicates that it is represented as a malleable material object rather than a restructured abstract pattern. The term "*khrɵgam*" reveals that despite scholars' emphasis on the "ethical", law-like nature of kamma, its popular representation has merged seamlessly with the concepts of amoral powers affecting peoples' lives.[62] Similar to the concept of "bad luck (T. *khrɵ*, เคราะห์)" the word "kamma" is used, in the Thai context, mostly in a negative sense, meaning bad kamma. It is a reversion of the values displayed on the banners, posters, and walls of the wat's buildings.

The cultural success of rituals improving ones' existential status will to a large extent depend on the range of situations which the culture attributes to impersonal forces as opposed to individuals' will and acts. In Thai culture the scale is surprisingly wide. An author of a popular book on *sadɵkhrɵ* lists these situations as an illustration of "*khrɵ* understood in broader sense of *kamma*":

"[S]uffering from a series of unpleasant events, bad health, unexpected spending, losing job and difficulties to find a new one, broken family, misbehaving child, being abandoned by one's spouse, becoming addicted to substances and gambling, becoming a victim of bad temptations, all the things that make your life to sink down."[63]

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[60] See also MILOŠ HUBINA, "Preliminaries to the Study of Sadokhro Rituals: How Rituals make People Better Buddhists", *Studia Orientalia Slovaca* 16 (1, 2017): p. 43–67.

[61] Monks never used the word "elimination" since the ultimate dealing away with *kamma* is still the sole prerogative of meditation.

[62] Kitiarsa, among others, notes: "When it is translated into practice, karma is usually perceived as 'karmically determined fate' (khro kam), which guides people to either fortunate or unfortunate ways." KITIARSA, "Buddha Phanit", p. 133.

[63] GAEWTHĀRĀ, "Sadɵkhrɵ" Duei Ton Ēng Hen Phon Than Tā, Samnak Pim Yōn Rōi 2013, p. 11.

It seems to me that gambling, addiction to substances, misbehavior of one's children, a broken family, or being abandoned by one's spouse, would, in a Western context, only be attributed to external, impersonal conditions with great difficulties. The elements of personal responsibility (though not necessarily that of the victim, and accompanied by recognition of social contributors) would prevail over "circumstances" or "powers".

I am unaware of a comparative study on agency attribution[64] but Nisbet *et al*'s[65] concepts of "holistic thought"[66] and "field dependence" developed in the context of comparative studies of East Asians might be relevant also in this cultural area. The concepts refer to the heightened attention paid to the context or "field" among East Asians when compared to Americans. Presenting a body of evidence for the phenomenon in both perceptual and reasoning processes, Nisbett *et al* have further proposed that "[i]t seems reasonable to assume that people attribute causality to the events they attend to. If Westerners attend to the object, we would expect them to attribute causality to the object. If East Asians attend to the field and the object's relations with the field, it seems likely that they would be more inclined to attribute causality to context and situations. Each of these expectations is supported by a substantial amount of evidence."[67] A virtually unlimited net of causal links makes the field an under-determined area where "anything goes". An interesting question then is whether the "high contingency quotient" reported by Spiro[68] among the Burmese,[69] "tolerance for ambiguity", "flexibility and adjustment orientation", and "flexibility over principle and ideology" identified by Komin among the Thais might indicate the influence of the same oversaturated background which permits a much greater share of uncontrolled post-hoc interpretation and causal attribution, and less prediction, long-term planning, and personal responsibility.

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[64] Though Barrett refers to a specific "agent-centered social cognition of American adults". JUSTIN L. BARRETT, "Bringing Data to Mind: Empirical Claims of Lawson and McCauley's Theory of Religious Ritual", in T. LIGHT and B. C. WILSON (eds.), *Religion as a Human Capacity: A Festschrift in Honor of E. Thomas Lawson*, Leiden, Boston: Brill 2004, p. 284.

[65] RICHARD E. NISBETT, KAIPING PENG, INCHEOL CHOI and ARA NORENZAYAN, "Culture and Systems of Thought: Holistic Versus Analytic Cognition", *Psychological Review* 108 (2, 2001): p. 291–310.

[66] Nisbett *et al* define "holistic thought" as "involving an orientation to the context or field as a whole, including attention to relationships between a focal object and the field, and a preference for explaining and predicting events on the basis of such relationships. Holistic approaches rely on experience-based knowledge rather than on abstract logic and are dialectical, meaning that there is an emphasis on change, recognition of contradiction and of the need for multiple perspectives, and a search for the "Middle Way" between opposing propositions. Nisbett *et al.*, "Culture and Systems of Thought", p. 293.

[67] Nisbett *et al.*, "Culture and Systems of Thought", p. 298.

[68] MELFORD E. SPIRO, *Buddhism and Society: A Great Tradition and its Burmese Vicissitudes*, Second expanded edition, Berkeley: University of California 1982 (first published 1970), p. 89.

[69] "Almost invariably, the answer to any question concerning a villager's habits, his likes and dislikes … or almost anything else, concludes with such common refrains as: 'That is the way I feel now, but I can't tell about the future,' … The Burmese view not only their own inner states as evanescent but look upon interpersonal relationships in the same manner." SPIRO, *Buddhism and Society*, p. 89–90.

Summation

I have argued against productivity of interpreting living Buddhism through the prism of doctrinal tradition and made a case for its understanding as an extension of established cultural practices. As a part of a culture, living Buddhism is based in its system of values and, as with all cultures, constrained by our general cognitive mechanisms. "Buddhism" in such a context is a taxonomical rather than essentialist category identifiable, rather than definable through specific doctrinal concepts.

This outlook is minor in Theravāda studies dominated by socio-cultural paradigm and the theories of syncretism which "rest on the assumption that there is one thing that can be described as pure Brahmanism or Theravada that has been polluted, diluted, or borrowed."[70]

McDaniel's alternative to this model is flawed by its disregard for the psychological embedding of the surrounding culture. I have suggested three corrections, which altogether entail the necessity of integrating socio-cultural and cognitive studies of religion. This integration balances a possible over-accentuation of either cultural or cognitive concepts in explaining religious phenomena. Cognitive and other psychological studies can also provide a causal explanation for socio-cultural models. The force with which "animistic" traditions in Southeast Asia erode the better institutionalized Buddhism and the ease with which practices incongruent with basic Buddhist notions take roots in it can be ascribed to the general human tendency to spontaneously modify abstract concepts into more intuitive forms via approximating one of the ontological categories. The same tendency can be used to explain reification of kamma and its ritualistic manipulation which in traditional socio-cultural studies are typically attributed to (post-) modern "commodity logic" or "fragmentation and de-centralization of social space".

Throughout the text I understood the cognitive constraints as the broadest and most stable framework nesting cultural structures. I don't mean to imply a rigid "stratigraphic"[71] view here and I recognize the possibility of cultural structures' off-setting the cognitive constraints.

These complex cultural, cognitive, and environmental structures create a "stabilizing dint" for religious phenomena. I have explained how the similarity of novel practices with the established routines and notions may increase the probability of their recall and thus increase their chances in cultural competition. Similarity of course is not the only way novel phenomena can become stabilized. The study of the nature and functioning of the stabilizing dint is only in its nascent phase and though much of my proposal remains speculative, it is a kind of speculation which, unlike self-contained socio-cultural interpretations, permits empirical testing.

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[70] McDaniel, *The Lovelorn Ghost and the Magical Monk,* p. 15.
[71] Armin W. Geertz, "The Meaningful Brain: Clifford Geertz and the Cognitive Science of Culture", in Dimitris Xygalatas and William W. McCorkle (eds.), *Mental Culture: Classical Social Theory and the Cognitive Science of Religion*, Durham: Acumen 2013, p. 178; Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, New York: Basic Books 1973, p. 37ff.

I have illustrated my proposals through the example of a famous Thai *wat* – wat Thāmai. De-emphasis of the doctrine in my account impacted upon the way I suggest seeing the effigies, visuals, and architecture of the *wat*. Instead of being symbolic expressions of doctrinal tenets, they have, in real people's representations, an advertising and ritualistic function.

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About a Boy Club Movement, Implicit Religion and a Local Czech and Slovak Transmedia Phenomenon (review)

Zuzana Kostićová

A Czech Religious studies scholar and Protestant theologian Pavel Hošek has been becoming more and more focused on implicit religious phenomena and their presence in literature and popular culture in the last few years. After years of analyzing C. S. Lewis' and J. R. R. Tolkien's texts and their religious implications, Hošek suddenly turned his attention to Czech young adult literature and to Jaroslav Foglar, its most celebrated author. The result of this new interest is a little book called *Evangelium podle Jaroslava Foglara* ("Gospel According to Jaroslav Foglar").

While Jaroslav Foglar is not widely known outside of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, he is literally the most famous and most influential Czech author of young adult literature. As a young man, Foglar got acquainted with the Scouts movement (also the Wandervogel movement and the Czech organization Junák, similar to the Scouts). Although he was already too mature to engage in the movement in the role of a child, he became active as a leader and literally spent his entire life dedicating himself to educating boys. Even though he was greatly loved and respected both as a Scouts leader and a journalist working for children's magazines (also as a writer of a long comic book series, on which he cooperated with two illustrators, Jan Fischer and Marko Čermák), his by far most important contribution to the Czech culture lay in his novels. Mostly intended for boys of the age around thirteen, the books speak not only about nature and adventure, but also noble friendship, cultivation of character, perseverance and high moral values that every boy should strive to attain. Many of his critics pointed out that Foglar's books are filled with outright moralizing. Nevertheless, the popularity of the novels among children clearly shows that Foglar was uniquely gifted not only to create a magical atmosphere of dark, old cities filled with mystery and breathtakingly beautiful wild landscape, but also to present morality and nobleness of character to children in such a way that not only they devoured his books, but actively tried to bring what they read to life.

This is precisely Pavel Hošek's launching point. The imaginative mystique and moral dimension of the books create a world in itself, closely intertwined with actual practices of the Scouts and Junáks; literally thousands of boys were deeply influenced by them. Hošek presents Foglar's world as a unique and specifically Czech type of implicit religion for boys (and, although they perhaps were not Foglar's main target group, also girls). Inspired by Ninian Smart's famous *Dimensions of the sacred*, Hošek proceeds to analyze the phenomenon of "Foglaring" as a coherent worldview, functionally equivalent to religion. He analyzes the rites of passage, especially the initia-

tions that took place in his Junák troop and that are backed up by narratives that can be found in Foglar's novels and comic books. For example, the "thirteen beavers", an equivalent of the Scouts' badges, are based on a story of a Wild West boy Roy told in Foglar's *Hoši od Bobří řeky* (*Beaver River Boys*) novel. Importantly, these initiations are not only a kind of "award", but should lead to a deep personal transformation not wholly unlike to a religious one. In this sense, Hošek shows that the initiation process is strongly related both to landscape (whether it's a dark city or wilderness of a breathtaking beauty) and to encounter with death.

In this sense, these rites and narratives are strongly intertwined with actual experiences that the boys live through both in the troop and in the club life. This is another important dimension of Foglaring – were it confined only to the official troop lead by Foglar, it would have been a very short-lived phenomenon. Instead, the author, inspired by the Wandervogel movement, created a concept of a boy club, a group of friends led by the oldest and most responsible of the children (i.e. not created by an adult, but by the children themselves). Foglar actively supported the actual creation of these clubs on the pages of the boys' magazines he wrote for. Moreover, the protagonists of many of his novels were members of such clubs; the most important case of course being the five boys from the Rychlé šípy (Fast Arrows) club featured in Foglar's most famous novel *Záhada hlavolamu* (*The Puzzle Mystery*) and its two sequels. Even during both Nazi and Communist regime with their strict prohibition of Foglar's work, these children clubs continued to appear spontaneously in secret and the novels were discreetly passed from family to family and devoured by hundreds of children. Moreover, even though Foglar's books were intended for boys and in most cases features no female characters, significant or not (notable exceptions being Vlasta from the comic series and the girls from *Historie Svorné sedmy* novel), girls actually actively read his books and some of them spontaneously organized in clubs as well. The club experience was related to a place (klubovna, "clubhouse") and to the club's history, meticulously recorded in a chronicle. Hošek convincingly shows how these phenomena perfectly match Smart's institutional dimension of the sacred and how even the material dimension gets its say in the form of visual signs of club membership (most famously depicted as the yellow pins in *Záhada hlavolamu*) and "sacred" objects of the club (from club flag and souvenirs and club trips and camps to the most sacred of all, the club chronicle).

The club or troop environment, the specific initiations devised by Foglar, the deeply moving experiences created both by the reading of the novels and the actual trips to dark city alleys or stunning countryside, all of this was devised to incite a profound transformation of the character. Average, boring, and meaningless life of wandering through city streets with no aim or goal is left aside and a new life emerges; a life of noble deeds, intense, often almost mystical experiences, and a high moral code. This "new, better life" (or "blue life", as put in the *Rychlé šípy* comic series) is often personified by a concrete protagonist of the novels described as noble or "knightly", such as Mirek Dušín or Vláďa Dratuš in *Rychlé šípy* novels or Ludva Grygar in *Chata v Jezerní kotlině* (*The Lake Hollow Hut*). These exceptional boys then serve as role models for their friends and an embodiment of the ideal boy of Foglar's books.

This type of approach to Foglar's books is complemented by two chapters; one dedicated to a comparison with Tolkien's fairytale stories theory and one that analyzes Foglar in the light of C. S. Lewis' idea of lifechanging effects of reading. Despite of the fact that Foglar's imagination is firmly rooted in the real world of here and now and in this sense, it is far from the imaginative worlds of Lewis and Tolkien, the comparisons hold well. Nevertheless, from the perspective of Religious studies, the core of Hošek's book remains the analysis of Foglar's works in the perspective of the *Dimensions of the Sacred*. Hošek reinforces his arguments by showing that at least in one documented case of Radko Kadlec, later Father Bernard, the seeds sown by Foglar bloomed in a full-fledged conversion to Christianity in young adulthood.

In sum, Pavel Hošek's new book becomes a must-read for anyone interested in Czech popular culture and its religious or implicit religious content. In the context of a boom of interest of Religious studies scholars in popular culture and its comic books, pulp journals, videogames and other similar phenomena, it is only too easy to be swept by the current that focuses mainly on the United States and Western Europe, forgetting the specificity of local environment. It is no exaggeration to say that for a Czech or Slovak child, Foglar is just as important as C. S. Lewis or the creators of Batman for a Western one. And this is not only true for the generations that went through their childhood during the Nazi and Communist periods, but increasingly so for the current generations that experienced the boom of publishing of Foglar's books after the Velvet Revolution. Moreover, the nineties with their new reprints of the comic series, relaunching of the old 1969 TV series *Záhada hlavolamu* (which was prohibited by the Communists) and the new 1993 movie transformed Foglar's world into a summarily important Czech transmedial phenomenon, coupled with a new emergence of Foglar-style troops and children's clubs. In this sense, Pavel Hošek's book may be of interest not only to Czech scholars and enthusiasts, but also to a wider international audience studying both implicit religion and religion in the media and popular culture.

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